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The discovery and successful development of a technology innovation requires 
dual capabilities to both explore new knowledge as well as to exploit existing knowledge 
(March 1991). Innovation, therefore, requires an ambidextrous knowledge creation 
strategy, defined as the simultaneous pursuit of both exploration and exploitation 
(O’Reilly and Tushman 2008, Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009, Raisch and Birkinshaw 
2008, Lavie et. al 2010, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). While the benefits of 
ambidexterity at the firm level are well-accepted, that is, the benefits of diversifying 
exploration and exploitation across different organizational sub-units or functional 
domains, there is a call for a more granular task-level examination of the ambidexterity 
phenomenon (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). In response to this call, this thesis considers 
the challenges of pursuing an ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy.  This research 
generates insights for synchronizing exploration and exploitation activities within an 
innovation project. It has particular importance for understanding and managing the 
dynamic evolution and resolution of uncertainty during the innovation process.  
A temporal ambidexterity strategy is one in which a single organizational unit 
dynamically balances its investments in exploration and exploitation over time (Brown 
and Eisenhardt 1997, Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003).  All three essays, presented herein, 
provide new insights on various factors which should be considered when developing and 
executing a temporal ambidextrous strategy. In the first essay (Chapter 2), I examine the 
impact of exploration, exploitation and learning from cumulative innovation experience 
on the likelihood of successfully versus unsuccessfully generating a breakthrough 
innovation. The first essay provides empirical support for the two analytical essays which 
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follow. Specifically, I demonstrate three important tenets for developing a theory of 
temporal ambidexterity. First, I confirm, as conceptually expected (March 1991), that 
when pursued independently, exploration and exploitation have opposing variance-
generating versus variance-reducing impacts on innovation performance, respectively. 
Second, I show that exploration and exploitation have a negative interaction effect on 
innovation performance. So that, in the short-term, jointly pursuing exploration and 
exploitation reduces the likelihood of an innovation breakthrough. Third, I find that the 
benefits of ambidexterity accrue in the long-term, as a result of learning from prior failure 
experience. This result provides empirical support for the benefits implied by the 
innovation management mantra: “fail fast, fail often”. However, I also demonstrate the 
boundary conditions of learning from failure. Specifically, I demonstrate that prior failure 
experience and exploitation are jointly necessary, but not independently sufficient, for 
learning from failure to occur. Furthermore, the empirical results also demonstrate the 
potential for succumbing to either an “exploration failure trap” or an “exploitation 
success trap”, with cumulative failure and success experience, respectively. In summary, 
the results of Essay 1 demonstrate that pursuing an ambidextrous knowledge creation 
strategy necessitates a delicate balancing act, in order to manage the short-term and long-
term benefits, and perils, of exploration, exploitation and prior innovation experience. 
In Essay 2 (Chapter 3), I introduce a dynamic optimization model of temporal 
ambidexterity, which extends the empirical findings from Essay 1 (Chapter 2). I examine 
the optimal sequencing of exploration and exploitation knowledge creation activities 
throughout the innovation process. I consider how an innovation manager’s optimal 
dynamic investments in exploration and exploitation are driven by the innovation team’s 
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knowledge creation capabilities and prior innovation experience, and by the manager’s 
short-term and long-term innovation risk objectives. The results demonstrate the 
conditions under which various temporal ambidexterity strategies endogenously arise. 
Interestingly, I show that the colloquial “fail early, fail cheap” strategy, that is a strategy 
focused on early variance-generating exploration, is the optimal strategy for a risk-averse 
manager, when the innovation team’s prior experience is such that the team is initially 
able to generate a predictable, but limited, range of innovation performance outcomes, 
and given low marginal costs of exploration.  
Finally, in Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I extend the single firm model introduced in Essay 
2 (Chapter 3), to develop a model of temporal ambidexterity for two firms jointly 
pursuing knowledge creation and knowledge-sharing under co-opetition. Here, I consider 
how co-opetition, that is, cooperative knowledge-sharing with a competitor, impacts a 
firm’s optimal ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy. Specifically, I compare the 
optimal knowledge creation and knowledge-sharing strategies under two competitive 
regimes: (i) competition to achieve the best relative performance (risk-seeking) and (ii) 
competition to avoid the worst relative performance (risk-averse). I consider two-way 
knowledge sharing, and I assume that each firm freely reveals its knowledge to its 
competitor, without receiving compensation. The dynamic analytical results contribute to 
the open questions regarding optimal knowledge-sharing strategies under co-opetition by 
demonstrating not only “how much” and “what knowledge should be shared” but, also 
“when” and “under what conditions” knowledge-sharing with a co-opetitive partner is 
beneficial (Loebecke et al. 1999). Importantly, I analytically examine the factors which 
drive empirically observed alliance dysfunctions, wherein organizations delay 
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knowledge-sharing and withhold information from their alliance partners (Hamel 1991, 




             CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This research aims to deepen our understanding of the knowledge creation 
challenges which occur during the innovation process. The discovery and successful 
development of a technology innovation requires dual capabilities to both explore new 
knowledge as well as to exploit existing knowledge (March 1991). Innovation, therefore, 
requires an ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy, defined as the simultaneous 
pursuit of both exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly and Tushman 2008, Andriopoulos 
and Lewis 2009, Lavie et. al 2010, Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Lavie et. al 2010, 
O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). However, exploration and exploitation have opposing 
variance-generating versus variance-reducing effects on innovation outcomes. As such, 
they have been characterized as conflicting modes of knowledge creation, which require 
different skills and processes, and which are difficult to pursue simultaneously, in the 
same space and/or time. At the same time, at the firm level, exploration and exploitation 
have been shown to have complementary effects (He and Wong 2004), which suggests 
that they should be pursued together in some optimal balance (March 1991).  
While the benefits of ambidexterity at the firm level are well-accepted (Lavie et. 
al 2010, Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Lavie et. al 2010, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013), 
that is, the benefits of diversifying exploration and exploitation across different 
organizational sub-units or functional domains, there is a call for a more granular task-
level examination of the ambidexterity phenomenon (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). In 
response to this call, this thesis considers the challenges of pursuing an ambidextrous 
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knowledge strategy within a single innovation project. As opposed to an organizational 
ambidexterity strategy, which balances exploration and exploitation across various 
organizational units or functional domains, a temporal ambidexterity strategy is one in 
which a single organizational unit dynamically balances its investments in exploration 
and exploitation over time (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003).  
All three essays, presented herein, provide new insights on various factors which should 
be considered when developing and executing a temporal ambidexterity strategy. 
The first essay (Chapter 2) is an empirical study that examines the impact of 
pursuing an ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy on innovation performance 
outcomes. Based on a sample of patents, granted for innovations in the biomedical device 
industry, I examine how firms can effectively synchronize exploration and exploitation, 
in order to maximize the upside potential for innovation success while minimizing the 
downside risk of failures.  For the purposes of this study, I refer to an innovation as a 
success if the innovation process results in the creation of a breakthrough innovation, 
which is evaluated as having above-average technological value (i.e., an extreme right-
tail realization), relative to a population of comparable innovations. Conversely, I define 
an innovation outcome as a failure when the innovation is evaluated as having below-
average technological value (i.e., an extreme left-tail realization), relative to a population 
of comparable innovations. 
Two competing views exist on the most effective strategies for improving the 
likelihood of success from exploration, while mitigating the associated high levels of 
uncertainty and failure. One view advocates pursuing an ambidextrous strategy. As an 
alternative, other researchers suggest that, instead of simultaneously pursuing 
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exploitation in order to reduce risks of exploration, managers should actively embrace the 
uncertainty associated with exploration. Researchers and practitioners argue that, while 
exploration may lead to failure in the short-term, failures improve the likelihood of 
generating breakthrough innovations in the long-term. Consistent with this view, 
innovation incentive structures and funding systems which embrace uncertainty and 
exhibit a high tolerance for failure are encouraged (Tian and Wang 2011, Azoulay et al. 
2011). This notion, regarding the benefits of failure, is promoted in the often-cited 
innovation mantra: “fail fast, fail often” (Thomke 2001). Yet, according to Cannon and 
Edmonson (2001): “Despite the importance of learning from failure, however, it is more 
common in exhortation than in practice, and our understanding of the conditions under 
which it occurs is limited.” (p.161). 
The results of Essay 1 (Chapter 2) provide a critical link between theories of 
ambidexterity and theories of learning from failure. I show that exploration and 
exploitation improve innovation performance through two separate pathways:                
(i) exploration directly increases the likelihood of a successfully generating a 
breakthrough innovation and (ii) exploitation and prior failure experience jointly increase 
the likelihood of generating a breakthrough innovation. Therefore, I demonstrate the 
critical role of exploitation for enabling learning from prior failure experience. These 
results suggest that, rather than being alternate strategies for improving innovation 
performance, in fact, ambidexterity and learning from failure are complementary 
processes which operate in tandem.  
I also demonstrate other features salient to understanding the paradoxical 
challenges of ambidexterity. First, I demonstrate that exploration increases the variance 
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of innovation outcomes, as well as the likelihood of generating a breakthrough. The 
opposite is true for exploitation. Second, I demonstrate a negative interaction effect 
between exploration and exploitation, which highlights the challenge of pursuing 
ambidexterity. Third, I demonstrate that prior success experience can lead to an 
“exploitation success trap”. Finally, I find that prior failure experience can lead to an 
“exploration failure trap”. Collectively, the results illustrate that pursuing an 
ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy necessitates a delicate balancing act, in order 
to manage the short-term and long-term benefits, and perils, of exploration, exploitation, 
and learning from failure. 
In Essay 2 (Chapter 3), I introduce a dynamic optimization model of temporal 
ambidexterity, which extends the empirical findings from Essay 1 (Chapter 2). The model 
considers the manager of an innovation team who invests in exploration and exploitation 
during the innovation process. The uncertain nature of the development activities is 
captured in terms of the mean and variance of the distribution of possible innovation 
performance outcomes. The manager must determine how to balance the variance-
generating effects of exploration against the variance-reducing effects of exploitation. A 
key feature of the dynamic model is the consideration of the innovation team’s absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), which is a function of its prior innovation 
experience. Absorptive capacity can both improve as well as constrain the path for future 
learning. I assume that past exploration generates future opportunities for exploitation 
(Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, Lavie et al. 2010). On the other hand, past exploitation 
tends to reduce opportunities for further exploitation (Fleming 2001). Furthermore, I 
assume a lagged realization of the performance benefits of exploration. Importantly, I 
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consider how the manager’s decision to invest in exploration and exploitation is impacted 
by his short-term versus long-term risk objectives. These dynamic risk preferences are a 
function of the level of technical uncertainty which remains unresolved at a given point in 
time during the innovation process. I examine the optimal sequencing of knowledge 
creation activities, and provide examples where either the typical explore-then-exploit 
sequential strategy or the atypical exploit-then-explore sequential strategy is optimal. 
Interestingly, I show that the colloquial “fail early, fail cheap” strategy, that is a strategy 
focused on early variance-generating exploration, is the optimal strategy for a risk-averse 
manager, when the innovation team’s prior experience is such that the team is initially 
able to generate a predictable, but limited, range of innovation performance outcomes, 
and given low marginal costs of exploration.  
In Essay 3, (Chapter 4) I extend the model of temporal ambidexterity, introduced 
in Essay 2 (Chapter 3), to introduce a differential game model of knowledge-sharing 
between two rival firms.  In the third essay, I consider how co-opetition, that is, 
cooperative knowledge-sharing with a competitor, impacts a firm’s optimal ambidextrous 
knowledge creation strategy. A firm can participate in knowledge-sharing alliances in 
order to explore new technological opportunities, as well as to improve the ability to 
exploit its existing capabilities. Therefore, I consider two alternative types of alliances:  
(i) an exploration knowledge-sharing alliance and (ii) an exploitation knowledge-sharing 
alliance. Based on March’s (1991) framework of competition for relative position in a 
right-tail race versus in a left-tail race, I compare the optimal knowledge creation and 
knowledge-sharing strategies under two different competitive performance regimes:       
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(i) competition to achieve the best relative performance (risk-seeking) and (ii) 
competition to avoid the worst relative performance (risk-averse). 
I examine the optimal sequencing of exploration and exploitation activities, under 
both types of alliances, and provide examples where either the typical explore-then-
exploit sequential strategy or the atypical exploit-then-explore sequential strategy may be 
optimal under co-opetition. For both the exploration and exploitation knowledge-sharing 
alliance, I consider two-way knowledge sharing in which I assume that each firm freely 
reveals its knowledge to its competitor, without receiving compensation. As a result of 
this modeling assumption, I am able to gain a better understanding of a firm’s incentives 
for free-revealing and participating in cooperative innovation with its competitor (Von 
Hippel and von Krogh 2003, 2006).  Importantly, the analytical results provide insights 
on how a firm should optimally manage its knowledge sharing exchanges, in order to 
balance the potential benefits of cooperation, against the potential threat of being “out-
learned and out-competed by the competitor-partner” (Gnyawali and Park 2011, p. 657). 
The results also provide a better understanding of the motivating factors which drive 
empirically observed alliance dysfunctions, wherein organizations delay knowledge-
sharing and withhold information from their alliance partners (Hamel 1991, Khanna et al. 
1998, Müller 2010).  
Collectively, all three essays provide insights for managers tasked with allocating 
knowledge creation resources during the innovation process (Gaimon and Bailey 2012). 
Specifically, this research generates insights for synchronizing exploration and 
exploitation activities within an innovation project. It has particular importance for 
understanding and managing the dynamic evolution and resolution of uncertainty during 
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the innovation process. The findings presented herein will enable innovation managers to 
more effectively leverage the benefits of an ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy, 
by taking into consideration issues related to risk-management, short-term and long-term 
performance tradeoffs, learning from prior innovation experience and leveraging external 
knowledge sources under competition. An innovation process in which exploration 
precedes exploitation has been accepted as the typical sequence of knowledge creation 
activities, however, the findings of these three studies suggest conditions under which 
alternate strategies may be optimal. This suggests that a more adaptive approach is 
required when synchronizing exploration and exploitation knowledge creation activities 










2. THE AMBIDEXTERITY PARADOX: BALANCING THE 
BENEFITS AND PERILS OF EXPLORATION, EXPLOITATION 
AND LEARNING FROM FAILURE 
2.1 Introduction 
Firms which are able to successfully undertake the process of innovation can reap 
benefits in terms of competitive advantage (Barney 1991), increased financial returns 
(Sorescu et al. 2003) and improved market value (Kelm et al. 1995, Sood and Tellis 
2009).  To demonstrate the potential returns from successful innovation, consider the 
global market for medical devices which was estimated to be worth more than $200 
billion dollars at a mid-2000 estimate (Denend and Zenios 2006). Several high profile 
examples illustrate the financial benefits which result from innovation breakthroughs 
within the medical devices industry. For example, Boston Scientific Corporation’s access 
to license the patent for a breakthrough innovation for cardiac stents, branded Taxus, was 
estimated to potentially double the medical device firm’s $3.5 billion annual revenues 
(Kerber 2004). Similarly, in 2011 Medtronic acquired medical device developer Ardian 
for $800 million, namely to gain access to its breakthrough renal denervation system 
branded Simplicity (Businesswire 2010).  While in 2013, IDEV Technologies, which 
develops next generation medical devices, was acquired by Abbott for $310 million 
primarily to gain proprietary access to its stent system branded Supera Veritas (Abbott 
Laboratories 2013).  
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Given their potential to generate significant firm value, researchers have sought to 
better understand the sources of breakthrough innovations. Hereafter, we refer to an 
innovation as a success if the innovation process results in the creation of a breakthrough 
innovation, which is evaluated as having above-average technological value (i.e., an 
extreme right-tail realization), relative to a population of comparable innovations 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990). Conversely, we define an innovation outcome as a 
failure when the innovation is evaluated as having below-average technological value 
(i.e., an extreme left-tail realization), relative to a population of comparable innovations.  
The degree to which a firm chooses to focus on exploration, that is, broad search and 
recombination across multiple knowledge domains to generate new knowledge, versus 
exploitation, that is building on existing knowledge domains (March 1991), has been 
identified as a critical predictor of inter-firm differences in innovation performance (He 
and Wong 2004, Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). However, March (1991) cautions against 
the dangers of pursuing either mode of knowledge creation in excess. 
While exploration, that is the search for new knowledge across multiple, 
knowledge domains, has been empirically shown to be positively associated with 
generating breakthrough innovations (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001, Katila and Ahuja 
2002), an excessive emphasis on exploration is also expected to increase uncertainty and 
the variance of the distribution of innovation outcomes (March 1991, Fleming and 
Sorenson 2001, He and Wong 2004). As a result, while exploration increases the variance 
and the likelihood of a breakthrough innovation (i.e., the likelihood of realizing an 
extreme right tail outcome) the increased variance is also expected to increase the 
likelihood of failure (i.e., the likelihood of realizing an extreme left tail outcome). On the 
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other hand, a focus on exploitation of existing knowledge is expected to decrease 
uncertainty and reduce the risk of failure (March 1991). However, an excessive focus on 
exploitation of existing knowledge leads to generating only incremental innovation 
outcomes, with diminishing returns (Sørensen and Stuart 2000, Ahuja and Lampert 
2001).  
Since exploration is accepted as a core requirement for generating breakthrough 
innovations, an obvious question arises: What is the optimal way for innovators to 
mitigate the high levels of risk and uncertainty associated with exploration? Two 
competing views exist on the most effective strategies for improving the likelihood of 
breakthrough success from exploration, while also mitigating the high levels of 
uncertainty and failure associated with exploration. One view advocates pursuing an 
ambidextrous strategy, that is, advocates simultaneously pursuing both exploration and 
exploitation (Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009, Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Lavie et. al 
2010, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). An ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy is 
purported to allow innovators to achieve the best of both worlds, by balancing the 
variance-increasing benefits of increased breakthroughs from exploration with the 
variance-reducing benefits of exploitation (He and Wong 2004). Contrary to the 
ambidexterity view, other researchers and practitioners suggest that, instead of 
simultaneously pursuing exploitation in order to reduce risk and uncertainty of 
exploration, innovators should instead actively embrace the increased uncertainty 
associated with exploration. These researchers argue that, while exploration may lead to 
failure in the short-term, failures provide innovators with the opportunity to improve the 
likelihood of generating successful breakthroughs in the long-term (Cannon and 
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Edmonson 2005).  Consistent with this notion, recent research has shown that 
organizations with incentive structures and funding systems which embrace uncertainty 
and exhibit a higher tolerance for failure yield higher rates of innovation (Tian and Wang 
2011, Azoulay et al. 2011). This view regarding the benefits derived from embracing 
failure is particularly widespread, and is promoted in the often-cited innovation mantra, 
“fail fast, fast often” (Thomke 2001). Nevertheless, the value of failure is not yet well-
understood. According to Cannon and Edmonson (2001): “Despite the importance of 
learning from failure, however, it is more common in exhortation than in practice, and 
our understanding of the conditions under which it occurs is limited.” 
In this paper, we introduce and empirically test a model of knowledge creation 
and ambidexterity and examine questions related to the two competing views discussed 
above. To examine the role of ambidexterity we pose: Do the benefits derived from 
pursuing an ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy outweigh the benefits of 
independently pursuing exploration? What role does exploitation play in an 
ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy? To examine the role of learning we ask: Does 
learning from prior successes and/or learning from prior failures improve the likelihood 
of future successes? Employing a sample of patents in the biomedical devices industry, 
we investigate the impact of exploration, exploitation, prior success experience and prior 
failure experience on future innovation outcomes. Our results highlight the challenges 
and benefits of simultaneously pursuing exploration and exploitation, in the short-term, 
as well as the role of learning from success and learning from failure, for realizing the 
long-term benefits of ambidexterity. 
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Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we confirm that 
exploration increases the likelihood of generating a breakthrough. Furthermore, as 
conceptually expected, we also empirically demonstrate that exploration increases the 
variance (uncertainty) of innovation outcomes. Secondly, while we find that exploitation 
reduces the variance (uncertainty) of innovation outcomes, we also demonstrate that 
exploitation has negative implications for innovation performance, because it reduces the 
likelihood of breakthrough successes. Furthermore, contrary to the studies which 
demonstrate a positive benefit to ambidexterity, at the firm level and at later stages in the 
innovation process, (Katila and Ahuja 2002, He and Wong 2004, Rothaermel and Deeds 
2004, Cao et al. 2009, Chandrasekaran et al. 2011), our results, which focus on the initial 
knowledge creation stage of the innovation process, indicate a negative interaction 
between exploration with exploitation. Moreover, contrary to the proposition that 
innovators learn from failure, our results suggest that innovators learn more readily from 
prior success experience, since we find that prior failure experience has a direct negative 
impact on innovation performance. Interestingly, we demonstrate, through a positive 
interaction term, that prior failure experience along with exploitation are jointly 
necessary, but are not independently sufficient, for learning from failure to occur. In 
essence, we uncover the benefits, as well as the limitations, of exploitation and learning 
from failure. 
Our findings also provide a critical link between theories of ambidexterity and 
theories of learning from failure in the innovation process. We show that exploration and 
exploitation improve innovation performance through two separate pathways:                 
(i) exploration directly increases the likelihood of a success outcome and (ii) exploitation 
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and prior failure experience are jointly necessary, but not independently sufficient, to 
increase the likelihood of a future success outcome. Taken together, the results indicate 
that innovation performance is enhanced by undertaking both exploration and 
exploitation, that is, pursuing ambidexterity, however, the benefits of exploitation accrue 
from the ability to effectively learn from prior failure experience. These results suggest 
that, rather than being alternate strategies for improving innovation performance, in fact, 
ambidexterity and learning from failure are to be seen as complementary processes which 
operate in tandem with each other.  Our results on the benefits of prior failure experience 
also provide support for the veracity of the innovation mantra: “fail fast, fail often” 
(Thomke 2001).  
Our finding on the role of prior success and failure experience, as a moderator in 
the knowledge creation and innovation process, is also an important contribution. 
Although prior research has analytically modeled the role of learning and memory in the 
innovation search process (Jain and Kogut 2013), the impact of learning from experience 
as a moderator in the search process has not been empirically tested. Furthermore, to our 
knowledge, no prior research has simultaneously compared the impact of prior success 
experience and prior failure experience on the generation of subsequent innovation 
breakthroughs. Collectively, our empirical findings and insights contribute to a deeper 
conceptual understanding of knowledge creation, learning and ambidexterity in the 
innovation process.  
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2.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Model of Induced and Autonomous Learning in the Innovation  
We propose a model of the impact of an innovator’s knowledge creation activities 
on the distribution of innovation outcomes. In developing this model, we build on the 
literature related to organizational learning which suggests that induced learning and 
autonomous learning can serve as substitutes and complements for improving 
performance (Adler and Clark 1991, Ittner et al. 2001, West and Iansiti 2003). Our model 
is unique in that we consider the interdependence between induced and autonomous 
learning within the context of the innovation search process. Whereas autonomous 
learning refers to learning-by-doing and recognizes cumulative experience as a source of 
knowledge which contributes to future performance improvements (Yelle 1979, Argote 
1991), induced learning refers to the deliberate activities and investments which are made 
to improve performance. In our model, we consider two alternative induced learning 
activities in the innovation search process: exploration and exploitation (March 1991). 
While the exploration/exploitation tradeoff can be conceptualized as two ends of a 
continuum (Gupta et al. 2006), we follow Katila and Ahuja’s (2002) definition of 
exploration and exploitation as orthogonal. That is, we assume innovators choose to 
invest in varying degrees of exploration as well as varying degrees of exploitation during 
the innovation process, so that they can choose to operate in one of four quadrants within 
this two-dimensional framework. Our choice of representing exploration and exploitation 
as orthogonal measures allows us the flexibility to test two key elements of our model:        
(i) the interaction between exploration and exploitation, as a measure of ambidexterity 
and (ii) the moderating effect of prior innovation experience on the effectiveness of both 
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exploration and exploitation in the knowledge creation and innovation process. We 
introduce our conceptual model below.  
While building cumulative experience, innovators observe both success and 
failure outcomes as a result of previous activities. Based on these outcomes, innovators 
are able to make inferences, which enable them to better predict cause-and-effect, in 
order to improve future performance. The recognition that success and failure outcomes 
each hold idiosyncratic information, has ignited a stream of research in the areas of 
learning from failure and learning from success (Kim et al. 2009, Madsen and Desai 
2010, KC et al. 2013). While most studies have focused on the benefits of either learning 
from failure or learning from success, recent studies have begun to directly compare the 
benefits of learning from failure versus learning from success (Madsen and Desai 2010). 
We extend these recent studies which consider success experience and failure experience 
as dual inputs in the innovation process.  
Broadly speaking, the performance benefits of learning are defined as either       
(i) achieving superior performance, or (ii) reducing performance variability, failures or 
errors. Lavie et al. (2010) suggest that an investigation of exploration and exploitation 
necessarily requires a dual outcome measure which captures the inherent performance 
tradeoffs between these two modes of knowledge creation. In this paper we consider the 
impacts of exploration, exploitation and learning from experience on the likelihood of 
success versus failure, in the knowledge creation and innovation process. In doing so, we 
address the need for a two-fold measure which can quantify these tradeoffs between 
exploration and exploitation in maximizing the upside potential for generating 
breakthroughs versus minimizing the downside risk of  failure. In summary, the model of 
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knowledge creation examines how an innovator’s exploration and exploitation activities 
(induced learning) as well as prior success experience and prior failure experience 
(autonomous learning) act as both substitutes and complements for improving innovation 









Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model of Knowledge Creation in the Innovation Process 
 
2.2.2 Search and Learning on the NK Landscape 
Following Fleming (2001) we consider innovation as a process of recombinant 
search. As such, we assume that innovations result when innovators recombine various 
technological components in new ways. We leverage the analogy of the NK performance 
landscape in order to demonstrate the impact of an innovator’s search activities over a 
rugged landscape of uncertain innovation performance outcomes (Levinthal 1997, 
Fleming and Sorenson 2001, Fleming and Sorenson 2004, Erat and Kavadias 2008, Jain 
and Kogut 2013). Within the NK model, N refers to the number of technological domains 
over which the innovator’s recombination effort is applied, and K refers to the degree of 
interdependence between these N domains, as it relates to the value of the innovation 
output. As the number of technological domains N and the degree of interdependence K 
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rises, the landscape of performance becomes increasingly rugged; that is the innovation 
performance landscape has increasingly higher peaks as well as lower valleys, with 
respect to the realized value of the innovation output. The peaks (valleys) in the 
performance landscape correspond to different technology configurations which yield 
superior (inferior) performance. However, a-priori, these configurations are unknown to 
the innovator. 
The literature recognizes two different strategies for traversing the NK landscape. 
The process of exploration, or “long jumps”, refers to searching for new innovation 
outcomes by recombining multiple components (high N), across distant or unrelated 
domains (high K) (Levinthal 1997).  However, given the vast and rugged expanse of the 
innovation performance landscape, as well as the limited knowledge of the innovator, 
exploration effectively becomes a process of “blind search” over the landscape. 
Alternatively, therefore, innovators may leverage a “map” of the landscape, which they 
use as a guide in their search efforts (Fleming and Sorenson 2004). The map of the 
landscape reflects existing scientific research and provides a codified relationship of 
cause-and-effect, which improves the innovators ability to make predictions between 
moves to various positions of the landscape and the resulting performance outcomes 
(Fleming and Sorenson 2004). Such reliance on extant scientific research in the 
innovation search process, is consistent with March’s (1991) definition of exploitation as 
“refinement of an existing technology” (p. 72).  However, Levinthal (1997) notes that the 
outcome of the innovation search process may also be influenced by the starting point on 
the innovation performance landscape. This highlights the importance of considering the 
role of prior innovation experience. As innovators repetitively attempt to generate novel 
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breakthroughs within an unknown rugged landscape they generate knowledge by trial-
and-error learning (Nelson 2008, Rerup and Feldman 2011). Furthermore, this prior 
innovation experience necessarily modifies the effectiveness and efficiency of future 
search efforts (Cohen and Levinthal 1991). Naturally, the notion of trial-and-error 
learning suggests that the result from each innovation attempt could either be a successful 
trial outcome or a failed trial outcome. However, the explicit role of success experience 
versus failure experience as a moderating factor in the innovation search process has not 
been hypothesized or empirically tested. Therefore, in this paper, we consider how 
learning from prior success and prior failure experience critically influences the 
effectiveness and efficiency of future exploration and exploitation search activities across 
the rugged NK landscape.  
2.2.3 Impact of Exploration on Innovation Performance Outcomes 
Based on the NK model of search, the process of exploration, or “long jumps”, 
refers to recombining multiple components (high N), across distant or unrelated domains 
(high K). Managerially, exploration is associated with increasing the scope of search 
(Katila and Ahuja 2002), increasing the diversity and breadth of knowledge sources 
(Taylor and Greve 2006, Lazer and Friedman 2007, Wu and Shanley 2009), and 
accessing external knowledge sources (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). This strategy of 
combining a large number of seemingly unrelated technological components underscores 
the principles of creativity and brainstorming, which give rise to successful innovation 
outcomes, by scaling to one of the peaks on the rugged landscape. However, as the 
innovation performance landscape becomes more rugged, outcomes from exploration 
becomes more uncertain and unpredictable (Fleming and Sorenson 2001, Austin et al. 
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2012). As a result of the increased variance of the outcomes, the search may either result 
in generating superior outcomes (scaling a peak), or undesirable outcomes (traversing a 
valley). Therefore, we posit that increasing the degree of exploration increases the 
potential to generate a success, but also increases the likelihood of realizing a failure in 
the innovation process (Austin et al. 2012).   
HYPOTHESIS 1: Exploration increases the likelihood of both success (extreme right-
tail outcome) and failure (extreme left-tail outcome) in the innovation process.  
2.2.4 Impact of Exploitation on Innovation Performance Outcomes 
In addition to the degree of exploration, the innovator can also choose the degree of 
exploitation to pursue for an innovation project. March (1991) describes exploitation as 
the “refinement of an existing technology”. Therefore, we consider exploitation as being 
associated with building upon a technological trajectory (Dosi 1982, Benner and 
Tushman 2003) through the reuse of existing knowledge (Fleming 2001). Innovators 
build on existing knowledge by relying on available scientific knowledge. Fleming and 
Sorenson (2004) suggest that reliance on extant scientific knowledge can improve the 
innovation search process by serving as a “map” of the uncertain performance landscape. 
As technological knowledge becomes more mature, standardized, codified and well-
understood over time, then the “map” becomes more representative of the landscape and 
increases in predictive power (Hamilton and Singh 1992, Bohn 1994, Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Autio et al. 2004, Linton and Walsh 2004). Therefore, as exploitation and 
hence the degree of reliance on the “map” increases, outcomes become more predictable, 
and uncertainty is reduced. However, the exploitation of existing, mature technologies 
reduces the potential for generating a novel breakthrough outcome (Sorenson and Stuart 
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2000, Ahuja and Lampert 2001, Katila and Ahuja 2002, Fleming and Sorenson 2004). In 
other words, pursuing exploitation entails a performance tradeoff so that “preventing 
failure can mean sacrificing opportunity” (McGrath 1999). Sorensen and Stuart (2000) 
establish a related tradeoff by empirically demonstrating that while a focus on exploiting 
mature technology improves innovation efficiency, the gains are realized at the expense 
of generating only incremental innovation outcomes. Consistent with these arguments we 
propose the following hypothesis.  
HYPOTHESIS 2: Exploitation decreases the likelihood of both success (extreme right-
tail outcome) and failure (extreme left-tail outcome) in the innovation process. 
2.2.5 Benefits and Perils of Ambidexterity – Balancing Exploration and 
Exploitation 
In his seminal work on exploration and exploitation, March (1991) cautions 
against the danger of focusing exclusively on either exploration or exploitation, and 
suggests that a balance between the two modes of knowledge creation may be more 
appropriate. Several studies confirm the positive benefits, with respect to firm 
performance, of employing an ambidextrous organizational strategy (Katila and Ahuja 
2002, He and Wong 2004, Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012). For 
example, He and Wong (2004) find a positive interaction between exploration and 
exploitation activities, leading to an increased rate of sales growth. Rothaermel and 
Deeds (2004) also find that performance improves if firms employ an ambidextrous 
alliance strategy. While many of the studies of ambidexterity have focused on this 
phenomenon at the firm level, Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) underscore the need for a 
more granular task-level examination of the ambidexterity phenomenon.  
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Our definitions distinguishing between exploration and exploitation are consistent 
with several factors considered complementary in the knowledge creation process 
including: building knowledge breadth versus knowledge depth (McKee 1992, Katila and 
Ahuja 2002, Wu and Shanley 2009), increasing knowledge diversity versus specialization 
(Narayanan et al. 2009), focusing on cross-functional versus within-function knowledge 
(Bajaj et al. 2004), and using novel versus standardized processes (Gilson et al. 2005), 
respectively. For example Katila and Ahuja (2002) find a positive interaction between 
knowledge breadth (exploration) and knowledge depth (exploitation) on the number of 
new products launched, for firms which employ an ambidextrous innovation search 
strategy. Relatedly, Gilson et.al (2005) find support for the complementary effect 
between creativity (exploration) and standardization of work processes (exploitation) on 
team performance in a knowledge-intensive service setting. Therefore in Hypothesis 3A, 
we posit that pursuing ambidexterity improves innovation performance. We characterize 
a performance benefit as either an improved likelihood of generating a success, or a 
reduction in the likelihood of generating failures.  
HYPOTHESIS 3A:  Jointly pursuing exploration and exploitation increases the 
likelihood of success (extreme right-tail outcome) and decreases the likelihood of failure 
(extreme left-tail outcome) in the innovation process. 
 Contrary to the benefits proposed in Hypothesis 3A, the notion of the 
“ambidexterity paradox” suggests that, although beneficial, an ambidextrous approach 
may be difficult to implement (Leonard-Barton 1992, Gupta et al. 2006, Raisch and 
Birkinshaw 2008, Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009). This difficulty results due to the 
tensions and conflicts which arise when trying to simultaneously undertake the dissimilar 
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and contradictory processes of exploration and exploitation. For example, exploitation 
capabilities are associated with the standardization of processes and the codification of 
existing knowledge. On the other hand, exploration is constrained by the inertia and core 
rigidities which can result from the same process standardization and knowledge 
codification activities which enhance exploitation (Leonard‐Barton 1992, Benner and 
Tushman 2003). For example, Gilson et al. (2005) find that an organizational focus on 
standardization and reliance on established practices enhance exploitative learning, but 
inhibit exploration and creativity. Relatedly, in a field study, Wong (2004) finds that the 
organizational factors which enhance external exploratory learning, also inhibit local 
exploitation learning, and shows a negative interaction between these two activities.  
Therefore in Hypothesis 3B, we put forward the alternate hypothesis that ambidexterity 
has negative performance implications. 
HYPOTHESIS 3B:  Jointly pursuing exploration and exploitation decreases the 
likelihood of success (extreme right-tail outcome) and increases the likelihood of failure 
(extreme left-tail outcome) in the innovation process. 
2.2.6 Learning from Prior Success and Prior Failure Experience 
We also consider how prior innovation experience serves as a starting point which 
may critically influence the efficiency of future innovation efforts (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, Levinthal 1997). Jain (2013) empirically shows that the cost to complete an 
innovation is reduced with cumulative experience, suggesting that innovators can in-fact 
“learn to innovate”.  We extend Jain (2013) by distinguishing between learning from 
success experience versus learning from failure experience.  Below we develop 
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hypotheses regarding the impact of prior success experience and prior failure experience 
on subsequent innovation performance.  
Learning from Success 
While some studies have explicitly examined the impact of learning from success 
experience (Kim et. al 2009, KC et al. 2013), other studies have implicitly assumed that 
firms are, in fact, learning from “successful” experiences (Lapre and Nembhard 2010). 
The management philosophy of implementing “best practices” is a classic example of 
learning from success (Tucker et al. 2007). A best practice is a solution known to yield a 
successful result. Identification of prior success factors and best practices can help an 
innovator to improve performance, by proving a clear set of guiding principles which can 
be followed to ensure future success (Lee and Van de Steen 2010). Within the context of 
the search for superior innovations on a rugged landscape, identifying best practices 
relate to identifying prior technology configurations which have consistently yielded 
superior outcomes. By observing repeated patterns of prior successful technology 
configurations, the innovator further refines their “best practices”. Some have referred to 
this cumulative “best practices” experience, as cognition (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000), 
memory (Jain and Kogut 2013), templates (Baron and Ensley 2006) or routines (Obstfeld 
2012).  By building a repository of innovation best practices and thereby improving 
innovation capabilities, through repeated practice, innovators are able to improve future 
innovation performance. Therefore in Hypothesis 4, we posit that prior success 
experience improves innovation performance. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Prior success experience increases the likelihood of success (extreme 
right-tail outcome) and decreases the likelihood of failure (extreme left-tail outcome). 
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Learning from Failure  
While theories of ambidexterity propose balancing the risks of failure from 
exploration with the risk-reducing benefits of exploitation, other scholars suggest that 
failure should be encouraged instead of avoided (McGrath 1999, Thomke 2001, Cannon 
and Edmonson 2005). Managerial support for such initiatives is reflected in the practice 
of organizations which provide incentive structures which encourage risk-taking and 
exhibit a high tolerance for failure. For example, the medical research organization 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute encourages its researchers to “embrace the unknown 
even if it means uncertainty or the chance of failure” (Howard Hughes Medical Institute 
Annual Report 2003, pg. 12).  Several well-known examples demonstrate how prior 
failure can lead to improved likelihood of future success (McGrath 1999). In particular, a 
failure may suggest alternative outcomes which were not previously considered. For 
example, a failed experiment at DuPont is credited for the eventual successful discovery 
of Nylon (Cannon and Edmonson 2005). Furthermore, in addition to helping to generate 
superior performance outcomes, prior failure experience may reduce the likelihood of 
subsequent failures. Prior failure can help a firm to reduce the likelihood of future 
failures, by signifying unsuccessful practices which should be avoided in the future. In 
support of this view, Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) demonstrate that prior accident 
experience reduces the likelihood of future accidents. Maden and Desai (2010) also show 
that failure experience reduces the likelihood of launch failures, in the orbital launch 
vehicle industry. Therefore in Hypothesis 5, we posit that prior failure experience 
improves innovation performance. 
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HYPOTHESIS 5A: Prior failure experience increases the likelihood of success (extreme 
right-tail outcome) and decreases the likelihood of failure (extreme left-tail outcome). 
 Although the notion of learning from failure has gained considerable attention, 
some empirical results suggest that the failure experience may not provide performance 
benefits. Considering innovation as a process of search on a rugged landscape, repeated 
failures suggest the possibility that an innovator has become stuck or trapped in a valley 
on the NK performance landscape (Sorenson et al. 2006). Furthermore, leveraging 
theories of organizational behavior, KC et al. (2013) suggest that, based on attribution 
theory, it may be easier for firms to learn from their success versus their failure 
experience. Baumard and Starbuck (2005) conduct a number of case studies and find that 
firms have difficulty leveraging failure experience to improve performance. Moreover, 
they suggest that repeated failure experience can give rise to maladaptive behaviors, such 
as an escalating commitment to failure. Therefore, these findings lead us to the alternate 
hypothesis posited in 5B, below.  
HYPOTHESIS 5B: Prior failure experience decreases the likelihood of generating a 
success (extreme right-tail) and increase the likelihood of generating a failure (extreme 
left-tail) outcome. 
2.2.7 Moderating Impact of Prior Success and Prior Failure Experience on Search 
Consistent with the notion that failure experience may not provide the expected 
performance benefits, Sitkin (1992) cautions that, “simply experiencing a negative event 
is not sufficient for learning” (Cohen and Sproull 1995, p. 142). Moreover, Sitkin (1992) 
advises that in order to generate learning, intelligent failures must take place in “domains 
that are familiar enough to permit effective learning” (Cohen and Sproull 1995, p. 145). 
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This suggests that in a well-understood scientific domain, given a finite set of cause-and-
effect relationships, failure experience provides informational value by revealing 
information about the underlying factors which contributed to the failure (Petkova 2009). 
This conceptual notion is consistent with Lee and Van de Steen’s (2010) results which 
analytically demonstrate that failure experience has no informational value unless there 
are a finite number of known solutions. 
Pisano (1994) empirically finds that experimental experience only improves 
performance when there is a sound theoretical knowledge of the science underlying 
innovation in a particular domain. Nelson (2008) also outlines the role of theory in the 
problem-solving process required for effective trial-and error learning.  Relatedly, 
Fleming and Sorenson (2004) suggest that exploiting well understood scientific domains 
may provide benefits in the face of negative feedback; however, they do not empirically 
test this relationship between exploiting existing technology and prior failure experience. 
Cannon and Edmonson (2005) provide a related illustration in which Eli Lily 
commissioned a mathematician to probe and analyze the underlying causes of failure of 
the clinical trials for Alimta. By identifying and eventually resolving the underlying 
sources of failure, the company was able to transform the initial failure into an eventual 
success. Reinforcing the importance of domain expertise as a prerequisite for learning 
from failure, in a number of case studies, Baumard and Starbuck (2005) find that 
“managers did not report on problems that seemed ‘out of box’ and difficult to explain” 
(p.293). Consistent with the above arguments, in Hypothesis 6 below, we propose that 
prior failure experience and exploitation jointly enhance innovation performance.  
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HYPOTHESIS 6: The interaction between exploitation and prior failure experience 
increases the likelihood of generating a success (extreme right-tail) and decreases the 
likelihood of generating a failure (extreme left-tail) outcome. 
Contrary to the joint benefits of prior failure and exploitation proposed in 
Hypothesis 6, Levinthal and March (1993) suggest that repeated failure experience can 
cause innovators to succumb to an “exploration failure trap”. Levinthal and March (1993) 
describe this potential reinforcing cycle between the exploration of new knowledge and 
failure as follows: “Failure leads to search and change which leads to new failure which 
leads to more search and so on. New ideas and technologies fail and are replaced by other 
new ideas and technologies, which fail in turn.” (p. 106). This suggests that prior failure 
experience leads to deteriorating innovation performance from exploration, which leads 
to Hypothesis 7 below: 
HYPOTHESIS 7: The interaction between exploration and prior failure experience 
decreases the likelihood of generating a success (extreme right-tail) and increases the 
likelihood of generating a failure (extreme left-tail) outcome. 
On the other hand, Levinthal and March (1993) suggest that repeated success 
experience can cause innovators to succumb to an “exploitation success trap”.  As the 
organization accumulates success experience, this increases confidence in the current 
available solutions (Levinthal and March 1993, March 2003). Given that Hypothesis 2 
suggests that exploitation decreases the likelihood of both failure and success outcomes, 
we predict that given prior success experience, these effects are magnified. Therefore, in 
Hypothesis 8 we predict that prior success moderates the main effect of exploitation, 
leading to increasingly incremental outcomes, so that that the likelihood of both success 
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and failure are further reduced. These predictions are consistent with the theory of the 
“exploitation success trap” (Levinthal and March 1993), which suggests that prior 
success experience and exploitation jointly reinforce stable, but sub-optimal performance 
outcomes from the innovation process (Levinthal and March 1993, Leonard-Barton 1992, 
Audia and Goncalo 2007). Thus, we posit: 
HYPOTHESIS 8: The interaction between exploitation and prior success experience 
decreases the likelihood of generating a success (extreme right-tail) and increases the 
likelihood of generating a failure (extreme left-tail) outcome. 
Hypothesis 7 suggests that, within the process of exploration for new knowledge, 
prior failure experience can simply become a “confusing experience” (Levinthal and 
March 1993), as innovators blindly explore the vast and rugged NK landscape. Recall that 
exploration to discover superior peaks in the performance landscape corresponds to 
exploring various technology recombinations across a large number of disparate and 
interdependent domains (Fleming 2001). High levels of component interdependency 
suggest that improving the ability to effectively explore new technology recombinations 
reduces an understanding of the performance impacts of simultaneously modifying these 
technology configurations, that is, understanding the “complex interdependent co-
variations among events” (Reber 1989, Narayanan et al. 2009). By accumulating prior 
success experience, an innovator gains a better understanding of these interdependencies 
and more readily identify superior peaks on the rugged performance landscape, with less 
error, in the future.  Consistent with the above arguments, in Hypothesis 9 below, we 




HYPOTHESIS 9: The interaction between exploration and prior success experience 
increases the likelihood of generating a success (extreme right-tail) and decreases the 
likelihood of generating a failure (extreme left-tail) outcome. 
2.3 Data and Empirical Setting 
The data used for this study is based on the biomedical device industry. Focusing 
on a single industry allows us to control for cross-industry variations which can account 
for differences in innovation performance (Klevorick et al. 1995). In addition, the 
biomedical device industry provides an appropriate context for our study as knowledge 
creation activities have the potential to generate a wide distribution of innovation 
outcomes, including innovation breakthroughs, in this industry (Denend and Zenios 
2006). In addition, firms in this industry draw upon their prior innovation experience. Our 
level of analysis is the patent, based on data drawn from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) database (Hall et al. 2001).  The data sample includes all 
patents applied for between 1985 and 1994 within Sub-category 32, which represents 
innovations related to surgical and medical instruments (Hall et al. 2001). This time 
window provides five years of data for the focal patents of the study (1990-1994), as well 
as five years of history for generating our measures to capture prior success and failure 
experience (1985-1989).  Overall, our sample consists of 13,464 focal patents granted to 
3390 patent assignees during the specified time period. In addition, for a sub-sample of 
patents granted to publicly listed firms, we retrieved data from Compustat for firm R&D 




2.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Innovation Outcome Measures  
The perceived value of an innovation has been shown to be manifested in the 
number of forward citations received (Albert et al. 1991).  Patents which receive a 
substantial number of forward citations are shown be associated with the generation of 
technological breakthroughs, the subsequent commercialization of radical innovations, 
and the realization of supernormal profits (Trajtenberg 1990, Sorescu et al. 2003).  On the 
other hand, patents which receive very few forward citations are typically reflective of 
incremental innovations, below-average scientific merit and competitive failures 
(Tushman and Anderson 1986, Sood and Tellis 2009). In this study, we examine the 
factors which contribute to success and failure in the knowledge creation process.  
For each variable the subscript i denotes the patent, j denotes the assignee to 
which patent i was granted, and t denotes the year in which a patent was applied. For 
each patent, we define the variable Successijt  as an indicator of whether a particular patent 
i, filed by assignee j, and applied for in year t is considered a breakthrough innovation, 
which is evaluated as having above-average technological value (i.e., an extreme right-
tail realization), relative to the other innovations in the sample. Specifically, the success 
variable is a binary variable which equals 1 if patent i falls in the top 3 % relative to the 
number of forward citations received by other patents granted in year t   (Ahuja and 
Lampert 2001, Fleming 2001, Singh and Fleming 2010, Azoulay et al. 2011). We chose 
the top 3 % as the cutoff for defining an extreme right tail outcome based on a visual 
inspection of a natural breakpoint in the distribution of the number of forward citations 
received. Other cutoff points used in previous studies have ranged from the top 1% 
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(Ahuja and Lampert 2001) to the top 5% (Singh and Fleming 2010). In addition to using 
the top 3%, for robustness, we also ran the analysis using the top 1% and the top 2 % as 
alternate cutoff points. The count of forward citations received for the focal patents 
(1990-1994) are based on the population of patents granted between 1991 and 1999 (Hall 
et al. 2001). The percentile rankings are done on an annual basis, versus an aggregate 
basis for the entire sample to account for exposure effects, which lead to earlier patents 
having more time to accumulate forward citations. For each patent, we define the variable 
Failureijt  as an indicator of whether a particular patent i, filed by assignee j, and applied 
for in year t is evaluated as having below-average technological value (i.e., an extreme 
left-tail realization), relative to the other innovations in the sample. Specifically, we 
define failure as a binary variable that equals 1 if patent i receives zero forward citations. 
(Singh and Fleming 2010, Azoulay et al. 2011).   
2.3.2 Independent Variables 
Exploration and Exploitation 
Consistent with several previous studies on innovation, we consider the details of 
the patent’s backward citations as a proxy for revealing an innovator’s knowledge 
creation activities (Fleming 2001, Ahuja and Lambert 2001, Katila and Ahuja 2002, 
Nerkar 2003).  In order to test the ambidexterity hypothesis, we characterize exploration 
and exploitation as orthogonal measures (Gupta et al. 2006, Schilling and Green 2011). 
Currently, no clear consensus exists on a well-accepted definition of exploration versus 
exploitation (Gupta et al. 2006). However, several proxies exist for distinguishing 
between exploration to discover a new technological knowledge versus exploitation and 
reuse of existing knowledge.  
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We define the variable Exploreijt  as the measure of exploration undertaken in 
developing patent i, filed by assignee j, and applied for in year t. Based on the NK model 
of search and innovation, we define exploration as increasing in the breadth, range and 
diversity of inputs to the knowledge creation process. This enables the recombination of 
multiple components (high N), across distant or unrelated domains (high K) in order to 
explore and discover new technological trajectories (Fleming and Sorenson 2001, 
Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco 2008, Leiponen and Helfat 2009, Singh and 
Fleming 2010, Gruber et al. 2012, Schilling and Green 2011).  Similar to Quintana-
Garcia and Benavides-Velasco (2008) we use a Herfindahl diversification index as a 
proxy for an innovator’s degree of exploration (Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco 
2008, Gruber et al. 2012). The diversification index, which ranges from 0 to 1, considers 
both the breadth and concentration of technology classes referenced in the backward 
citations for a particular patent.  An explore measure that is high (closer to one) suggests 
a higher degree of search breadth and greater emphasis on accessing a wide range of 
technology classes when generating the innovation.  Conversely, if the patent is based on 
a very narrow range of technology classes then the measure of exploration is low, or 
closer to zero.  
While we consider exploration as the search for new knowledge, building on 
Fleming and Sorenson’s (2004) notion of “science as map”, we define exploitation as the 
degree to which the innovation search process relies on the reuse and refinement of extant 
technological knowledge. We define the variable Exploitijt as the degree of exploitation 
undertaken for a particular patent i, filed by assignee j, and applied for in year t. To 
capture the degree to which an innovation exploits extant knowledge, we consider the 
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average age of all the contributing technologies utilized for a particular patent as a proxy 
for the technological maturity of the knowledge base upon which the patent was built 
(Hamilton and Singh 1992, Ahuja and Lambert 2001, Sorenson and Stuart 2000). 
Specifically, we measure the average time difference in years, or backward lag, between 
the application date of the focal citing patent i and the application date of all the patents 
which were backward cited as prior art. An exploit measure that is large, this indicates 
the focal patent placed greater emphasis on exploitation of more mature technologies or 
was increasingly based on extant technology. The average and maximum backward lag 
observed in the sample was 11 years and 97 years, respectively.  
Prior Innovation Experience 
We consider how the patent assignee’s innovation experience contributes to the 
assignee’s future innovation performance. We define the variable Prior Success jt-5 to 
capture the assignee’s cumulative success experience. This variable embodies the 
cumulative number of successful patents, with respect to the number of forward citations 
received, which were granted to assignee j over the five year period leading up to year t 
of the focal patent. Similarly, we define the variable Prior Failure jt-5 as the cumulative 
number of failed patents, with respect to the number of forward citations received, which 
were granted to assignee j over the five year period leading up to year t of the focal 
patent. We generate four additional variables to examine the interaction of prior success 
experience and prior failure experience with exploration and exploitation.  
2.4 Methods 
We estimate the impact of exploration, exploitation, prior success experience and 
prior failure experience on the likelihood that a subsequent patent will be a success or a 
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failure. Since we define success and failure as dichotomous variables, we use a logistic 
regression model to estimate the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood of 
success and failure (Singh and Fleming 2010). Our data for estimating the probability of 
success and failure have a high proportion of zeros and ones. Therefore, we conduct our 
analysis using the complementary log-log model. To account for temporal effects within 
the industry, we control for the year in which the patent was applied. We also controlled 
for the unique patent technology classes (i.e. 128, 600, 601, 602, 604, 606, 607), within 
Sub-category 32, to which a patent belongs (Hall et al. 2001).  In addition, we perform a 
clustered analysis to account for assignee (firm) level factors which could impact the 
number of forward citations received by a patent. We applied a logarithmic 
transformation to adjust for the skewed distribution of the Exploit, Prior Success and 
Prior Failure variables. To control for multi-collinearity, we mean-centered the 
exploration, exploitation, prior success and prior failure experience variables and 
calculated the variance inflation factors across all variables (Aiken and West 1991).   For 
robustness, we ran a zero inflated binomial regression to account for the possibility that a 
focus on either exploration or exploitation may account for excessive instances of zero 
forward citations being received by a patent.  
We recognize the possibility for endogeneity with respect to factors which may 
influences both an innovator’s choice to explore or to exploit, as well as the number of 
forward citations received. In our model of knowledge creation (Figure 2.1), we assume 
that exploration, exploitation, prior success experience and prior failure experience 
predict the likelihood that an innovation will be a success or a failure. In addition, we 
consider that prior success and prior failure experience may also affect the degree of 
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exploration and exploitation undertaken. Given the limitations of the data, no appropriate 
instrumental variables were available to control for these factors. Therefore, for 
robustness, we test a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) mediator/moderator model in 
which prior success and prior failure experience predicts the degree of exploration and 
exploitation undertaken, and also moderates the effect of exploration and exploitation on 
the innovation performance (Zellner 1962, Baron and Kenney 1986). 
2.5 Results 
Table A1 provides a breakdown of the range of knowledge creation strategies 
demonstrated across the sample, based on the degree of exploration and exploitation 
undertaken for each patent. We classify the degree of exploration and exploitation 
employed for each patent as high or low, based on the level of exploration and 
exploitation for each patent relative to the median level of exploration and exploitation 
across the entire sample of patents. From Table A1, we find that 23% of the patents were 
based on a high exploration-high exploitation strategy, reflecting an ambidextrous 
knowledge creation strategy.  In addition, 15% of the patents reflected a high exploration-
low exploitation knowledge creation strategy, reflecting a highly exploratory focus. On 
the other hand, 33% of the patents exhibited a low exploration-high exploitation 
knowledge creation strategy, reflecting a highly exploitative focus. Therefore, our sample 
provides a wide cross-section of knowledge creation strategies against which to test our 
hypotheses.  
Table A2 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics and pair wise 
correlations of the dependent and independent variables. For the full sample, the 
minimum, average and maximum of the exploration variable is 0, 0.38 and 0.91, 
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respectively. The minimum, average and maximum of the exploitation variable is 0, 
11.02 and 97 years, respectively. Approximately 3% of the patents were classified as a 
success, reflecting an extreme right tail outcome, whereas approximately 10% of the 
patents were classified as a failure, reflecting an extreme left tail outcome. For those 
patents ranked as a success, we examined the proportion of self-citations as well as the 
proportion of citations received from a category external to the major patent category 3 
assigned for drugs and medical (Hall et al. 2001). We found that for the success patents, 
as compared to the full sample of patents, the average percentage of self-citations were 
comparable at approximately 10%. For the full sample approximately 14% of the forward 
citations received came from an external patent category, whereas for the success patents 
approximately 7% of the forward citations received came from an external patent 
category.  The minimum, average and maximum number of prior successes experienced 
by an assignee, in the five years preceding the focal patent, is 0, 1.52 and 22, 
respectively.  While, the minimum, average and maximum number of prior failures 
experienced by an assignee, in the five years preceding the focal patent, is 0, 1.01 and 17, 
respectively.   
Table A3 provides the results of the complementary log-log model which 
estimates the effects of exploration, exploitation, prior success experience and prior 
failure experience on the likelihood of success and failure. Models S1, S2, S3, S4 and S5 
test the impact of the independent variables on the likelihood of success. Similarly, 
models F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5 test the impact of the independent variables on the 
likelihood of failure.  Therefore, for models S1-S5, a positive coefficient indicates an 
increased probability of success and hence a performance benefit. Conversely, for models 
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F1-F5, a negative coefficient indicates a reduced probability of failure and hence a 
performance benefit. 
From Table A3, models S1 and F1 includes the exploration and exploitation 
variables. Recall that Hypothesis 1 conjectured that exploration is positively related to an 
increased likelihood of both successes and failures. The positive coefficient for 
exploration in model S1 indicates that exploration increases the likelihood of success     
(β = 0.34, p < 0.001). Whereas, the negative coefficient for exploration in model F1 
indicates that exploration reduces the likelihood of failure (β = -0.04, p < 0.10). 
Hypothesis 2 posited that exploitation is related to a decreased likelihood of both 
successes and failures. The negative coefficient for exploitation in model S1 indicates 
that exploitation decreases the likelihood of success (β = -0.49, p < 0.001).  Whereas, the 
positive coefficient for exploitation in model F1 indicates that exploitation increases the 
likelihood of failure (β = 0.33, p < 0.001). Therefore, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are partially 
supported, with respect to the extreme right tail outcomes (success), but not with respect 
to the extreme left tail outcomes (failure).  
Our findings deviate from prior conceptual assumptions about the impact of 
exploration and exploitation on the probability of generating extreme left-tail outcomes 
from a distribution of innovation outcomes.  Exploration and exploitation have been 
defined as having variance-increasing and variance-reducing impacts on innovation 
performance outcomes, respectively (Fleming 2001, He and Wong 2004). Furthermore, it 
is typically assumed that exploration (exploitation) symmetrically increases (decreases) 
the likelihood of both left-tail and right-tail outcomes (March 1991, Fleming 2001, Gupta 
et al. 2006). However, contrary to the expected results, our findings indicate that 
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exploration increases the likelihood of success, but also decreases the likelihood of 
failures. While we show that the direct effect of exploitation is to reduce the likelihood of 
success, but to increase the likelihood of failure.  Therefore, we conduct three additional 
tests. In the first two additional analyses, we normalize the number of forward citations 
received by a patent, relative to all other patents granted in the same year, to have a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one. We then run a linear regression to estimate the 
impact of all the variables in the study on both the normalized level of citations as well as 
the absolute deviation. This analysis allows us to examine the impact of the independent 
variables on changes to both the mean as well as the variance of the distribution of the 
number of forward citations received (Taylor and Greve 2006). In a third test, we conduct 
a quantile regression analysis on the number of forward citations received (Singh and 
Fleming 2010). Unlike linear regressions, which estimate the impact of an independent 
variable on the mean, quantile regressions estimate the effect of an independent variable 
on the magnitude of each percentile of a distribution (Singh and Fleming 2010).  
The results of the linear regression on the mean and variance of the number of 
forward citations received are presented in Table A4. The quantile regression results are 
provided in Table A5.  From model V1 of Table A4 we see that exploration increases the 
variance in the number of citations received (β = 0.40, p < 0.001).  While from model M1 
of Table A4, we find exploration also increases the mean (β =0.06, p < 0.001).  On the 
other hand, from model V1 of Table A4 we see that exploitation decreases the variance          
(β = -0.05, p < 0.001). While model M1 of Table A5 shows that exploitation also 
decreases the mean (β =-0.14, p < 0.001). These additional mean/variance regression 
analyses provide important insights. Although exploration increases the variance and 
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uncertainty of outcomes, as expected, it also increases the mean (a right shift of the 
distribution), so that the likelihood of an extreme left-tail outcome, that is the risk of 
failure, is reduced. Conversely, although exploitation decreases the variance and the 
uncertainty of outcomes, given that the mean also decreases (a left shift of the 
distribution) then the likelihood of an extreme left-tail outcome (the risk of failure) is 
amplified. The quantile regression coefficients for the lower (10th) , middle (50th) and 
upper (90th) percentiles are given in Table A5. The direction and relative magnitude of 
the quantile coefficients confirms the mean/variance findings. 
Although we find that exploitation neither directly improves success nor reduces 
failure, we also consider that exploitation may be undertaken to benefit from the 
synergies related to ambidexterity, as proposed in Hypothesis 3. We include the 
interaction term between exploration and exploitation in models S2 and F2 of Table A3.  
The results from model F2 indicate that jointly undertaking exploration and exploitation 
increases the likelihood of failure (β = 0.11, p < 0.001). Therefore, our results provide 
support for the alternate Hypothesis 3B which highlights the challenges of ambidexterity.  
This result provides an indication of the potential coordination costs and negative 
performance implications which may result when trying to combine these two 
incompatible modes of knowledge creation (March 1991, Leonard-Barton 1992, Gilson et 
al. 2005, Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008).  The interaction effect for the likelihood of 
success is not significant.  
 From Table A3, models S3 and F3 includes only the prior success and prior 
failure variables. In Hypothesis 4, we propose that learning from success may improve 
performance. In model S3, the positive coefficient for the effect of prior success 
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experience on the likelihood of subsequent success indicates that innovators who have 
succeeded in the past are more likely to generate a breakthrough in the future (β = 0.59, p 
< 0.001). Furthermore, from model F3, prior success experience provides a dual benefit, 
as it also reduces the likelihood of future failures (β = -0.19, p < 0.001). This suggests 
that, as they search over the rugged landscape, innovators who have successfully located 
a peak on the NK landscape in the past are more likely to successfully generate a 
breakthrough in the future, with less error (Sorenson et al. 2006).  
In Hypothesis 5A, we propose that the opportunity to learn from prior failures 
may improve performance.  However, from model S3, we find that prior failure 
experience reduces the likelihood of future success (β = -0.54, p < 0.001).  Furthermore, 
from model F3, we find that prior failure experience increases the likelihood of 
subsequent failures (β = 0.10, p < 0.01). These findings do not support a theory of 
learning from failure, as posited in Hypothesis 5A. To the contrary, we find support for 
the alternate hypothesis, given in 5B, that prior failure experience degrades future 
performance. This result suggests that innovators may become trapped in a valley during 
search on the rugged NK landscape (Sorenson et al. 2006).  Collectively, the results of 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 are also consistent with the suggestion, based on attribution theory, 
that it may be easier for innovators to learn and improve performance based on their prior 
success experience versus their failure experience (KC et al. 2013). 
  We probe further into the benefits of prior experience to consider how this 
knowledge moderates the effect of future exploration and exploitation. We include the 
interaction terms between exploration, exploitation, prior success and prior failure in 
models in S4 and F4 (Table A3). However, we find that in several cases the sign of the 
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coefficient for the interaction term changes in the full models, given in columns S5 and 
F5 of Table A3. For robustness, given the possibility for endogeneity, we test a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) mediator/moderator model. In this model we 
assume that prior success and prior failure experience predict the likelihood of future 
success and failure, as well as moderate, not only, the degree, but also the effectiveness, 
of exploration and exploitation. We find that the results of the interaction effects between 
prior innovation experience and exploration, as well as exploitation  from models S4 and 
F4 (Table A3) are consistent with the results of model 3 (SUR Mean, Table A6) and 
model 6 (SUR Variance, Table A6), which accounts for this endogenous relationship. 
Therefore, we focus on the interaction results of models S4 and F4, versus models S5 and 
F5 from Table A3. 
The results of model S4 (Table A3) support Hypothesis 6 and demonstrates that 
the interaction between exploitation and prior failures increases the likelihood of a 
breakthrough success (β= 0.24, p < 0.001).  This is an interesting finding as the earlier 
results of Hypotheses 2 and 5B show that the direct effects of both exploitation and prior 
failure experience is to decrease the likelihood of success. However, the results of 
Hypothesis 6 show that an innovator is able to reverse these effects and is able to derive a 
positive indirect learning benefit from jointly leveraging both exploitation and prior 
failure experience. Collectively, the results of Hypotheses 2, 4 and 6 demonstrate that 
prior failure experience is necessary, but not sufficient for learning from failure to occur. 
Specifically, the results suggests that it is also necessary for an innovator to leverage the 
mature, well-codified knowledge, associated with exploitation (Narayanan et al. 2009), in 
order to extract the information embedded in prior failure and thereby improve future 
42 
 
performance. On the other hand, we also find support for a potential “exploration failure 
trap” (Levinthal and March 1993), as posited in Hypothesis 7. Although failure 
experience, in conjunction with exploitation, improves performance, we find that the 
interaction between exploration and prior failures decreases the likelihood of a 
breakthrough success (β= -0.16, p < 0.10).  Consequently, prior failure experience is a 
potential “two-edged sword”, depending on whether the future search activities are 
pursued with an exploratory or exploitative focus. Although innovators pursuing search 
with an exploitative focus may benefit from learning from failure, failure experience may 
also lead to confusion when search activities have a more exploratory focus. 
We also find partial support for an “exploitation success trap” as posited in 
Hypothesis 8. From Table A3, model S1 and Table A4, model V5 we found that the main 
effect of exploitation is to reduce the likelihood of breakthrough success and reduce 
uncertainty, respectively. Additionally, from model S4 (Table A3), we find that the 
interaction between exploitation and prior success further decreases the likelihood of a 
breakthrough success (β= -0.23, p < 0.01).  Furthermore, from model V4 of Table A4, we 
find that prior success experience makes exploitation more efficient at reducing the 
variance of innovation outcomes (β= -0.04, p < 0.05). Our results, therefore, provide 
empirical support for the notion of a success learning trap (Levinthal and March 1993), as 
prior success experience reinforces exploitation’s main effect of generating predictable, 
but sub-optimal, performance outcomes (Levinthal and March 1993, Leonard-Barton 
1992, Audia and Goncalo 2007). Based on models S4 and F4 (Table A3), the interaction 
effect between prior success experience and exploration, as proposed in Hypothesis 9 is 
not supported.   
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2.5.1 Robustness Tests 
Alternate Success Percentile Cut-off Points 
For robustness, we ran the analysis for the likelihood of breakthrough success using 
three alternate success percentile cut-off points. The results of the complementary log-log 
model comparing the likelihood of being in the Top 1%, 2% and 3%, which are given in 
Table A7, are consistent with the main results from Table A3.  
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model 
Since the number of forward citations received is truncated at zero, we ran the 
analysis for the mean number of citations received, using a zero inflated negative 
binomial model. Even accounting for the inflation, the results of the zero inflated 
negative binomial model, given in Table A8, are consistent with the main results.  
Sub-sample of Publicly Listed Firms 
For a sub-sample of patents granted to publicly listed firms, we matched patent 
assignees to firms, in order to retrieve financial data from Compustat (Bessen 2009).  We 
ran the analysis for the sub-sample, including controls for the magnitude of the firm’s 
assets as well as for R&D intensity. The results for the subsample are given in Table A9. 
The subsample includes 2835 focal patents assigned across 125 publicly listed firms. As 
expected asset size and R&D intensity were positively related to the likelihood of 
breakthroughs, but had a non-significant impact on the likelihood of failure. For the sub-
sample the results for the impact of exploration, exploitation, prior failure experience and 
prior success experience were all consistent with the main results on the likelihood of 
breakthrough success and failure, although the impact of exploration was non-significant. 
Interestingly, we do not find support for learning from failure, either with respect to the 
44 
 
main effect of prior failure experience, or through the interaction terms. This suggests 
that more mature publicly-listed firms may lack either the motivation or ability to 
leverage their failure experience. 
Alternate Exploitation Measure 
We recognize that no clear consensus exists on a well-accepted definition of 
exploration versus exploitation (Gupta et al. 2006). In selecting the measures for our 
study we consider two key features of the knowledge creation process which we wish to 
examine: (i) the impact of knowledge creation activities on the uncertainty of innovation 
outcomes and (ii) the complementary relationship between exploration, exploitation and 
prior innovation experience.  Specifically, we consider exploration as experimentation 
with diverse components to discover a new technological trajectory versus exploitation as 
the reuse of components from an existing technological trajectory (Dosi 1982, Fleming 
2001, Linton and Walsh 2004). Our notion of exploitation is consistent with Benner and 
Tushman’s definition of exploitation as search activities which “involve improvements in 
existing components and build on the existing technological trajectory” (2002, pg. 679) 
This definition of exploitation as building on an existing technological trajectory 
(Benner and Tushman 2000), or relying on extant science as a “map” of the technological 
landscape (Fleming and Sorenson 2004), differs from some studies in which exploitation 
has been defined as the depth of an innovator’s existing knowledge base. Studies 
invoking this definition have measured the degree of exploitation as: “accumulation of 
search experience with the same knowledge elements” (Katila and Ahuja 2002); 
“knowledge stock”, “absorptive capacity” (Wu and Shanley 2009); and “ongoing use of a 
firm's knowledge base” (Vermeulen and Barkema 2001).  Therefore, for robustness we 
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defined an alternate exploitation variable, Exploit II, to capture the depth of an 
innovator’s existing knowledge stock, with respect to the knowledge elements used in the 
focal patent. Similar to Fleming (2001), we calculated the number of times, within the 
prior ten years, that the assignee utilized the same configuration of technological classes 
in prior patents. This captures the assignee’s cumulative familiarity with this technology 
combination. The results for the likelihood of success and failure models using this 
alternate exploitation measure are given in Tables A10 and A11. 
In our model of induced and autonomous learning (Figure 2.1) we explicitly 
disaggregate the two elements of exploitation referenced above by considering both:      
(i) induced learning based on exploitative search, which builds on an existing 
technological trajectory, and (ii) autonomous learning which leverages the knowledge 
stock gained from cumulative search experience. Given that we already consider an 
innovator’s accumulated success experience and failure experience, additionally 
considering exploitation as the reuse of the innovator’s knowledge stock is redundant. 
The results from Tables A10 and A11 confirm this. Table A10 shows that the main effect 
of prior failure experience is to reduce the likelihood of success, and that the interaction 
between prior failure experience and cumulative experience with these combinations 
(Exploit II) further reduces this likelihood of success. The interaction between prior 
failure experience and cumulative combination experience (Exploit II) suggests that 
experience with the same technology combination does not improve performance, given 
prior failure experience. Analogously, Table A10 shows that the main effect of success 
experience is to increase the likelihood of success and that the interaction between prior 
success experience and cumulative experience with these combinations (Exploit II) 
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further increases this likelihood of success. Since we hypothesize an interaction between 
exploitation and prior innovation experience, an exploitation measure which also reflects 
cumulative search experience is therefore a redundant measure. 
Discounting Prior Experience 
 Given the importance of prior experience as both an independent variable and a 
moderator in the model, for robustness we ran the analysis using two alternate 
specifications for discounting prior success experience and prior failure experience. First, 
in Table A12 we discounted both prior success experience and prior failure experience by 
the square root of the age of the experience. While, in Tables A13 we implemented a 
linear discounting factor (Baum and Ingram 1998, Haunschild and Sullivan 2002). The 
results after discounting the effects of prior experience are consistent with the main 
results from Table A3, although there are a few changes in the level of significance. For 
example, comparing Table A3 with Tables A12 and A13, the interaction term between 
prior failure experience and exploitation, still positively impacts the likelihood of 
success, however, the significance is slightly reduced in the discounted models. In one 
case, a term which was significant in Table A3 is no longer significant in Tables A12 and 
A13, and that occurs with the estimation of the impact of prior failure experience on 
increasing the likelihood of a subsequent failure 
2.6 Implications for Theory and Practice 
Our results address important open questions in the research on ambidexterity, 
with respect to understanding , “when ambidexterity is more or less useful?” and “when 
do the benefits of ambidexterity outweigh the costs?” (O’Reilly and Tushman 2013, 
p.26).  Specifically, we contribute to a more nuanced understanding of both the short-
47 
 
term and long-term challenges, and benefits, of pursuing an ambidextrous knowledge 
creation strategy during the innovation process. We provide some important findings for 
advancing a more comprehensive model of how innovators benefit from exploration and 
exploitation, as well as how they can learn from prior failure and success experience, in 
order to increase the likelihood of generating a breakthrough innovation and mitigate the 
risks of failures. With these insights, managers can become better informed regarding 
strategies for managing two important categories of “risk” in the innovation process:  the 
risk of “sinking the boat”, that is, the risk of failure, versus the risk of “missing the boat”, 
which is the risk of missing the opportunity for successfully generating a breakthrough 
(Dickson and Giglierano 1986). 
Our results have important theoretical and managerial implications. Firstly, we 
highlight the importance of making a critical conceptual distinction between classifying 
exploration as an uncertain versus a risky undertaking.  Our findings weaken support for 
the traditional classification of exploration as a risk-increasing activity, since exploration 
increase the upside potential for generating breakthrough successes, while decreasing the 
downside risk of failures. Traditionally, it has been thought that exploration leads to more 
uncertainty, as well as higher probability of failure. However we find that while 
exploration does increase the variance of innovation outcomes, this occurs through an 
asymmetric upward shift in the distribution (Singh and Fleming 2010).  Specifically, we 
find that exploration increases both the mean as well as the variance of innovation 
outcomes. This is consistent with March’s (1991) view on the performance implications 
of the exploration of new knowledge: “Some learning processes increase both average 
performance and variability. A standard example would be the short-run consequences 
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from adoption of a new technology. If a new technology is so clearly superior as to 
overcome the disadvantages of unfamiliarity with it, it will offer a higher expected value 
than the old technology. At the same time, the limited experience with the new technology  
(relative to experience with the old) will lead to an increased variance”(p. 83).  
In addition, while exploitation has been touted for its risk-reducing benefits, we 
do not find significant support for this claim. While we do find that exploitation reduces 
the variance of innovation outcomes; we find that this occurs through an asymmetric 
downward shift in the distribution (Singh and Fleming 2010). Therefore, while the 
absolute uncertainty of outcomes is reduced with exploitation, the likelihood of 
generating breakthrough outcomes is reduced, and the likelihood of generating 
breakthrough failures is increased. If an organization’s objective is to reduce uncertainty, 
then exploitation does provide uncertainty-reduction benefits. However, if the goal is 
risk-reduction, that is to improve the upside potential for generating breakthroughs and/or 
to reduce the downside risk of failures, then exploitation, as defined in this study, does 
not achieve this objective. Therefore, we demonstrate that exploitation can lead to 
predictable, but sub-optimal performance (Levinthal and March 1993, Leonard-Barton 
1992). 
While traditionally studies on learning have focused on repetitive, production-
related tasks, our results demonstrate that non-repetitive tasks, such as innovation, can 
also benefit from learning-by-doing. We find support for the theory of learning from 
success, as our results demonstrate that prior breakthrough experience leads to a higher 
likelihood of generating breakthroughs in the future. However, we also find that 
innovators can succumb to an “exploitation success trap”. As success experience and 
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exploitation jointly reduce uncertainty, this could lead to an overinvestment in 
exploitation because “organizations discover the short-term virtue of local refinement 
and the folly of exploration. As they develop greater and greater competence at a 
particular activity, they engage in that activity more, thus further increasing competence 
and the opportunity cost of exploration” (p. 106). 
While we find consistent evidence of the effectiveness of learning from success, 
we did not find support for the main effect of learning from failure. Furthermore, we 
show that innovators are prone to falling into an “exploration failure trap”, as 
demonstrated by the interaction between exploration and prior failure experience, which 
jointly reduce the likelihood of future breakthroughs (Levinthal and March 1993). 
Cannon and Edmondson (2005) suggest that, in order to benefit from prior failure 
experience, innovators must also have the requisite knowledge and processes in place, to 
be able to detect and analyze these failures. Consistent with this suggestion, we find that 
only with a focus on exploitative search, based on mature, well-codified knowledge, can 
innovators jointly leverage both exploitation and prior failure experience, in order to 
increase the likelihood of generating a future breakthrough. This result clearly 
demonstrates the benefit of pursuing ambidexterity. Although exploitation has a negative 
main effect on the likelihood of generating breakthroughs, innovators still need to 
balance exploration with exploitation, in order to leverage the knowledge available from 
prior failure experience. Importantly, therefore, we establish a critical link between the 
theory of ambidexterity and the theory of learning from failure. Whereas these two 
theories have been offered as alternative views on dealing with the risks associated with 
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exploration, our findings demonstrate that, in fact, pursuing exploitation and learning 
from failure are complementary processes, which operate in tandem with each other.  
In spite of demonstrating the benefits of pursuing exploitation, in order to extract 
the information embedded in past failures, our results also demonstrate the paradoxical 
challenges associated with simultaneously undertaking both exploration and exploitation. 
As opposed to those studies which demonstrate the benefits of ambidexterity (Katila and 
Ahuja 2002, Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, Cao et al. 2009, Chandrasekaran et al. 2011), 
our results indicate the potential negative performance implications of ambidexterity, as 
reflected by the negative interaction effect between exploration with exploitation.  This 
result provides empirical support the notion that exploration and exploitation are 
incompatible knowledge creation activities, which may be difficult to combine (Leonard -
Barton 1992, Gupta et al. 2006, Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Andriopoulos and Lewis 
2009).  Zhou (2011) finds that pursuing multiple related activities can provide synergies, 
however he notes that the cost of coordination may dominate any synergistic benefits. 
Similarly, our findings suggest that innovators which pursue an ambidextrous strategy 
must recognize both the potential perils as well as the possible benefits of such a strategy. 
Figure 1.2 below summarizes both the positive and negative performance implications 
which result from the main effects as well as the interaction effects between exploration, 
exploitation, prior success and prior failure experience (Table A3, Models S1-4/F1-4; 
Table A4, Model V4, Table A6 Models 3 and 6). Figure 1.2 highlights ways in which 
exploration, exploitation, success experience and failure experience deliver innovation 
performance benefits which are both conflicting and synergistic. Collectively, our results 
illustrate that pursuing an ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy necessitates a 
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delicate balancing act, in order to manage the short-term and long-term benefits, and 
perils, of exploration, exploitation, learning from success and learning from failure.  
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2.7 Future Research 
   Our current study has focused on exploration and exploitation knowledge creation 
activities as determinants of the performance outcomes from the innovation process. 
These findings have managerial implications for firms which must engage in the 
uncertain process of knowledge creation and innovation. However, we recognize several 
limitations of this study. First, by focusing on the biomedical device industry, we are 
unable to necessarily generalize the results to all industries. Second, we study the impact 
of exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity on success and failure, once a patent has 
been granted at the invention stage of the innovation process. However, we recognize that 
the innovation process is multistage process, (Krishnan and Loch 2005, Gaimon and 
Bailey 2012), for which success and failure outcomes are possible outcomes at each stage 
of the process (Girotra et al. 2007, Hora and Dutta 2012). Firstly, a patent application 
could be considered a success or failure, depending on whether or not the patent is 
successfully approved and granted. Thereafter, conditional on being granted, a patent’s 
success or failure can be measured as a function it’s demonstrated technical value and 
scientific merit. Once product development and commercialization begins, additional 
measures of innovation success and failure include the number of new products created, 
product quality, frequency of product recalls, level of market profitability and other 
innovation-related financial metrics (Griffin and Page 1993, Katila and Ahuja 2002, 
Sorescu et al. 2003, Artz et al. 2010). Although our results identify the impact of 
exploration and exploitation on the outcomes in the invention stage, our study does not 
consider the impact of these knowledge creation activities on the preceding (patent 
application) and subsequent stages (commercialization) in the innovation process. 
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Therefore, the results of our study may underestimate or overestimate the impact of 
exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity on overall success and failure in the 
innovation process.    
   The fact that this study considers only a single stage in the multistage innovation 
process also provides several opportunities for future research. Whereas, in this paper we 
demonstrate the positive benefits of exploration on generating a scientific breakthrough, a 
follow-up step would be to examine the impact of exploration, exploitation and 
ambidexterity on both the preceding and subsequent steps in the innovation process. To 
our knowledge, no study has examined the impact of exploration and exploitation on the 
likelihood of success versus failure in the patent application process. We have begun a 
study to extend our findings on the impact of exploration and exploitation, in the patent 
application process. Secondly, we are also interested in studying the relationship between 
exploration, exploitation and ambidexterity on the subsequent commercialization stage, 
to examine the impact of knowledge creation activities on the eventual technical success 
and failure of the innovation. In the case of the biomedical industry, technical success and 
failure would be reflected in the number of medical device recalls. This is especially 
important in the medical device industry where, although the potential to develop 
breakthrough innovations is important, the final product quality and the likelihood of 
technical failures and product recalls are also critical.  In low-risk medical device sectors 
such as orthopedics, a high level of technical uncertainty may be more acceptable 
(Denend and Zenios 2006). However, in more risk-sensitive segments, for example 
cardiac related innovations, firms may be less prone to undertake exploration of new 
knowledge, to generate breakthrough innovations, if this can lead to a higher risk of 
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technical failure and recalls in the subsequent product development and 
commercialization stages. Finally, research opportunities also exist for studying the 
creation and diffusion of knowledge across multiple industries. We find that for the 
success patents approximately 7% of the forward citations received came from a patent 
category external to the patent category of the focal patent.  This suggests that another 
fruitful area for research would be to examine the knowledge spillover implications with 
respect to how exploration in a one industry may provide opportunities for exploration in 





3. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE CREATION FROM 
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION  
3.1 Introduction 
  A critical challenge faced by firms who achieve their competitive advantage 
through innovation is to identify efficient and effective strategies for managing the high 
levels of technical uncertainty associated with the process of innovation.  Technical 
uncertainty, as embodied in the variance of an innovation’s performance outcome, 
reflects the extent of the range and unpredictability of an innovation’s performance 
outcomes. Existing research on the innovation process has utilized the stage-gate and 
innovation tournament concepts to describe the dynamic evolution of uncertainty 
throughout the innovation process (Cooper 1990, Sethi and Iqbal 2008, Terwiesch and 
Ulrich 2009). While both the stage-gate and tournament funnel approaches recommend 
that uncertainty be continuously reduced over time, some scholars point to the potential 
pitfall of focusing on resolving uncertainty too early in the innovation process. To the 
contrary, it has been suggested that generating uncertainty and retaining ambiguity during 
in the innovation process may be beneficial (Leonardi 2011, Austin et al. 2012). 
Commenting on the optimal timing of uncertainty resolution during innovation process, 
Cross (2000) notes, “normally, the overall aim of a design strategy will be to converge on 
a final, evaluated and detailed design proposal, but within the process of reaching that 
final design there will be times when it will be appropriate and necessary to diverge, to 
widen the search or to seek new ideas and starting points” (p. 186). Contrary to the stage-
56 
 
gate view of continuous uncertainty reduction, this comment suggests that it may be 
desirable to increase the variance of innovation outcomes at certain points during in the 
innovation process. These two opposing views suggest that the optimal dynamic 
evolution and resolution of uncertainty over time during the innovation process remains 
an open issue (Koput 1997, Leonardi 2011, Bingham and Davis 2012). 
  Several factors have been suggested to influence the optimal rate and timing of 
the evolution and resolution of uncertainty during the innovation process including the 
relative costs and information generation efficiencies across various innovation activities 
(Thomke 1998, Thomke 2000, Fixson and Marion 2012, Austin et al. 2012), an 
organization’s risk preferences (Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, Sommer and Loch 2009, 
Manso 2011, Chandrasekaran and Mishra 2012), and  differences in short-term versus 
long-term innovation objectives (Van de Ven and Polley 1992, Das and Teng 1997, Fried 
and Slowik 2004, Manso 2011). For example, Thomke (1998) suggests that changes in 
the relative efficiencies of innovation technologies, such as the availability of cheaper 
prototyping methods for exploring new innovation solutions, may make it optimal to “fail 
early, fail cheap”,  resulting in an increased focus on generating uncertainty early in the 
innovation process (Thomke 2001, Austin et al. 2012). However, reducing the marginal 
cost of innovation and experimentation technologies may also have the opposite effect. 
Fixson and Marion (2012) empirically find that the reduced cost of digital design tools 
can result in postponing exploratory design iterations, which naturally results in the 
generation of uncertainty later in the innovation process. In this paper, we introduce a 
dynamic model which examines the impact of the above-mentioned drivers on the 
optimal evolution and resolution of technical uncertainty during the innovation process.  
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  To examine the optimal dynamic evolution and resolution of technical uncertainty 
throughout the innovation process we introduce a dynamic model of knowledge creation. 
We build on our findings presented in Chapter 2, in which we empirically demonstrate 
the distinction between exploration and exploitation, as variance-generating versus 
variance-reducing knowledge creation activities (March 1991, Fleming 2001, He and 
Wong 2004). March (1991) suggests that pursuing either exploration or exploitation 
independently, or excessively, can lead to negative performance outcomes. Specifically, 
as demonstrated in Chapter 2, excessive exploration can result in an innovation which is 
novel, but with a high degree of uncertainty, whereas excessive exploitation may yield 
predictable outcomes, but with only marginal performance advantages over the current 
solutions (March 1991). Avoiding either of these extreme scenarios requires that firms 
follow an appropriate ambidexterity strategy, which refers to the simultaneous pursuit of 
both exploration and exploitation.  
  Several strategies have been proposed for dealing with the challenge of investing 
in exploration and exploitation simultaneously (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Lavie et. al 
2010, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). One such approach is a temporal ambidexterity 
strategy in which an organization balances exploration and exploitation by sequentially 
focusing on generating versus resolving uncertainty, at different points in time during the 
innovation process (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003). 
However, the specific optimal sequence of exploration and exploitation activities which 
should be adhered to when pursuing a temporal ambidexterity strategy remains an open 
issue (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Raisch et al. 2009,  Lavie et al. 2010).  
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 This paper contributes to the theory of temporal ambidexterity by introducing an 
analytical model which examines the optimal timing of exploration and exploitation 
knowledge creation activities throughout the innovation process. Our research provides 
three key contributions to the academic literature, as well as to managers seeking a better 
understanding of effective temporal ambidexterity strategies (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1997, Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003, Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009, Lavie et al. 2010, 
Smith et al. 2010).  Our first contribution is to extend March’s (1991) conceptual 
framework by introducing an analytical model which captures the interdependencies and 
tradeoffs that arise when simultaneously investing in both exploration and exploitation 
during the innovation process. Secondly, the existing literature highlights the path-
dependent process of knowledge creation. Based on this notion, prior knowledge creation 
activities,  in other words cumulative experience, may impact the effectiveness and hence 
the optimal sequencing of the knowledge creation activities which follow (Shane 2000, 
Audia and Goncalo 2007, Eesley and Roberts 2010, Ozkan et al. 2009, Gaimon and 
Bailey 2012, Argote 2013). Therefore, a key feature of our model is the inclusion of the 
effect of absorptive capacity, which we characterize as reflecting the impact of prior 
knowledge creation activities and cumulative experience, on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of future exploration and exploitation activities (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990). Importantly, we extend the generalized model of absorptive capacity and we 
distinguish between the effects of cumulative exploration versus cumulative exploitation 
experience, which have differing effects on the effectiveness of future knowledge 
creation activities.  Third, we consider how the optimal investments in knowledge 
creation are impacted by the decision-maker’s short-term versus long-term risk 
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preferences (Das and Teng 1997, Fried and Slowik 2004), which are functions of the 
levels of technical uncertainty which remain unresolved at various stages of the 
innovation process (Van de Ven and Polley 1992, Lenfle and Loch 2010, Azuolay et al. 
2011). Incorporating dynamic risk preferences in our model of exploration and 
exploitation is critical, and leads to new and important insights on the inter-temporal 
tradeoffs which may occur when simultaneously pursuing exploration and exploitation.   
3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 Exploration, Exploitation and Temporal Ambidexterity 
 It is widely accepted that superior innovation performance is realized by firms 
which can successfully engage in an ambidextrous approach, simultaneously employing 
both exploration and exploitation. To date the existing literature on ambidexterity has 
focused on the development of conceptual frameworks (Gupta et al. 2006, Lavie et al. 
2010), simulations (Levinthal and March 1981, March 1991), and empirical studies 
which examine the benefits of employing an ambidextrous knowledge creation strategy 
during the innovation process (Katila and Ahuja 2002, Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, He 
and Wong 2004). For example, Katila and Ahuja (2002) empirically find a significant 
positive interaction effect between exploration and exploitation on the total number of 
new products introduced by firms pursuing innovation.   
Several strategies have been proposed to simultaneously undertake both of these 
knowledge creation activities. The two strategies most prominently discussed in the 
literature are (i) organizational (functional/domain) ambidexterity and (ii) temporal 
ambidexterity (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003, Raisch and 
Birkinshaw 2008, Lavie et al. 2010, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). Firms which 
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implement an organizational or functional ambidexterity strategy have separate 
organizational units which focus exclusively on exploration versus exploitation activities 
(Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Lavie et al. 2010). Alternatively, firms which implement a 
temporal ambidexterity strategy pursue exploration and exploitation simultaneously by 
sequentially focusing on each mode of knowledge creation at different points in time, 
within a single organizational unit (Lavie et al. 2010). However, the literature remains 
unclear as to what specific sequence of activities is most effective when executing a 
temporal ambidexterity strategy (Bingham and Davis 2012). In one notable exception to 
this gap in the literature, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) empirically finds that in the 
biotech industry, a sequential strategy of exploration followed by exploitation is optimal 
in order to improve innovation performance, as measured by the total number of new 
products generated by a firm. In contrast to Rothaermel and Deeds’ empirical research 
study, in our paper we propose an analytical model of temporal ambidexterity, which 
allows us to characterize the conditions under which the typical explore-exploit as well as 
the atypical exploit-explore optimal dynamic knowledge creation strategies may 
optimally arise.  
3.2.2 Generating and Resolving Uncertainty in Innovation 
Based on empirical research, the importance of considering the benefits of 
simultaneously pursuing exploration and exploitation is well accepted (Katila and Ahuja 
2002, Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, He and Wong 2004, Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, 
Lavie et al. 2010). However, the existing normative literature has largely treated the 
problem of the optimal investment in exploration versus exploitation independently. That 
is, one subset of the normative literature has considered models of investment in the 
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variance-generating process of exploration related to search, concept generation and 
innovation discovery (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000, Huchzermeier and Loch 2001, 
Kavadias and Sommer 2009, Erat and Krishnan 2012) whereas another subset of the 
normative literature has considered models of investment in the variance-reducing 
process of exploitation related to concept selection, testing and uncertainty resolution 
(Krishnan et al. 1997, Loch and Terwiesch 1998, Loch et al. 2001,  Thomke and Bell 
2001, Erat and Kavadias 2008). Moreover, the latter body of research, related to concept 
selection and uncertainty resolution, generally characterizes technical uncertainty as 
exogenous and learning as a strictly uncertainty reducing strategy. Our paper contributes 
to both these streams of literature. However, our work differs from the existing literature 
in that we introduce a model which simultaneously considers the dynamic generation, as 
well as the dynamic resolution of uncertainty in the innovation process, both of which are 
endogenous. We model exploration-based learning as generating uncertainty in the 
innovation process, while exploitation-based learning is associated with uncertainty 
resolution.  
3.2.3 Dynamic Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
While the analytical research noted above which mainly considers uncertainty as 
exogenous, the empirical literature on risk-taking reflects the endogenous nature of 
uncertainty. However, the empirical literature provides inconsistent findings with regards 
to when it is optimal to undertake additional risk and to increase uncertainty (Sitkin and 
Pablo 1992, Forlani and Mullins 2000). Some evidence suggests that decision-makers 
undertake more risky decisions, such as exploration, to avoid poor performance (March 
and Shapira 1992, Wiseman and Bromiley 1996). In contrast, other research suggests that 
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decision-makers undertake less risky decisions, such as investing in exploitation, to 
preserve deteriorating performance (Staw et al. 1981, March and Shapira 1992). To 
examine this open issue, regarding optimal risk-taking, we consider how a manager’s 
performance objectives drive the decision to invest in variance-generating exploration 
versus variance-reducing exploitation.  Importantly, we recognize that a manager may 
have dynamic risk-preferences with respect to his short-term versus his long-term 
objectives (Das and Teng 1997, Fried and Slowik 2004), which are functions of the 
desired levels of technical uncertainty which remain unresolved at various points during 
the innovation process (Van de Ven and Polley 1992, Lenfle and Loch 2010, Azuolay et 
al. 2011). Therefore, we contribute to the literature which examines the relationship 
between risk-taking and innovation performance (Staw et al. 1981, March and Shapira 
1992, Wiseman and Bromiley 1996), by introducing a contingency model of temporal 
ambidexterity which considers the effect of a manager’s dynamic risk preferences (Das 
and Teng 1997, Fried and Slowik 2004) on the optimal rates of investment in exploration 
and exploitation. 
3.3 A Dynamic Model of Knowledge Creation from Exploration and Exploitation 
  We consider a manager leading a team in developing an innovation. During the 
innovation process, the innovation team’s knowledge accumulates in proportion to the 
investments in knowledge creation that occur over a fixed time horizon t∈[0,T], where 0 
is the initial time of the innovation process. The terminal time T, when the innovation 
process concludes, is given. The technical performance of the innovation is continuously 
monitored and reflects the changes which result from various knowledge creation 
activities including concept generation, trial-and-error activities, simulations, prototype 
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testing and experiments (Van de Ven and Polley 1992, Browning et al. 2002, Austin et al. 
2012). The uncertain nature of the technical performance of the innovation under 
development is captured as the random variable X(t), distributed with mean µ(t) and 
variance (standard deviation) σ(t) (March 1991, Huchzermeier and Loch 2001, Carrillo 
and Gaimon 2004, He and Wong 2004). The mean, µ(t), represents the average technical 
performance of the innovation at time t. The variance (standard deviation), σ(t), reflects 
the projected range and predictability of the technical performance outcomes which could 
be realized from the innovation at time t (Huchzermeier and Loch 2001, Browning et al. 
2002, Luo et al. 2005).  
  Let µ(0)>0 represent the mean technical performance of the innovation at the 
beginning of the innovation process. Also, let σ(0)>0 represent the level of variance of 
the innovation’s technical performance at the beginning of the innovation process. 
Beyond the innovation team’s initial level of knowledge, investments in knowledge 
creation activities dynamically alter the distribution of the innovation’s possible technical 
performance outcomes (March 1991). The manager directs the innovation team to invest 
in both exploration and exploitation knowledge creation activities in order to improve the 
technical performance of the innovation under development. Let the decision variables 
i(t) and e(t) denote the rate of knowledge creation efforts from exploration and the rate of 
knowledge creation efforts from exploitation at time t∈[0,T], respectively, where i(t) and 
e(t)≥0. The mathematical relationships captured in Equations (1) and (2) reflect the 
dynamic effects of exploration and exploitation on the mean and variance of the 
distribution of technical performance outcomes. Let dY/dy denote the first order 
derivative of Y with respect to y. Therefore, dµ(t)/dt and dσ(t)/dt denote the rates of 
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change with respect to time in the mean and variance at time t. The coefficients α0 and 
β0>0 in Equation (1) represent the extent to which a unit of exploration versus 
exploitation positively impacts the mean value of the technical performance outcomes, 
respectively. The positive coefficients α1 and β1>0 in Equation (2) represent the extent to 
which a unit of exploration versus exploitation impact the variance of the technical 
performance outcomes. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, investing in exploration has a 
variance increasing effect on the range of possible outcomes from the innovation process 
(Fleming 2001, Austin et al. 2012). In contrast, exploitation reduces the level of technical 
uncertainty of the innovation outcomes. We model the variance-reducing impact of 
exploitation in the second term in Equation (2) and the variance-increasing effect of 
exploration in the first term.  
  Our model also recognizes the impact of the lagged realization of performance 
benefits from the knowledge creation process (Gaimon 1997, Carrillo and Gaimon 2000, 
Rahmandad 2008).  March (1991) highlights that characterizations of exploration and 
exploitation must account for differences not only in the variability, but also in the timing 
of the performance outcomes from these two modes of knowledge creation; the former 
being not only “less certain” but also “more remote in time” (p. 73) To account for this 
feature, our model contrasts the instantaneous impact of exploitation versus the lagged 
effect of investing in exploration.  That is, we assume that the impact from investments in 
exploration at time τ, are not realized until some later time tœ[τ,T], when changes to both 
the mean and variance due to exploration take effect  (Loch and Tapper 2002). We define 
the distributed lag function θ(τ-t) to reflect the portion of the changes in the mean and 
variance realized at time τ, due to investments in exploration at time t, such that       
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0≤θ(τ-t)≤1 and  θτ‐tdτ=1 
∞
t
(Gaimon 1997, Carrillo and Gaimon 2000). The lag 
function supports a general characterization of when the results from investing in 
exploration are realized over time. The distributed lag function also allows for the 
possibility that the results from exploration may not be feasibly realized with the 
planning horizon given that T<¶ holds (Loch and Tapper 2002). In the numerical 
analysis presented in Section 3.6 we characterize the lag using a Gamma distribution 
(Gaimon 1997, Carrillo and Gaimon 2000). 
  We also consider the innovation team’s absorptive capacity, which reflects the 
team’s prior knowledge and cumulative experience, which impacts the efficiency of 
future exploration and exploitation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Rothaermel and 
Alexandre 2009). First, we consider the effect of absorptive capacity as it relates to the 
changes in the mean over time. We assume the rates at which both exploration and 
exploitation improve the mean technical performance at time t, (dµ(t)/dt), are increasing 
in the current level of the mean, (µ(t)). That is, we assume that if the innovation team has 
greater prior knowledge or cumulative experience it is better able to improve the mean 
level of the innovation outcome at time t. Mathematically, this relationship is reflected in 
Equation (1) below.  
  Next, we consider the effect of the absorptive capacity as it relates to changes in 
the variance over time t. Recall that the variable σ(t), captures the effects of all past 
investments in exploration and exploitation knowledge creation activities. That is, the 
innovation outcomes will have a large variance (σ(t) is large) given significant prior 
investments in exploration. Conversely, a small variance reflects considerable prior 
investments in exploitation. We assume the rate at which exploration generates variance 
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(dσ(t)/dt) at time t is increasing in the current level of the variance (σ(t)), as captured in 
the first term in Equation (2). First, suppose the innovation team has a greater level of 
cumulative exploration experience (large variance), Equation (2) suggests that it is easier 
to generate additional novel outcomes from exploration in the future. Empirical research 
supports this assumption (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006, Dunlap‐Hinkler et al. 2010). In 
addition, we also assume that the rate at which exploitation reduces the variance is 
increasing in the current level of the variance (σ(t)), as captured in the second term in 
Equation (2). Empirical research also supports this assumption that greater levels of 
cumulative exploration experience (large variance), create more opportunities to refine 
knowledge and resolve existing technical uncertainty through exploitation in the future 
(Schilling et al. 2003). Second, suppose the innovation team has a greater level of 
cumulative exploitation experience, so that the variance is small. As a consequence, the 
innovation team may suffer from inertia and core rigidities, such that the ability to 
generate creative outcomes and increase the variance from exploration in the future is 
more difficult to achieve (Benner and Tushman 2003, Ward 2004). Lastly, we capture the 
impact of diminishing returns to exploitation. That is, if the innovation team has a greater 
level of cumulative exploitation experience, so that knowledge is very reliable and well 
understood (small variance), then there are limits to additional performance refinements, 
and further reductions in the variance from exploitation are increasingly difficult to 
achieve (Fleming 2001, Linton and Walsh 2004, Erat and Kavadias 2008). The above 
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3.4 Manager’s Performance Objectives 
3.4.1 Short-term versus Long-term Performance Objectives 
Having concluded our discussion of the dynamics of exploration and exploitation 
we now discuss the manager’s innovation performance objectives. The manager’s 
objective in the short-term is to demonstrate ongoing progress in enhancing the technical 
performance outcomes of the innovation, throughout the planning horizon. Secondly, in 
the long-term the manager considers the impact of the terminal technical performance on 
the innovation’s future market value, which will be evaluated at the end of the innovation 
process. In the following discussions, we will denote the manager’s short-term and long-
term objectives, by j=S,L respectively. 
  In the short-term, the innovation process is often monitored, on an ongoing basis, 
by corporate management, venture capitalists and funding partners (Van de Ven and 
Polley 1992) who provide tangible or intangible incentives to the manager for 
demonstrating ongoing performance improvements during the innovation process (Van 
de Ven and Polley 1992, Chao et al. 2009, Sommer and Loch 2009). As a result of these 
performance requirements the manager may be driven to be risk-averse or risk-seeking in 
the short-term. For example, Azoulay et al. (2011) describe the difference between the 
practices for monitoring progress on NIH (National Institute of Health) versus HHMI 
(Howard Hughes Medical Institute) innovation grants. The former encourages the 
researcher to pursue more incremental innovations and requires very detailed and 
comprehensive preliminary evidence of success, in order to receive ongoing funding. On 
the other hand, HHMI “urges its researchers to take risks, to explore unproven avenues, 
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to embrace the unknown even if it means uncertainty or the chance of failure" (Howard 
Hughes Medical Institute Annual Report 2003, pg. 12).  
  However, in addition to demonstrating short-term performance improvements, the 
manager also considers how his decisions may impact achieving his long-term innovation 
objectives. Naturally, the future market value of the innovation is a function of the 
potential value from licensing, venture IPO, or commercializing the innovation (Tyebjee, 
and Bruno1984, Kerber 2004, Sood and Tellis 2009, Gaimon and Bailey 2012), which 
increases in relation to its technical performance. For example, Sood and Tellis (2009) 
empirically demonstrate the impact of terminal outcomes, such as demonstration of a 
prototype or granting of a patent, on firm market value. However, the market valuation of 
the innovation also depends on the level of uncertainty associated with realizing the 
anticipated performance benefits (Luo et al. 2005). Managers exhibit a range of 
preferences with respect to the variability of payoffs which will be realized from an 
innovation. A manager who is risk-averse with respect to the market value of the 
innovation perceives a higher potential payoff when the variance of the innovation’s 
terminal outcomes is small. However, a manager who is risk-seeking in the long-term is 
willing to develop a more high risk technology innovation, which has a greater upside 
potential to achieve superior market value, even at the expense of higher downside risk. 
The literature reflects this characterization of the relationship between risk-taking and 
long-term payoffs such as stock options (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002, Xue 2007).  
3.4.2 Evaluating Innovation Performance  
  Our characterization of the manager’s performance focus reflects a common 
distinction in the risk-taking and aspiration literature. This stream of literature 
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distinguishes between a risk-averse decision-maker who focuses on a survival target, and 
is therefore mostly concerned with the worst case outcome of the innovation’s projected 
performance, versus a risk-seeking decision-maker who focuses on an aspiration target, 
and is therefore mostly concerned with the best-case outcome of the innovation’s 
projected performance (Dickson and Giglierano 1986, March and Shapira 1992,  
Brockner et al. 2004, Boyle and Shapira 2012).  
  We consider how the manager’s decisions to explore and to exploit during the 
innovation process impact the innovation’s projected performance outcomes 
(Huchzermeier and Loch 2001, Browning et al. 2002, Hillson 2002, Luo et al. 2005). 
Therefore, our model consider three common performance indicators: (i) the lower bound 
(minimum) of the innovation’s projected performance (Baumol 1963, Browning et al. 
2002, Hillson 2002, Luo et al. 2005), (ii) the upper bound (maximum) of the innovation’s 
projected performance (Browning et al. 2002, Hillson 2002, Luo et al. 2005), or (iii) the 
expected value (mean) of the innovation’s projected performance, which is typically 
assumed to be the focal performance indicator. We leverage and extend the process 
capability index model (Kane 1986) to characterize the effect of uncertainty on the upper 
and lower bounds of the innovation’s projected performance. Let P be the standardized 
normal statistic. Employing the standardized normal transformation zPj(t), as defined in 
Equation (3), captures the upper (lower) performance confidence limit which is 
achievable by the innovation at a specified probability, reflected by the standardized 
normal statistic of Pj where j=S,L. The manager’s objective is to maximize zPj(t), that is, 
to maximize  the lower (upper) bound of the innovation’s projected performance given 
Pj<0(>0). (Baumol (1963) considers a similar formulation for the maximization of the 
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expected gain-confidence limit, but only for Pj<0. Given our intent to focus on the impact 
of uncertainty, we do not consider the case when Pj is zero (i.e., the manager’s objective 
is simply to maximize the mean expected performance of the innovation). We consider 
the implications of the sign of Pj below. 
zPj(t)=µ(t)+Pjσ(t), j=S,L                  (3) 
  With Pj<0, the risk-averse manager has a maxi-min objective (Libby and Fishburn 
1977). A larger absolute value of Pj<0 indicates that the manager has a larger degree of 
risk-aversion, so that he is trying to improve the degree of confidence associated with the 
innovation’s projected minimum performance (Baumol 1963).  On the other hand, when 
Pj>0, the manager is risk-seeking. A larger absolute value of Pj>0 indicates that, while the 
manager is trying to improve the maximum performance limit of the innovation, he is 
willing to do so with a higher level of uncertainty and more tolerance for the probability 
of failure. This is consistent with the need to facilitate risk-taking in order to focus on the 
innovation’s upside potential, and to create breakthrough next-generation innovations 
(Van de Ven and Polley 1992). Based on this characterization, we refer to Pj as the risk-
taking preference with respect to both the short-term and long-term objectives, j=S,L. 
Our characterization of the varying risk preferences, as exhibited by venture investors 
and hence innovation managers, during the innovation process reflect those which have 
been empirically observed (Lenfle and Loch 2010, Azuolay et al. 2011, Tian and Wang 
2011).  
  Our model also captures the possibility that the manager’s short-term and long-
term risks preferences are not aligned (Das and Teng 1997). Van de Ven and Polley 
(1992) observe that managers are often risk-averse in the short-term, with respect to not 
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being able to demonstrate sufficient progress, during the innovation process, to ensure 
ongoing funding, but may be risk-seeking with respect to long-term market-related 
objectives, that is PS>0 and PL<0 hold. Alternatively, we also consider a manager to be 
risk-averse in the long-term with respect to market objectives, but risk-seeking in the 
short-term, with respect to demonstrating development progress, that is PS>0 and PL<0 
hold (Wu and Knott 2006).  
3.4.3 Cost Objectives 
  To complete our presentation of the manager’s objective function, we consider the 
impact of the operating costs which are incurred as the firm invests in exploration and 
exploitation (Bajaj et al. 2004, Choi et al. 2008, Austin et al. 2012, Fixson and Marion 
2012). Thomke (1998, 2001) highlights how different cost structures may drive different 
choices in the optimal mode and sequencing of knowledge creation activities. We define 
the cost parameters for knowledge creation from exploration and exploitation as c0 and 
c1, respectively. We make no assumptions about the comparative costs of exploration 
versus exploitation a-priori. Consistent with the literature, we assume quadratic cost 
functions for both modes of knowledge creation to reflect the diseconomies of scale due 
to the disruption and coordination of larger-scale exploration or exploitation activities at 
any single instant in time (Carrillo and Gaimon 2000).  
3.4.4 Objective Function 
  Figure 2.1 below describes the manager’s knowledge creation activities and 
performance objectives. To summarize, the manager optimally invests in exploration and 
exploitation to optimize a multi-dimensional objective: (i) maximize the innovation’s 
lower (PS<0) or upper (PS>0) performance bound in the short-term during the innovation 
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process; (ii) maximize the innovation’s lower (PL<0) or upper (PL>0) terminal 
performance realized in the long-term at the end of the innovation process; and (iii) 
minimize the cumulative expenditures incurred for knowledge creation over the 
innovation process. The marginal incentive for a unit increase in technical performance 
during the innovation process and at the terminal time of the innovation process are given 
by the short-term performance incentive, wS, and the long-term performance incentive, 
wL, respectively. The three-part objective is captured in Equation (4), with zPS and zPL 
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Figure 3.1: Innovation Process Dynamics and Objectives 
 
3.5 Optimal Dynamic Knowledge Creation Strategies 
  The manager optimizes Equation (4) above subject to the dynamics in Equations 
(1) and (2) and non-negativity constraints on e(t) and i(t) for all t∈[0,T]. The model is 
solved using optimal control theory methods for problems with continuously distributed 
time lags (Hartl and Sethi 1984, Sethi and Thompson 2000).  Throughout the remainder 
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE:               
Prior knowledge at  the 
beginning of innovation 
process t=0: µ(0), σ(0)  
(e.g., innovation experience, 
pre-existing patents). 
1. Dynamic investments in 
exploration and exploitation. 
2. SHORT TERM -OBJECTIVE:               
Demonstrate ongoing 
development progress based on 
technical performance 
improvements at time t during 
innovation process: µ(t), σ(t). 
INNOVATION PLANNING HORIZON 
LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE:               
Improve future value based 
on technical performance at 
the end of innovation process  
t=T: µ(T), σ(T)  
(e.g., prototype developed, 
patents granted). 
 t=0 t=T 
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of the paper "*" refers to an optimal solution. The optimality conditions and proofs 
appear in Appendix B.  
  We introduce the adjoint variables, λ0(t) and λ1(t), to represent the instantaneous 
marginal values to the objective of a unit increase in the mean and variance at time t, 
respectively. We also introduce the variables, x0(t) and x1(t), to represent the cumulative 
distributed marginal values of a unit increase in the mean and variance at time t, 
respectively, due to the lagged effect of exploration, given in Equations (5) and (6) 
below. Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1a and 1b illustrate how the innovation manager 
values a unit increase in the mean and the variance at time t, throughout the planning 
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THEOREM 1. The marginal value of a unit increase in the mean and variance at time t 
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COROLLARY 1a. The instantaneous and cumulative distributed marginal values of a 
unit increase in the mean (λ0(t), x0(t)) are both positive and non-increasing for t∈[0,T]. 
COROLLARY 1b. The instantaneous and cumulative distributed marginal value of a unit 
increase in the variance (λ1(t), x1(t)) may be positive or negative, and non-decreasing or 
non-increasing. Case (I)-(IV) (below) depict four scenarios that are likely to occur for 
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t∈[0,T]. We introduce conditions corresponding to all possible solutions for λ1(t) and 
x1(t) in Appendix B. 
(I) Given PS<0 and PL<0 hold, then λ1(t)<0; dλ1(t)/dt>0; x1(t)>λ1(t), dx1(t)/dt>0 are 
likely to occur for t∈[0,T], 
(II) Given PS>0 and PL>0 hold, then λ1(t)>0; dλ1(t)/dt<0; x1(t)<λ1(t), dx1(t)/dt<0 are 
likely to occur for t∈[0,T], 
(III)Given PS>0 and PL<0 hold, then λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ[0,t1] and λ1(t)<0, 
dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ[t1, T] are likely to occur for t∈[0,T], 
(IV)Given PS<0 and PL>0 hold, then λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ[0,t1] and λ1(t)>0, 
dλ1(t)/dt>0,  tœ[t1, T] are likely to occur for t∈[0,T]. 
  From Corollary 1a, the marginal value of an unit increase in the mean 
performance is always positive and non-increasing, so that it is always more valuable to 
invest in an additional unit of the mean technical performance earlier in the development 
horizon in order to maximize the remaining time to leverage the mean absorptive 
capacity benefits. Corollary 1b indicates that the marginal value of an additional unit of 
variance may be either positive or negative, and that increasing or decreasing the variance 
may be more valuable earlier or later in the development horizon, depending on the 
innovation team’s short-term versus long-term performance objectives. 
  From Corollary 1b(I), when the manager is risk-averse in both the short-term and 
the long-term (PS<0 and PL<0), the instantaneous marginal value of the variance is 
negative and increasing. Under these conditions, the magnitude of the cumulative 
distributed marginal value of the variance is large relative to the instantaneous marginal 
value of the variance (x1(t)≥λ1(t)). That is, when resolving uncertainty is valuable 
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(λ1(t)<0), the delay in realizing the performance impacts of exploration increases the risk-
averse manager’s propensity to invest in variance-generating exploration activities. This 
is an interesting and counterintuitive finding. However, these insights are consistent with 
empirical findings on the impact of time delays on risk-taking decisions. For example, in 
an experimental study Abdellaoui et al. (2011) find that participants become increasingly 
more risk-tolerant with delayed lotteries. On the other hand, from Corollary 1b(II), when 
the manager is risk-seeking in both the short-term and the long-term (PS>0 and PL>0), the 
instantaneous marginal value of the variance is positive and decreasing. Under these 
conditions, the magnitude of the cumulative distributed marginal value of the variance is 
small relative to the instantaneous marginal value of the variance (x1(t)≤λ1(t)). That is, 
when generating uncertainty is valuable (λ1(t)>0), the delay in realizing the performance 
impacts of exploration reduces the risk-seeking manager’s propensity to invest in 
exploration. 
  Further interpretation of the marginal values of the mean and variance are given 
when we discuss the optimal dynamic exploration and exploitation strategies in 
Theorems 2 and 3 which follow. Theorem 2 provides insights on how the marginal value 
of the mean and variance, along with the innovation team’s level of knowledge and 
knowledge creation capabilities affects the manager’s decision to either increase or 
decrease the relative focus on investing in exploration versus exploitation.  
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COROLLARY 2a. There may exist an optimal stopping (starting) time for exploration or 
exploitation, such that after (before) the optimal stopping (starting) time, it is not 
optimal to invest in knowledge creation. 
COROLLARY 2b. Given e*(t)>0, the rate of exploitation is larger if: (i) µ(t) or λ0(t)>0 is 
larger; (ii) σ(t) is larger (smaller) when λ1(t)<0 (λ1(t)>0); or (iii) c1 is smaller.   
COROLLARY 2c. Given i*(t)>0, the rate of exploration is larger if: (i) µ(t) or x0(t)>0 is 
larger;  (ii) σ(t) is smaller (larger) when  x1(t)<0 (x1(t)>0); or (iii) c0 is smaller. 
  The analytical results of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2a provide insights on the 
tensions faced by managers when implementing an ambidextrous knowledge creation 
strategy. First, both exploration and exploitation improve mean performance, as noted in 
Corollaries 2b and 2c. Second, as the marginal value of an additional unit of variance 
(λ1(t), x1(t)) becomes increasingly positive (negative), then the optimal rate of 
exploitation decreases (increases), while the optimal rate of exploration increases 
(decreases). Third, from Equation (2) while the variance is decreasing in the rate of 
exploitation, the marginal effectiveness of exploitation for reducing the variance is 
improved at higher levels of the variance, which results from earlier exploration. Our 
model therefore captures the paradoxical challenges associated with balancing 
exploration and exploitation.  Exploration and exploration are simultaneously (i) 
substitutes in improving the mean, (ii) opposites with respect to increasing versus 
decreasing the variance and (ii) complements in the long-term benefits of higher levels of 




  March (1991) cautions of the potential dangers of over-exploring and over-
exploiting. However, as yet, there are no clear guidelines for determining at what point 
exploration and exploitation transition from being helpful to being harmful.  From 
Theorem 2(i) and Corollary 2a, if the instantaneous marginal value of the variance is 
negative (λ1(t)<0 for all t∈[0,T]), the manager optimally undertakes exploitation for the 
entire innovation process. However, if the marginal value of the variance is positive 
(λ1(t)>0 for  t ∈[0,T]), there may exist an optimal stopping (starting) point for 
exploitation. That is, if λ1(t)β1σ(t)>β0λ0(t)μ(t), so that the instantaneous marginal value of 
the variance at time t is positive, but either the exploitation variance-reducing capability 
or the current variance is also large, then at some time t∈[0,T] during the planning 
horizon it may no longer be optimal for the manager to invest in exploitation. On the 
other hand, From Theorem 2(i) and Corollary 2a, if the cumulative distributed marginal 
value of the variance is positive (x1(t)>0 for all t∈[0,T]), then the manager optimally 
undertakes exploration for the entire duration of the innovation process. However, if 
x1(t)<0 where -x1(t)α1σ(t)>α0x0(t)µ(t), then at some time t∈[0,T] it may not be optimal to 
explore if the cumulative distributed marginal value of the variance is negative, but 
exploration increases the variance at a higher rate than it increases the mean. While the 
notion of exploration and exploitation learning traps are conceptually well-accepted 
(Levitt and March 1988, Levinthal and March 1993), our model provides an important 
new analytical perspective for identifying the optimal stopping (starting) point in order to 
avoid over-investing in exploration and exploitation.  
  The above discussions assume that both exploration and exploitation on average 
increase the mean performance (α0,α1>0). The importance of this assumption is clear. 
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Given a scenario in which the marginal value of the variance is negative, then if 
exploration also decreases the mean expected performance (α0<0), Equation (ii) in 
Theorem 2 is negative and it is never optimal to explore. As such, a feasible balancing 
strategy between exploration and exploitation would not exist, thereby leading to the 
trivial solution of investing in exploitation only. Although we do not explicitly consider 
the case where exploration decreases the mean performance (α0<0), we do however 
consider scenarios where exploration has negligible benefits for improving the 
innovation’s mean performance (α0≈0).    
3.5.1 Sequential versus Fixed-Dominant Knowledge Creation Strategies 
  Given the dynamic nature of the knowledge creation process, changes in the 
marginal value of the variance can cause the optimal relative emphasis on investments in 
exploration and exploitation to change over time (Thomke 1998). As a result, following 
from Theorems 2 and Corollary 3 below, we are able define four possible dynamic 
strategies which may occur, which are highlighted in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Possible Temporal Ambidexterity Strategies 
Fixed  
Dominance 
Fixed Exploitation–Dominant Exploitation exceeds exploration throughout innovation 
process. 




Sequential Explore–Exploit Exploration initially exceeds exploitation, then vice 
versa. 
Sequential Exploit–Explore Exploitation initially exceeds exploration, then vice 
versa. 
  
COROLLARY 3. An optimal switching time may exist at ts where ts∈(0,T) such that 
i*(ts)=e*(ts) holds. In particular, if i*(ts)>e*(ts) for t< ts and i*(ts)<e*(ts) for t> ts, the 
manager optimally pursues a sequential explore-exploit strategy. If the reverse holds, the 
manager optimally pursues a sequential exploit-explore strategy.   
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The manager may optimally pursue a fixed exploration-dominant or fixed 
exploitation-dominant strategy if the conditions i*(t)>e*(t) or e*(t)>i*(t) holds for all 
t∈[0,T], respectively. In the fixed exploitation-dominant strategy the rate of exploitation 
always exceeds the rate of exploration, so that uncertainty is continuously reduced over 
time. This strategy is consistent with a stage-gate innovation process, which is focused on 
screening an initial population of ideas for feasibility and continuously reducing 
uncertainty over time (Cooper 1990). In contrast, in the fixed exploration-dominant 
strategy the rate of exploration always exceeds the rate of exploitation, so that uncertainty 
is increasing over time. This suggests a process of ongoing search for new ideas.  
As the process of knowledge creation proceeds, the marginal benefit of one or the 
other mode of knowledge creation could either increase or decrease over time. Therefore, 
the manager may optimally switch the team’s focus from one dominant mode of 
knowledge creation to the other at a switching time, ts as noted in Corollary 3 (Thomke 
1998). We refer to the dynamic strategy as a sequential explore-exploit (sequential 
exploit-explore) strategy if before the switching time the rate of exploration (exploitation) 
optimally dominates, and after the switching time the rate of exploitation (exploration) 
optimally dominates.  
A sequential explore-exploit sequence suggests that the manager initially focuses 
on increasing the variance and then switches to focus on resolving uncertainty later in the 
innovation process. This sequential strategy is the most commonly cited strategy in the 
literature (Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). However, from 
Corollary 3, we are also able to identify conditions under which a sequential exploit-
explore dynamic knowledge creation strategy optimally occurs, in which the innovation 
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team initially focuses on resolving uncertainty and later focuses on generating new ideas 
(Koput 1997, Thomke 1998, Biazzo 2009). Therefore, our model provides analytic 
conditions under which this atypical exploit-explore dynamic knowledge creation 
strategy could arise. Further discussion of the optimal timing of the peak rates of 
exploration and exploitation is given in the next section.  
3.5.2 Front-Loaded versus Back-Loaded Knowledge Creation Strategies 
  Beyond determining the relative rates of exploration and exploitation, we are also 
interested in defining at what point during the innovation process the innovation team 
optimally focuses the peak efforts on each activity. We define the knowledge creation 
efforts as front-loaded when the rate of a knowledge creation activity is positive and 
decreasing (de*(t)/dt<0 or di*(t)/dt<0 for all t∈[0,T]),) whereby the peak rate of 
investment occurs at the initial time (Thomke and Fujimoto 2000, Thomke 2001, Carrillo 
and Gaimon 2004, Ozkan et al. 2009). There are various theories which promote the 
optimality of front-loading development activities. Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) notion 
of absorptive capacity suggests front-loading knowledge creation investments in order to 
maximize the benefits of cumulative knowledge, which improves the marginal 
effectiveness of future knowledge creation activities. In contrast, we define the 
knowledge creation efforts as back-loaded when the rate of a knowledge creation activity 
is positive and increasing (de*(t)/dt>0 or di*(t)/dt>0 for all t∈[0,T]), whereby the peak 
rate of investment occurs at the terminal time (Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, Ozkan et al. 
2009, Fixson and Marion 2012). Finally, we define the knowledge creation strategy as a 
delay strategy if the peak rate of investments optimally occurs at some intermediate time 
t∈(0,T), whereby we obtain an inverse U-shaped solution. 
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THEOREM 3. The optimal rates of change of investment in exploitation and exploration 
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Taken together, Theorem 3 along with Corollaries 1(a) and 1(b) provide the 
conditions under which the manager optimally front-loads, delays or back-loads the peak 
levels of investment in exploitation and exploitation.  As a result of the benefits of the 
mean to the objective, both exploration and exploitation are driven to be front-loaded. 
Additionally, for both exploration and exploitation, the two terms which are multiplied by 
α1 and β1, could be either positive or negative. Given σ(t) is always positive, then the 
determination of whether the manager invests in exploration and exploitation at an 
increasing or decreasing rate is a function of: (i) the instantaneous and cumulative 
distributed marginal value of the of variance (λ1(t), x1(t)); (ii) the marginal value of 
generating versus reducing the variance, earlier versus later in the innovation process 
(dλ1(t)/dt, dx1(t)/dt); and (iii) the innovation team’s relative rates of variance reduction 
versus variance at time t, which determine the sign of  dσ(t)/dt. Based on these three 
drivers, we discuss conditions under which the peak investments in exploitation and 
exploration are driven to occur earlier versus later in the innovation process.   
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COROLLARY 4a. The manager optimally invests in exploitation at a non-increasing rate 
at time t, if the following conditions hold for t∈[0,T]: (i)  λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, dσ(t)/dt<0 
or  (ii) λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, dσ(t)/dt>0. 
If the conditions in Corollary 4a(i) hold then exploitation is front-loaded 
(de*(t)/dt<0). Based on Corollary 1b.I when the manager’s objectives are aligned, such 
that he risk-averse in both the short-term and the long-term (Ps<0 and PL<0), then it is 
likely that the marginal value of the variance is negative and increasing (λ1(t)<0, 
dλ1(t)/dt>0). Also, consider a situation where the variance would be decreasing over time 
(dσ(t)/dt<0). This situation occurs when the team’s variance reduction capabilities 
outpace the rate of variance generation. For example, the innovation team may 
demonstrate superior variance reduction capabilities if they have access to advanced 
technologies for testing, screening and other uncertainty reduction methods, that is if 
β1>>α1 (Thomke 2001). Under the conditions defined in Corollaries 4a(i) and 1b.I, 
investing in exploitation to reduce the variance is not only more valuable, but also more 
effective, earlier in the innovation process, as the marginal variance reduction from 
exploitation is highest when variance is at its maximum at the beginning of the 
innovation process. Alternatively, from Corollaries 4a(ii) exploitation is front-loaded if 
the marginal value of the of variance is positive and increasing for all t∈[0,T], (λ1(t)>0, 
dλ1(t)/dt>0) while the variance is increasing (dσ(t)/dt>0). However, from Theorem 2, 
since the optimal rate of exploitation decreases as the marginal value of the variance 
becomes positive this second scenario is unlikely to occur, unless the mean effects from 
exploitation dominate the variance effects. 
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Recall from Theorem 3(i) that the sum of the two terms which are multiplied by 
β0, respectively, are negative, while the two terms which are multiplied β1, could be 
either positive or negative. Therefore, from Theorem 3 and Corollary 4a(ii), exploitation 
is driven towards a back-loaded strategy if the marginal value of the variance is 
decreasing throughout the innovation process for t∈[0,T]. From Corollary 1b.III, this 
scenario is most likely to occur if the short-term and long-term performance objectives 
are not aligned so that the manager is risk-seeking in the short-term, PS>0, but risk-averse 
in the long-term, PL<0. A back-loaded strategy is reinforced with increasing variance, so 
that the variance reduction benefits from absorptive capacity, peak later in the innovation 
process when the level of the variance reaches its maximum value.  
COROLLARY 4b. The manager optimally invests in exploration at a non-increasing rate 
at time t, if the following conditions hold for t∈[0,T]: (i) x1(t)>0, dx1(t)/dt<0, dσ(t)/dt>0 
or (ii) x1(t)<0, dx1(t)/dt<0, dσ(t)/dt<0.  
If the conditions in Corollary 4b(i) hold then exploration is front-loaded 
(di*(t)/dt<0). Based on Corollary 1b.II when the manager’s objectives are aligned, such 
that he risk-seeking in both the short-term and the long-term (Ps<0 and PL<0), then it is 
likely that the cumulative distributed marginal value of the variance is positive and 
decreasing (x1(t)<0, dx1(t)/dt>0), while the variance is increasing (dσ(t)/dt>0).  From 
Corollary 4b(ii), exploration is also optimally front-loaded when, among other 
conditions, the cumulative distributed marginal value of the variance is negative and 
decreasing over time. However, from Theorem 2, since the optimal rate of exploration 
decreases as the marginal value of the variance becomes negative this second scenario is 
unlikely to occur, unless the mean effects from exploration dominate the variance effects. 
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Recall from Theorem 3(i) that sum of the two terms which are multiplied by α0, 
are negative, while the two terms which are multiplied α1, could be either positive or 
negative. Given σ(t) is always positive, then based on Theorem 3 and Corollary 4b, 
exploration is more desirable later in the innovation process when the marginal value of 
the variance is increasing. From Corollary 1b.IV, this scenario is most likely to occur if 
the short-term and long-term performance objectives are not aligned, so that the manager 
wants to reduce variance in performance in the short-term, PS<0, and increase variance in 
the long-term, PL>0. Furthermore, from Theorem 3(ii) a back-loaded exploration strategy 
is reinforced with increasing variance, so that absorptive capacity peaks later in the 
development process. The variance is increasing over time when the variance generation 
capabilities of exploration dominate the variance reducing effects of exploitation 
(α1>>β1). For example, in the drug development process, advances in combinatorial 
chemistry have facilitated superior variance generation capabilities which allow the 
automated generation of numerous variants of potential drug compounds (Thomke 2001).  
3.6 Numerical Analysis and Managerial Insights 
  In the analytical insights presented above, we examine factors which determine 
how various optimal temporal ambidexterity strategies, for simultaneously investing in 
exploration and exploitation over time may endogenously arise. From Theorem 3, three 
possible optimal dynamic strategies are identified for each mode of learning: a front-
loaded strategy, a back-loaded strategy and a delay strategy. As such, there are nine 
possible combined temporal ambidexterity strategies. In this section, we present and 
discuss the results from extensive numerical analysis to illustrate several of the nine 
possible temporal ambidexterity strategies which may arise, including those not 
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previously discussed in the literature (see Table 3.2 below).  
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  In Cases 1-4 we examine the impact of several key factors which impact the 
optimal temporal ambidexterity strategy, namely: (i) the initial knowledge with which the 
innovation team is endowed, (μ(0),σ(0)), (ii) the marginal effectiveness of exploration 
and exploitation, (α0, β0, α1, β1), and (iii) the manager’s dynamic short-term and long-
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term risk preferences (PS, PL).  Details of the numerical analyses are provided in 
Appendix B. 
  In Cases 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D, we consider a manager whose short-term and long-
term performance objectives are aligned, such that he is risk-averse with respect to 
performance outcomes achieved in both timeframes (Corollary 1b.I).  On the other hand, 
in Cases 2A and 2B we assume that the manager is risk-seeking in both the short-term 
and the long-term (Corollary 1b.II).  In contrast to Cases 1 and 2, in which the manager’s 
short-term and long-term objectives are aligned, in Case 3 we assume that the manager is 
risk-seeking in the short-term, (i.e., with an aim to maximize the upper bound during the 
innovation process), but risk-averse in the long-term (i.e., tries to limit low performance 
of the final innovation outcomes) (Corollary 1b.III).  Alternatively, in Case 4, we assume 
that the manager is risk-averse in the short-term but risk-seeking in the long-term 
(Corollary 1b.IV).   
  In the Cases 1A-1D, the manager is risk-averse in the short-term and long-term. 
These cases are important since the literature reflects many instances of venture investors 
and managers who are risk-averse with respect to the performance outcomes both during 
as well as at the end of the innovation process (Tian and Wang 2011).  To explore the 
temporal ambidexterity strategies which may optimally occur for the risk-averse 
manager, we consider five subcases.  
  In Case 1A, we assume that the innovation team begins the innovation process 
with a large pool of initial ideas, so that the initial variance of the performance outcomes 
is large (i.e., σ(0) large). Furthermore, the manager is also able to explore various new 
innovation alternatives, with the possibility of discovering either a highly effective or 
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highly ineffective solution (i.e., α1 large). However, on average, the exploration provides 
negligible improvements in the mean performance (i.e., α0 small). Under these conditions 
from Theorem 2(ii), it is not optimal to explore and the manager pursues a front-loaded 
exploitation-only strategy. The fixed exploitation-dominant strategy, which endogenously 
arises in the risk-averse setting, is related to the stage-gate process, whereby performance 
uncertainty is continuously reduced over time (see Appendix Figure B5). 
  In Case 1B, we also assume that the initial variance of the performance outcomes 
is large (i.e., σ(0) large). However, we assume that exploration techniques are available 
with superior capabilities to improve the mean performance (i.e., α0>>β0). Under these 
conditions the manager optimally front-loads exploitation and delays the peak rate of 
exploration. However, in this fixed exploitation-dominant strategy, exploration is always 
pursued at a smaller rate and there may also exist an optimal starting time (see Appendix 
Figure B6). Pursuing exploration in a risk-averse environment is counterintuitive, and 
this highlights the importance of considering, not only the variance effects, but also the 
mean effects of exploration on performance. 
In Case IC, consistent with Case 1B, we assume that the innovation team has 
access to exploration techniques with the capability to improve the mean performance. 
However, in Case 1C we also assume that the team starts the development process with a 
low  variance, such that the initial range of performance outcomes is very limited and 
precisely achievable (i.e., σ(0) small). Under these conditions, it is still optimal for the 
manager to pursue a fixed exploitation-dominant strategy. However, relative to Case 1B 
(see Appendix, Figure B6), when the initial variance, σ(0), is small, it is increasingly 
valuable to invest in exploration (see Appendix, Figure B7). This case highlights the 
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importance of early exploration, even in a risk-averse environment. When the initial 
variance is small, the innovation team should optimally engage in early exploration. By 
adhering to this optimal policy, the team can avoid the inherent pitfall of converging on a 
final solution, too early (Leonardi 2011). This allows the innovation team to gain a better 
understanding of the design space and the potential technical alternatives. By generating 
variance early in the planning horizon, the team is able to observe a wide range of 
outcomes, including failures, which enhance the marginal effectiveness of future 
exploitation, in order to meet the risk-averse objectives (Thomke 1998, Thomke and 
Fujimoto 2000).  
  In Case 1D, we demonstrate that the propensity to invest in exploration in a risk-
averse setting, given low initial variance, is reinforced and magnified as the cost of 
exploration is reduced (Austin et al. 2012). Compared to Case 1C (see Appendix Figure 
B7), as the cost of exploration is reduced, the risk-averse manager eventually pursues a 
sequential explore-exploit strategy in which exploration dominates early in the innovation 
process, and exploitation dominates later (see Appendix Figure B8). Importantly, 
therefore, we provide a set of conditions, with respect to short and long-term performance 
objectives, as well as prior knowledge and the cost of learning, under which the 
managerial policy to “fail-early, fail-cheap” could endogenously arise (Thomke 2001, 
Austin et al. 2012). Highlighting the benefits of a sequential explore-exploit strategy 
within an innovation project, Lenfle and Loch (2010) qualitatively capture these findings: 
“the project manager found himself iteratively working through the process steps… 
adding modifications that had not been foreseen in the original design...In the end, the 
project manager was demoted and a new team brought in. This (new) team ... identified 
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130 “quality problems,” and fixed these over another 12 months with a strict phased 
planning approach. After this period, ramp-up was successful, and the facility reached its 
design capacity. The company concluded that the second team had won the day with 
better, more disciplined methods. However, this analysis failed to recognize that…the 
subsequent “rigorous planning” phase succeeded only because this fundamental work 
had been carried out first.” (p. 13). 
  In Case 1E, we consider the impact of the lagged realization of the benefits from 
investing in exploration. As described in Corollary 1b.I, we show that with short-term 
and long-term risk-averse objectives (Ps<0 and PL<0), as the severity of the lagged 
realization becomes more delayed the cumulative distributed marginal value of the 
variance becomes larger relative to the instantaneous marginal value of the variance, so 
that the manager optimally undertakes even greater amounts of exploration early in the 
development process (see Appendix Figure B9). This scenario numerically demonstrates 
the interesting and counterintuitive experimental findings presented by Abdellaoui et al. 
(2011) which empirically demonstrate that performance delays can increase the 
propensity for risk-taking. 
  In contrast to the risk-averse setting in Cases 1A-1E, we now consider a manager 
who is risk-seeking with respect to both the short-term and long-term objectives, such 
that the marginal value of the variance is positive and decreasing (Corollary 1b.II). In 
Case 2A, we consider the impact of the lagged realization of the benefits from investing 
in exploration. In this risk-seeking setting, as the effects of exploration are increasingly 
delayed, the manager optimally expedites and also reduces the rates of investment in 
exploration, so that the optimal solution moves from a fixed dominant-exploration to a 
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sequential explore-exploit strategy. As described in Corollary 1b.II, as the severity of the 
lagged realization is more delayed, the cumulative distributed marginal value of the 
variance is smaller, so that the manager optimally undertakes less exploration (see 
Appendix Figure B10). This scenario numerically demonstrates the intuitive result that, 
as the lag becomes more pronounced the incentive to invest in exploration is reduced, 
with risk-seeking objectives. Our results highlight an important finding that, for managers 
faced with inter-temporal risk-taking decisions, a time lag between initiating the 
investment and realizing the outcome from exploration may act as either an incentive or 
disincentive to invest, depending on whether the manager is risk-averse versus risk-
seeking, respectively (Abdellaoui et. al 2011).  
   In Case 2B, we consider a situation in which the marginal impact to the mean 
from exploitation is low and the initial variance is small. Under these conditions, we find 
that the manager optimally pursues a fixed exploitation-dominant strategy (see Appendix 
Figure B11). This is an interesting result, as it specifies conditions under which, counter-
intuitively, a risk-seeking manager focuses on exploitation and uncertainty reduction.  
Managerially, we show that if prior knowledge indicates that the initial performance 
outcomes have very low variance, the manager optimally pursues low cost incremental 
innovation activities. In other research, managers are cautioned against an over-reliance 
on uncertainty-reducing exploitation in a risk-seeking setting, whereby exploitative core 
capabilities may become core-rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992).  However, our findings 
provide conditions, under which excessive prior exploitation experience (i.e., small initial 




  Lastly, we consider two important scenarios in which short-term versus long-term 
performance objectives are not aligned (Das and Teng 1997). In Case 3, we consider a 
manager who is risk-seeking in the short-term but risk-averse in the long term (Wu and 
Knott 2006). Consistent with Corollaries 1b.III, 4a and 4b the manager optimally pursues 
a sequential explore-exploit strategy, in which he front-loads exploration but back-loads 
exploitation. Importantly, reflecting the insights from Corollary 2a, there exists an 
optimal stopping point for exploration (see Appendix Figure B12).  
  In Case 4, we consider a manager who is risk-averse with respect to his short-term 
objective but risk-seeking with respect to his long-term objective (Van de Ven and Polley 
1992). This scenario may reflect a situation in which the manager seeks to demonstrate 
and report his intermediate progress with a high degree of certainty in order to ensure 
sufficient ongoing funding so as not to “sink the boat” (p. 61) (Dickson and Giglierano 
1986). However, at the same time, he may be risk-seeking in the longer term, so as not to 
“miss the boat” (p. 62) regarding the market opportunity for the innovation (Dickson and 
Giglierano 1986). Consistent with Corollaries 1b.IV, 4a and 4b, the manager optimally 
front-loads exploitation to reduce uncertainty in the short-term but back-loads exploration 
toward the end of the innovation process to increase the upside potential of realizing a 
breakthrough innovation outcome. Note that, there may exist an optimal starting point for 
exploration. Furthermore, although the manager is risk-seeking in the long term, the peak 
rate of exploration occurs prior to the terminal time due to the delayed realization of the 
benefits of exploration (see Appendix Figure B13).  
3.7 Conclusions 
  Within a single organizational unit, pursuing a temporal ambidexterity strategy 
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has been advocated as an alternative to pursuing an organizational or functional-domain 
ambidexterity strategy, in which paradoxical exploration and exploitation activities are 
disbursed across multiple organizational units (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Siggelkow 
and Levinthal 2003, Lavie et al. 2010).  There have been several calls to add “time” as an 
important research lens through which to examine the concept of ambidexterity (Raisch 
et al. 2009, Lavie et al. 2010, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). To date, a limited body of 
research has leveraged qualitative and simulation-based studies to gain insights on the 
drivers, mechanisms and outcomes related to a temporal ambidexterity strategy.  
However, a normative model of temporal ambidexterity has not yet been proposed, so 
that the optimal sequence of exploration and exploitation activities is not specified in the 
literature. We respond to this gap in the literature by introducing a dynamic model of 
knowledge creation from exploration and exploitation. We contribute to the theory of 
temporal ambidexterity by providing new analytical insights on the inter-temporal 
tradeoffs, conflicts and synergies which may occur when simultaneously pursuing 
exploration and exploitation.  
  Our model embodies several elements that have been shown to be empirically and 
conceptually critical in theorizing a model of ambidexterity. Importantly, we capture the 
ways in which exploration and exploitation are not only paradoxical and contradictory 
forces in the knowledge creation process, but can also serve as substitutes and 
complements (Gupta et al. 2006). First, the model captures the opposing variance-
inducing and variance-reducing characteristics of exploration and exploitation, 
respectively. Moreover, we also model the contrasting lagged realization of the payoffs 
from investing in exploration, versus the instantaneous benefits of investing in 
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exploitation.  Second, we consider that exploration and exploitation act as substitutes, as 
both can increase the mean innovation performance outcome. Third, we recognize that 
exploration and exploitation may also be considered as complements, which provide 
synergies in the knowledge creation process. We incorporate this dynamic 
interdependence between exploration and exploitation through the inclusion of the effect 
of absorptive capacity. This feature of our model allows us to capture how prior 
investments in exploration and exploitation impact the effectiveness of future investments 
in exploration and exploitation.  
  Our results provide insights to aid managers identify effective strategies for 
pursuing knowledge creation and innovation under various risk objectives. While the 
analytical literature largely assumes a risk-averse, failure-sensitive decision-maker, the 
process of innovation and knowledge creation must necessarily assume that managers are 
likely to be risk-seeking and failure-tolerant in many cases. We examine the impact of 
these varying risk objectives on optimal temporal ambidexterity strategies.  In a key 
result of the paper, we demonstrate that adopting a policy to “fail-early, fail-cheap” 
(Thomke 2001) may in-fact be the optimal strategy for a risk-averse manager, given a 
small initial pool of innovation solutions. Beyond establishing the boundary conditions 
for this sequential explore-exploit strategy, in which exploration precedes exploitation 
(Rothaermel and Deeds 2004), we are also able provide analytic insights on the 
conditions under which alternate dynamic knowledge creation strategies may 
endogenously arise. For example, we provide the conditions under which, contrary to 
commonly held wisdom to continuously reduce uncertainty, it may be optimal to employ 
a sequential strategy in which exploitation precedes exploration, such that the uncertainty 
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of innovation outcomes continues to evolve towards the end of the planning horizon 
(Leonardi 2011). Finally, by incorporating the lagged effects of exploration, and 
modeling the decision maker’s dynamic risk preferences and short-term versus long-term 
objectives (Das and Teng 1997, Fried and Slowik 2004), we provide insights for 
managers faced with inter-temporal risk-taking decisions. Importantly, we demonstrate 
that the lagged effects exploration may act as either an incentive or disincentive to invest, 
depending on whether the manager is risk-averse versus risk-seeking, respectively 
(Abdellaoui et. al 2011). Collectively, our analytical results enable us to provide insights 
on the optimal sequencing of knowledge creation activities in the innovation process. As 
a managerial aid, our analytical results also highlight the optimal starting and/or stopping 
points which should be observed in order to avoid succumbing to possible exploration or 
exploitation learning traps (Levitt and March 1988, Levinthal and March 1993). 
   While our normative approach provides substantial insights, future opportunities 
exist to extend the model analytically. First, we recognize that other modeling features 
could be investigated. For example, there is an opportunity to examine the manager’s 
budget creation and funding control mechanisms (Chao et al. 2009). Second, we do not 
consider the effects of market risk or exogenous uncertainty. As a contribution to the 
literature on ambidexterity, we believe our model provides a basis for developing testable 
empirical hypotheses of the four proposed temporal ambidexterity strategies: fixed 
exploration-dominant, fixed exploitation-dominant, sequential explore-exploit and 
sequential exploit-explore. Future empirical work which builds on our proposed dynamic 
knowledge creation model is needed to further develop an understanding of temporal 
ambidexterity. For example, a longitudinal study across one or many innovation teams 
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could provide a basis for testing the conditions under which different temporal 




4. A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL OF EXPLORATION AND 
EXPLOITATION UNDER CO-OPETITION 
4.1 Introduction 
A technology-based firm achieves a competitive advantage by developing an 
innovation which demonstrates technologically superior product performance relative to 
the technology alternatives currently available in the market (Ali et al. 1993, Sorescu et 
al. 2003, Sood and Tellis 2009). For example, in the disk drive industry firms compete on 
technical performance as measured by relative disk gate density (Lerner 1997, Franco et 
al. 2010) or relative processing speed (Khanna 1995). Since a firm’s ability to innovate is 
largely a function of its knowledge resources and capabilities, competitive advantage is 
derived by a firm’s ability to effectively and efficiently generate, acquire and deploy 
knowledge. However, for firms which operate in high-tech, high-risk, capital-intensive 
domains, often knowledge-sharing, resource-sharing, and risk-sharing are important 
strategies to consider (Gnyawali and Park 2011). Furthermore, a firm may even need to 
consider the option of knowledge-sharing with its direct competitors (Hamel 1991, 
Khanna et al. 1998, Baum et al. 2000, Spencer 2003). A classic example is the joint 
development of the LCD technology by Sony Corporation and Samsung Electronics, two 
firms that are direct competitors in the flat screen display market (Gnyawali and Park 
2011).  The strategy of collaborating with competitors is referred to as co-opetition 
(Walley 2007). Research suggests that firms which participate in cooperative 
development and knowledge-sharing achieve greater levels of innovation (Cellini and 
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Lambertini 2002, Spencer 2003, McGill and Santoro 2009).  However, the resource based 
view of the firm proposes that competitive advantage is sustained from having high levels 
of proprietary information. Therefore, if a firm elects to participate in a knowledge-
sharing partnership with its competitor, a critical decision is the extent to which it should 
focus on its private benefits, which drives its relative competitive advantage (Barney 
1991), versus the collective benefits of the cooperative partnership (Kanter 1994), both of 
which can contribute to improved firm performance.  For the remainder of the paper, we 
introduce the term co-opetitive partner to refer to a firm which partners with one of its 
direct competitors. 
In this paper, we introduce a differential game model to examine the incentives 
which drive a firm to invest in its own knowledge creation as well as knowledge-sharing 
with its co-opetitive partner. Our model of co-opetitive learning allows us to examine 
how both competition and cooperation impact the rate, timing and sequence of the 
knowledge creation activities which a firm undertakes.  We provide insights on how a 
firm should optimally manage its knowledge sharing exchanges, in order to balance the 
potential benefits of cooperation, against the potential threat of being “out-learned and 
out-competed by the competitor-partner” (Gnyawali and Park 2011, p. 657). Our 
analytical results provide a better understanding of the motivating factors which drive 
empirically observed alliance dysfunctions, wherein organizations delay knowledge-
sharing and withhold information from their alliance partners (Hamel 1991, Khanna et al. 
1998, Müller 2010).  
Research suggests that a firm may limit the scope of its knowledge-sharing 
exchanges, as one mechanism for protecting against excessive knowledge loss and the 
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potential loss of competitive advantage (Oxley and Samson 2004). We contribute to this 
dialogue by examining how a firm’s participation in different types of knowledge sharing 
exchanges may affect the incentives to exchange knowledge with, or to withhold 
knowledge from, a co-opetitive partner. Specifically, we consider two types of 
knowledge-sharing alliances: (i) an exploration alliance, which is focused on risk-taking 
and discovering new technologies, and (ii) an exploitation alliance, which is focused on 
risk-reduction and on refining and extending existing technologies (Colombo et al. 2006, 
Im and Rai 2008).  We extend our earlier single firm mean-variance model of exploration 
and exploitation learning, described in Chapter 3, and introduce a differential game 
model to examine the moderating impact of competition and cooperation on a firm’s 
optimal knowledge creation strategy. Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) show that alliances 
which undertake a specific sequence of activities, initially focusing on exploration and 
then later focusing on exploitation, outperform those which do not follow this sequence. 
However, they do not consider the possibility that the alliance partners are also direct 
competitors. We contribute to the research streams on exploration/exploitation, learning 
alliances, and co-opetition by examining the optimal sequencing of exploration and 
exploitation activities undertaken by co-opetitive partners, and provide examples where 
the typical explore-then-exploit sequential strategy, versus other alternate sequential 
strategies, may be optimal. We show how the optimal sequence of knowledge creation 
from exploration and exploitation and a firm’s incentives and disincentives for 
knowledge sharing are influenced by: (i) the firm’s participation in an exploration versus 
an exploitation alliance, (ii) the competitive performance payoff regime, and (iii) the 
firm’s knowledge creation capabilities and the initial knowledge with which it is 
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endowed. Collectively, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the challenge 
and opportunities for a firm faced with the strategic imperative of engaging in a 
knowledge-sharing partnership with its competitor. By extrapolating from our analytic 
results, we offer managerial guidelines to determine “how much” and what knowledge 
should be shared, when, with whom, and under what conditions” (Loebecke et al. 1999). 
4.2 Related Literature 
4.2.1 Innovation and Competition 
Two competing theories of the incentives for innovation under competition are 
the Arrowian and Schumpeterian hypotheses. The Arrowian hypothesis states that 
competition encourages innovation while the Schumpeterian hypothesis proposes that 
monopoly market power encourages innovation. Cellini and Lambertini (2002) examine a 
dynamic model of research and development investment under competition. They find 
support for the Arrowian hypothesis that innovation efforts aimed at product 
differentiation increase with competition. Oraiopoulos and Kavadias (2008) develop a 
two-period model to determine how competing firms choose between investing in an 
unexplored versus an explored technological domain. They find that competition 
motivates exploration and more intense resource allocation. On the other hand, Boudreau 
et al. (2011) empirically find that competition discourages innovation efforts. Research 
also examines the impact of a firm’s relative competitive standing as an incentive for 
innovation.  Lerner (1997) finds that firms which do not have a competitive advantage 
have greater incentive to innovate. It is important to recognize that in Lerner (1997), 
Cellini and Lambertini (2002) and Oraiopoulos and Kavadias (2008), the decision maker 
selects and/or optimizes the level of effort for a single mode of innovation. In contrast, in 
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our dynamic game, we consider how a firm’s competitive environment impacts its 
incentive to balance and sequence its investments in both exploration and exploitation 
knowledge creation activities throughout the innovation process.  
4.2.2 Innovation and Cooperation 
Several studies also examine the benefits of knowledge sharing and cooperation 
to improve innovation outcomes (McGill and Santoro 2009, Hora and Dutta 2012). Deeds 
and Hill (1996) show that technical and commercial success is increasing in the level of 
alliance participation for biotechnology firms. Spencer (2003) finds that, in the flat panel 
display industry, innovation performance improves with the degree of knowledge that a 
firm shares. Research therefore recognizes that a critical incentive for investing in 
knowledge creation is the availability of external sources of technical knowledge, 
referred to as the “technological opportunity” (Kamien and Schwartz 1975, Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). Consistent with this view, Cellini and Lambertini (2002) develop an 
analytical model and demonstrate that research efforts aimed at product differentiation 
are increasing in R&D cooperation.  Rothaermel and Alexandre (2009) propose that 
firm’s innovative performance is a function of a balance between internal and external 
knowledge sourcing, as well as a balance between exploration and exploitation.   
4.2.3 Innovation and Learning under Co-opetition 
While the benefits of R&D cooperation and alliance formation are well accepted, 
for innovation and product differentiation, research also exists that highlights the 
challenges and potential disadvantages of knowledge-sharing. The disincentives for 
knowledge-sharing are particularly pertinent in cases where a firm must cooperate with 
its direct competitor (Hamel 1991, Inkpen 2000). Research has begun to examine the 
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tradeoffs involved in balancing a firm’s cooperative incentives versus its competitive 
disincentives for sharing knowledge. Ozkan (2009) introduces two models to examine the 
incentives for competitive versus cooperative knowledge development. In the cooperative 
Stackelberg game model, they consider a leader and a follower that jointly develop 
knowledge and also enter the market together as a joint venture, based on the cumulative 
knowledge generated by the partnership.  In the competitive Stackelberg game model, 
they consider a one-way transfer of knowledge in which the source firm has the option to 
sell or license knowledge to a recipient firm. After the knowledge transfer, both firms 
pursue additional knowledge development separately and then compete in the 
marketplace. They find that the recipient firm’s decision to purchase knowledge is not 
only a function of the price of the knowledge, but also depends on the customer’s 
valuation of the knowledge and the probability of successful development.  In contrast to 
Ozkan (2009), however, we consider two-way knowledge sharing. Furthermore, our 
model also differs in that we assume that each firm freely reveals its knowledge to its 
competitor, without receiving compensation. As a result of this modeling assumption, we 
are able to examine and gain a better understanding of a firm’s incentives for free-
revealing and participating in open source innovation with its competitor (Von Hippel 
and von Krogh 2003, 2006). The two-way knowledge-sharing feature of our model 
allows us to capture the positive benefits, and also the negative consequences of engaging 
in knowledge-sharing partnerships. As such, we explain how a firm balances the tradeoff 
between the synergistic benefits knowledge-sharing, which can improve the donor firm’s 
innovative performance, against the potential negative impacts of knowledge-sharing, if 
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the recipient is able to use the knowledge gained, to the donor firm’s eventual 
competitive disadvantage (Khanna et al. 1998, Loebecke et al. 1999).  
 To date the literature on co-opetition has been largely focused on conceptual 
analysis and empirical testing. However, Loebecke et al. (1999) propose a game theoretic 
modeling framework may be developed to enable researchers to gain additional insights 
on the issue of co-opetition. Furthermore, in their call for future research Loebecke et al. 
(1999) also suggest the importance of including “time” as an additional aspect to be 
studied.  Therefore, we contribute to the literature on co-opetition by introducing a 
differential game model of exploration and exploitation, which allows us to analytically 
examine the incentives for a firm to dynamically invest in knowledge creation and 
knowledge-sharing with its competitor. The differential game model allows us to 
consider the dynamic implications of a firm’s initial competitive advantage, as well as the 
fact that, while a firm may find it necessary to share knowledge, the optimal timing for 
selectively revealing and sharing this knowledge may vary in different scenarios. 
Therefore, our dynamic results contribute to the open questions not only of “how much” 
and “what knowledge should be shared” but, importantly, we also provide insights on 
“when” and “under what conditions” knowledge-sharing with a co-opetitive partner is 
beneficial (Loebecke et al. 1999). 
4.2.4 Exploration, Exploitation and Risk-Taking in Innovation 
Our model differs from the related analytical knowledge-sharing models in the 
literature in that we model two different types of knowledge-sharing activities, while also 
considering the impact of competition. Firstly, we consider a case in which firms 
participate in an exploitation-based knowledge-sharing alliance which provides the 
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benefit of improved reduction of technical uncertainty (Koza and Lewin 2000, Colombo 
2006). Exploitation activities include testing and refinement of existing knowledge, 
which allows a firm to reduce the level of technical uncertainty. However, exploitation 
tends to produce more incremental innovations (March 1991, Fleming 2001, He and 
Wong 2004).  Secondly, we also consider a case in which the competing firms participate 
in an exploration-based knowledge-sharing alliance, which provides both firms with 
knowledge related to the discovery of new technologies (Koza and Lewin 2000, 
Rothaermel and Deeds 2004, Colombo 2006). Exploration is related to the generation of 
variation and trial-and-error learning, to discover new and radical innovations, which can 
possibly achieve quantum leaps in technical performance. However, by employing more 
experimental technologies, the ability to reliably predict the outcome of the innovation is 
lower (March 1991, Bohn 1994, He and Wong 2004). 
In their call for future research Loebecke et al. (1999) stress the importance of 
considering the incentives which drive participation in co-opetitive partnerships. 
Therefore, to incorporate risk-taking incentives, we build on March’s (1991) framework 
of competition for relative position in a right-tail race to be the best, versus in a left-tail 
race to avoid finishing last. Several other studies have examined the impact of 
performance incentives on risk-taking choices. Cabral (2003) examines the choice 
between a low variance versus a mean preserving high variance innovation. He shows 
that when firms compete on relative performance, in an infinite period race, the laggard 
selects the risky technology.  Tsetlin et al. (2004) also show that, to increase the 
likelihood of winning, a competitor should maximize variability if it is in a weak relative 
position, which they define as having low mean performance. On the other hand, Boyle 
104 
 
and Shapira (2012) analyze a player’s competitive strategies in the Jeopardy Tournament 
of Champions game and find that a leader, not the laggard, is more inclined to select the 
riskier strategy. While the above literature examines the impact of competition and a 
firm’s competitive advantage on the propensity for pursuing risk-taking activities, such as 
exploration, versus pursuing risk-reducing activities, such as exploitation, it does not 
consider the impact of collaboration. In contrast, we consider how a firm’s competitive 
performance regime influences its optimal knowledge-sharing strategy. Collectively, we 
contribute to the research on organizational learning, alliances, and co-opetition by 
examining the optimal sequencing of a firm’s pursuit of exploration, exploitation and 
knowledge-sharing within a co-opetitive partnership. 
4.3 A Model of Exploration and Exploitation with Cooperation and Competition 
4.3.1 A Dynamic Model of Knowledge Creation  
We consider two technology-based firms, each with a manager responsible for 
generating the knowledge necessary to develop a novel innovation. Knowledge creation 
occurs over a fixed time horizon t∈[0,T], where 0 is the initial time of the innovation 
development phase.  The terminal time T when this phase of development concludes is 
given and is the same for both firms. At the end of the development phase, t=T, both 
firms compete against each other in the market on the basis of the technical performance 
of the innovations each has developed.  
For convenience, in the remainder of the paper we consider two firms, j=1,2, 
where we refer to j=1 as the focal firm, and j=2 as the rival firm. The manager of each 
firm can invest in both exploration-based and exploitation-based modes of knowledge 
creation. Let the control variables i(t), e(t) and I(t), E(t)  denote the rates of investment in 
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exploration and exploitation at time t∈[0,T], for the focal (small letters) and the rival firm 
(capital letters), respectively. All control variables are bounded below by zero. Operating 
costs are incurred as each firm invests in exploration and exploitation.  The parameters 
reflecting the costs of exploration and exploitation are defined as c0, c1 and C0, C1, for the 
focal and the rival firm, respectively. We make no assumptions about the comparative 
cost of exploration versus exploitation a-priori. Consistent with the literature, we assume 
quadratic cost functions for both modes of knowledge creation to reflect the 
diseconomies of scale due to the disruption and coordination of larger-scale knowledge 
creation activities at any single instant in time.  
Given the uncertain outcome of the innovation development process for both 
firms, we model the technical performance of each innovation, which is achievable at 
time t as a random variable, v(t) and V(t), for the focal and the rival firm, respectively 
(March 1991, Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, Oraiopoulos and Kavadias 2008). The 
performance outcomes are assumed to be distributed according to two separate normal 
distributions, v(t)∼N(µ(t),σ(t)) and V(t)∼N(M(t),S(t)), for the focal firm and the rival 
firm, respectively. The variables µ(t), σ(t) and M(t), S(t)  denote the mean and variance of 
the performance of the innovation developed by each firm. These variables represent the 
expected performance of the innovation as well as the uncertainty associated with 
realizing that performance at time t, respectively. At the initial time, µ(0)>0 and M(0)>0 
represent the mean technical performance of each firm’s innovation at the beginning of 
the development phase, which is driven by each firm’s prior knowledge and experience. 
The variance σ(t) and S(t) reflects the range and predictability of the possible 
performance outcome achievable by the innovation developed by each firm at time t. At 
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the initial time, σ(0)>0 and S(0)>0  represent the initial variance in the technical 
performance of the innovation for each firm. The initial variance is high if the previous 
ideas pursued prior to the current development phase were highly novel, and low if they 
are based on existing and well understood technology.   
For each firm, investments in knowledge creation dynamically alter the mean and 
variance of the probability distribution that characterizes the technical performance of the 
innovation (March 1991).  Investing in exploitation generates improvements in the mean 
technical performance. Moreover, exploitation refines the firm’s existing knowledge and 
resolves uncertainty by focusing on routinizing processes, generating repeatable 
outcomes and identifying unpromising alternatives. Therefore, exploitation is said to have 
a variance-reducing effect on the innovation process. In contrast, exploration of new 
knowledge allows for the discovery of novel technological approaches which can 
substantially increase the upside potential of the technical performance of the innovation. 
However, by employing more experimental technologies, the ability to predict the 
outcome of the innovation process is lower, so that exploration is said to have a variance-
increasing effect on the innovation process (March 1991, Bohn 1994). The variance-
reducing impact of exploitation and the variance-increasing impact of exploration are 
well accepted (March 1991, Fleming 2001, He and Wong 2004).  
The mathematical relationships captured in Equations (1) and (2) reflect the 
impact of exploration and exploitation on the mean and variance of the technical 
performance of the innovation at time t, for firm j, where j = 1. Let dG/dg denote the first 
order derivative of G with respect to g. Note that α0, β0 ,α1, β1 are all positive constants. 
The coefficients α0>0 and β0>0 in Equation (1) represent the extent to which a unit of 
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exploration versus a unit of exploitation, at time t, positively impacts the level of the 
mean technical performance of the innovation.  Consistent with our empirical findings 
from Chapter 2, in the second term of Equation (2), we model the variance-reducing 
impact of exploitation at time t (March 1991, He and Wong 2004), as a  reduction in the 
variance of the technical performance of the innovation at that time. On the other hand, 
exploration at time t is assumed to have a variance-increasing effect at that time (March 
1991, He and Wong 2004), as reflected in the first term in Equation (2). The coefficients 
α1>0 and β1>0 in Equation (2) represent the extent to which a unit of exploration versus a 
unit of exploitation impacts the variance of the technical performance of the innovation 
for the focal firm j=1. The analogous equations hold for firm j=2 with a0, b0 ,a1, b1, as 
positive constants.  
4.3.2 Two-way Knowledge-Sharing of Exploration and Exploitation Knowledge 
A key incentive for investing in knowledge creation is the availability of external 
technical knowledge (Kamien and Schwartz 1975, Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Khanna et 
al. 1998, Baum et al. 2000, Spencer 2003). Equations (1) and (2) also capture the 
mechanism by which the two competing firms cooperate by participating in a two-way 
knowledge-sharing agreement.  Two elements determine the extent to which a firm 
benefits from its alliance partner’s knowledge: (i) the cumulative knowledge of the 
source firm, and (ii) the degree to which the source firm commits to participating in the 
knowledge-sharing alliance. The degree of knowledge sharing participation is higher if a 
firm reveals more knowledge. The extent of knowledge-sharing by each firm reflects an 
up-front agreement between the two firms and is assumed given (i.e., determined prior to 
the initial time). 
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We recognize that a firm can participate in either an exploration or an 
exploitation-based alliance (Rothaermael and Deeds 2004, Colombo 2006, Lavie and 
Rosenkopf 2006, Hoang and Rothaermel 2010). Consistent with the empirical literature, 
our model focuses on the variance-enhancing versus the variance-reducing benefits which 
a firm derives from participating in an exploration versus an exploitation knowledge-
sharing partnership, respectively (Schulz 2001, Rothaermael and Deeds 2004, Im and Rai 
2008). Im and Rai (2008) empirically demonstrate the variance reducing benefits of an 
exploitation knowledge-sharing alliance. In Equation (2) below, we model the benefits of 
participating in an exploitation-based alliance, which reflects the benefits of knowledge-
sharing between firms related to low-risk, short-term improvements and the refinement of 
existing systems (Im and Rai 2008). Specifically, the rate at which the focal firm reduces 
its own variance at time t is driven by three factors: (i) the focal (recipient) firm’s rate of 
variance reduction due to its own exploitation efforts, e(t),  (ii) the rival (donor) firm’s 
cumulative variance-reduction efforts, as reflected by a smaller variance at time t, S(t), 
and (iii) the rival (donor) firm’s level of participation in the exploitation knowledge-
sharing alliance, Y. Reinganum (1981) employs a similar knowledge sharing parameter 
in a model of innovation and with rivalry. We assume diminishing returns to the 
knowledge sharing benefit such that Y∈(0,1). Importantly, as the rival (donor) firm’s 
variance, S(t), is smaller (less uncertainty) then the marginal reduction in the focal 
(recipient) firm’s variance with respect to e(t) (given by  β1S(t)
-Ye(t) as it appears in the 
second term on Equation (2)), improves (note the minus sign in the power of S(t)). This 
modeling assumption is consistent with empirical research, which finds that as a donor 
organization’s level of codification of existing knowledge increases (i.e. as donor firm’s 
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performance variability is reduced (smaller S(t)), then the outflows of codified 
exploitation-related knowledge from the donor is higher (Schulz 2001). The analogous 
equations hold for the rival firm, where the focal firm’s level of participation in the 
exploitation alliance is given by g.  
Im and Rai (2008) also empirically examine the variance enhancing benefits of an 
exploration knowledge-sharing alliance. In Equation (2) below we model the benefits of 
participating in an exploration-based alliance, which reflects the benefits of knowledge-
sharing between firms related to experimentation and innovation discovery involving 
significant risk and uncertainty. Specifically, the rate at which the focal firm can increase 
its own variance at time t is driven by three factors: (i) the rate of variation generation 
due to the focal firm’s own exploration efforts, i(t), (ii) the rival (donor) firm’s 
cumulative variance enhancement efforts, as reflected by a larger variance at time t, S(t), 
and (iii) the rival (donor) firm’s level of participation in the exploration knowledge-
sharing alliance, X. We assume diminishing returns to the knowledge sharing benefit 
such that X∈(0,1). As the pool of alternative solutions generated by the donor firm 
increases (S(t) gets larger), then the focal (recipient) firm’s ability to increase its own 
variance from exploration, as given by the first term in Equation (2), increases (note the 
power of S(t) is positive). This modeling assumption is consistent with empirical research 
which finds that, as the variability and uniqueness of the donor’s knowledge is higher 
(i.e. as donor firm’s performance variability is enhanced (larger S(t)), then the outflows 
of exploration-related knowledge from the donor are higher (Schulz 2001). The 
analogous equations hold for the rival firm, where the focal firm’s level of participation 
in the exploration alliance is given by y.  
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Reflecting the above discussion, we obtain Equations (1) and (2), below. From 
Equation (1), given µ(0), i(t), and e(t)≥0, the non-negativity of µ(t) is satisfied. However, 
from Equation (2) since it is possible that the non-negativity of σ(t) could be violated we 















i e −α −
σ
= β                                      (2) 
Beyond enhancing the knowledge creation abilities of the recipient firm, a key 
benefit of knowledge sharing is the opportunity for cost sharing. Therefore, we assume 
that a firm does not incur any additional costs for benefitting from the partner’s 
knowledge or for participating in the knowledge-sharing alliance (Von Hippel and Von 
Krogh 2006).  That is, we assume that the firm, which initially generates the knowledge, 
freely reveals this knowledge and does not derive any profit from knowledge-sharing.  
However, each firm derives a non-financial benefit because it reciprocally improves its 
marginal effectiveness of knowledge creation as a result of the shared knowledge. Lastly, 
note that a firm does not derive any benefit from the knowledge-sharing alliance unless it 
independently invests in its own internal exploration and exploitation efforts (Hoang and 
Rothaermel 2010), which is necessary to integrate and deploy the shared knowledge.   
4.3.3 Competing on Knowledge in a Right-tail and Left-tail Race 
The payoff which the focal firm realizes at the end of the planning horizon is a 
function of the relative terminal performance of the innovations developed by both firms, 
f(v(T),V(T)).  Empirical research confirms the impact of the relative technical advantage 
on firm performance, with respect to increased revenues, increased firm market value or 
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an increased likelihood of firm survival (Ali 1994, Sorescu et al. 2003, Franco et al. 
2010).  For example, Franco et al. (2010) measure relative performance advantage and 
relative competitive position in the disk drive industry, based on the disk density of a 
focal firm relative to the highest disk density available in the market within the same 
year. They show that the likelihood of firm survival in the subsequent year is positively 
related to the relative technical advantage.  
Leveraging the aspiration theory (March and Shapira 1992, Wiseman and 
Bromiley 1996), we model two different competitive performance regimes.  Based on 
March’s (1991) framework of competition for relative position in a right-tail race versus 
in a left-tail race, a firm is either rewarded for having the best relative performance or 
penalized for having the worst relative performance, respectively. This is also consistent 
with the risk-taking literature which refers to survival versus aspiration targets, 
respectively (March and Shapiro 1992, March 1988). Highlighting the managerial biases 
reflected by these performance regimes, Dickson and Giglierano (1986) refer to a 
manager’s concern for either “sinking the boat” by performing below a certain minimum 
target, or “missing the boat” by failing to achieve high performance outcomes. Roels and 
Su (2013) model a similar set of performance constructs, which they refer to as behind-
averse versus ahead-seeking behaviors, respectively. 
In the first competitive performance regime, each firm considers the innovation’s 
upside potential and strives to demonstrate the highest performance relative to its 
competitor. Given the two terminal performance distributions, the likelihood of the focal 
firm achieving the highest relative competitive position increases in relation to the mean 
and variance of its own performance (March 1991, Singh and Fleming 2010), but 
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decreases in relation to the mean and variance of the rival firm’s performance (March 
1991). Therefore, we define the expected terminal payoff for a focal firm that seeks to 
achieve the best technical performance of its innovation relative to its competitor, as 
given in Equation (3) below. Our model assumption is consistent with the results 
demonstrated by Tsetlin et al. (2004) who, using simulation, confirm that higher mean 
and variance are substitutes in increasing the likelihood of winning.   
In the second competitive performance regime, a firm is penalized for having the 
lowest relative performance and therefore tries to minimize this potential downside risk. 
Given the two terminal performance distributions, the focal firm’s competitive advantage 
increases in relation to  the mean and decreases in relation to the variance of its own 
performance, but decreases in relation to the mean, and increases in relation to the 
variance of the rival firm’s performance (March 1991). Therefore, we define the expected 
terminal payoff for the focal firm that seeks to avoid the worst relative performance, as 
given in Equation (4), below. This notion of managerial risk-avoidance is consistent with 
the threat-rigidity literature (Staw et al.1981) which suggests that a firm pursues activities 
which reduce risk and uncertainty in order to limit the probability of poor outcomes and 
maximize the likelihood of firm survival, or to avoid finishing last (March 1991).   
To summarize, the focal firm maximizes the objective as defined in Equation (5) 
subject to the dynamics in Equations (1) and (2), and the non-negativity constraints on 
i(t), e(t) and σ(t). Analogous expressions hold for the rival firm (j=2). That is, the 
manager of each firm optimally invests in exploration and exploitation in order to: (i) 
minimize the cumulative expenditures incurred for knowledge creation over the 
innovation process and (ii) maximize the expected terminal payoff. The objective 
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function is captured in Equation (5) with f[v(T),V(T)] for each performance regime as 
given in in Equations (3) ((4)) under competition to achieve the best relative performance 
(avoid the worst relative performance). We solve the model separately for each 
performance regime represented by Equations (3) and (4).  
f1[v(T),V(T)]= µ(T)+σ(T)-M(T)-S(T)                                                     (3) 







- {c i +c e }dt+f[v(T),V(T)]
2 ∫      
                               (5)  
We model knowledge sharing under competition as an open loop differential 
game (Sethi and Thompson 2000). Under the open loop solution each firm pre-commits 
to an optimal knowledge creation strategy, in the sense that they do not modify their 
actions once the development process begins (Gaimon 1989). This reflects a strategy in 
which each firm assesses its internal capability and external environment to determine an 
optimal plan, which it commits to and then executes over the development horizon. It has 
been shown under certain conditions, that a player in a differential game can improve its 
performance by playing an open loop game (Jorgensen 1982, Gaimon 1989)1. Koza and 
Lewin (2000) also highlight the importance of strategic intent during the alliance 
formation process, as critical to success.  
4.4 Optimal Solutions 
The model is solved using optimal control theory (Sethi and Thompson 2000, 
Hartl and Sethi 1984).  A summary of notation appears in Table C1 of Appendix C. We 
                                                     
1 Jorgensen (1982) cites instances where both firms playing open-loop strategies outperform both playing a 
closed loop strategy including Starr and Ho (1969), Mukundan and Elsner (1975), Case (1979). Gaimon 
(1989) finds that both firms playing an open loop strategy dominates both playing the closed loop 
approach. However, if one firm plays an open game against a closed loop competitor then Gaimon shows 
the open loop player wins.   
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introduce four adjoint variables for each firm. For the focal firm, j=1, λµ(t), λσ(t), λM(t), 
and λS(t) represent the marginal value to its objective of a unit increase in its own mean 
and variance at time t, as well as a unit change in the rival’s mean and variance at time t, 
respectively. The analogous variables for the rival firm, j=2, are Lµ(t), Lσ(t), LM(t), and 
LS(t).  For the focal firm, j=1, let ησ(t) (ηS(t)) represent the Lagrange multiplier associated 
with the non-negativity constraint on σ(t) (S(t)). The required optimality conditions and 
complementary slackness conditions for ησ(t) and ηS(t) are provided in Appendix C. 
However, for simplicity, in the remainder of the paper, we assume that the constraints are 
non-binding, so that σ(t)>0, S(t)>0, ησ(t)=0 and ηS(t)=0 hold for tœ[0,T]2. Throughout the 
remainder of the paper "*"refers to an optimal solution. The optimality conditions and 
proofs appear in the Appendix C. In the remainder of this section, we provide analytical 
insights on the factors which lead to various optimal dynamic knowledge creation and 
knowledge-sharing strategies. In many cases, we are able to derive the key insights 
analytically. In other instances, we rely on numerical analysis. Details of the numerical 
analyses are provided in Appendix C.  
To simplify the analysis which follows, we consider the optimal solutions for four 
special cases (see Table 4.1). In Case 1, both firms participate in an exploration-only 
alliance in which they exchange knowledge related to variance generation, that is y>0, 
X>0, g=0, Y=0. Furthermore, in Case 1A both firms compete to achieve the best 
performance, based on the terminal payoff structure as given in Equation (3). In contrast, 
in Case 1B both firms compete to avoid the worst performance, based on the terminal 
payoff structure as given in Equation (4). In Case 2, both firms participate in an 
                                                     
2 For reasonable parameter settings, throughout the extensive  numerical analysis conducted these 
constraints were not violated. 
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exploitation-only alliance in which they exchange knowledge related to variance 
reduction, that is y=0, X=0, g>0 and Y>0. In Case 2A both firms compete to achieve the 
best performance, based on the terminal payoff structure as given in Equation (3), while 
in Case 2B both firms compete to avoid the worst performance based on the terminal 
payoff structure as given in Equation (4). 
Table 4.1: Special Cases  
Case Knowledge Sharing Alliance Type Competitive Performance Regime  
1A Exploration-only  
Knowledge-sharing alliance  
y>0, X>0, g=0, Y=0 
Compete to achieve the Best performance, f1 
1B Compete to avoid the Worst performance, f2 
2A Exploitation-only  
Knowledge-sharing alliance 
y=0, X=0, g>0, Y>0. 
Compete to achieve the Best performance, f1  
2B Compete to avoid the Worst performance, f2 
 
In each of the four cases (1A, 1B, 2A, 2B) we consider the optimal rates at which 
the manager should pursue both exploration and exploitation throughout the planning 
horizon. We define the knowledge creation strategy as front-loaded, when the rate of the 
knowledge creation activity is positive and decreasing over all time (de*(t)/dt<0 or 
di*(t)/dt<0 for t∈[0,T]), so that the peak rate occurs at the initial time (Thomke and 
Fujimoto 2000, Thomke 2001, Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, Ozkan 2009, Xiao 2012). In 
contrast, we define the knowledge creation strategy as back-loaded when the rate of the 
knowledge creation is positive and increasing over all time (de*(t)/dt>0 or di*(t)/dt>0 for 
t∈[0,T]), so that the peak rate occurs at the terminal time (Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, 
Fixson and Marion 2012, Xiao 2012). In addition, we define a delay strategy as one in 
which the maximum rate of knowledge creation optimally occurs at some time during the 
planning horizon (inverse U-shaped). Finally, we introduce the notion of a knowledge 
creation strategy referred to as a bookend strategy, whereby the manager initially front-
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loads and also later back-loads its investment in knowledge creation, (i.e., the rate of 
knowledge creation optimally reaches a minimum at some time during the planning 
horizon and is U-shaped). 
4.4.1 Case 1: Knowledge Sharing in an Exploration-only Alliance 
In Theorem 1 below, we introduce the optimal solutions for the rates of 
exploration and exploitation as well as the marginal values of the variance for the focal 
firm (j=1) within an exploration-only alliance. Recall that in Case 1, the firms exchange 
knowledge as they pursue their individual variance generation activities, so that y>0, 
X>0, g=0, Y=0 (see Table 1).  
THEOREM 1. Within an exploration-only alliance, the optimal rates of exploration and 
exploitation and the corresponding rates of change at time t satisfy Equations (6) and (7). 
The rates of change of the marginal values of an additional unit of the focal firm’s and its 
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The optimal rates of exploration and exploitation are driven by the marginal value 
to the focal firm of its own mean and variance (λμ(t), λσ(t)). Furthermore, the marginal 
value to the focal firm of its own variance (λσ(t)) is in turn a  function of the marginal 
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value to the focal firm of an increase in its rival’s variance (λS(t)).  In addition, the 
optimal rates of exploration (i*(t)) and exploitation (e*(t)) depend on the focal firm’s 
marginal effectiveness of exploration and exploitation (α0, β0 ,α1, β1) and the knowledge 
shared by the rival firm (S(t)X). To further examine the optimal solutions for an 
exploration-only alliance, as given in Theorem 1, we consider subcases 1A and 1B (see 
Table 4.1). Corollary 1A corresponds to Case 1A, whereas, Corollary 1B corresponds to 
Case 1B. 
COROLLARY 1A. For a firm operating under competition to be the best performer 
within an exploration-only alliance the marginal value to the focal firm of its own mean 
is positive and of the rival firm’s mean is negative, while the marginal value of the firm’s 
own variance and of the rival firm’s variance satisfies one of the following three cases 
for tœ[0,T]: (I) λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,T];  (II) λσ(t)≤0, 
dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1] and λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt<0 
for tœ(t1,T] where t1œ(0,T)  or (III) λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)≥0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t2] 
and λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt>0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ(t2,T] where t2œ(0,T) . The optimal 
solutions for λσ(t) and λS(t) for tœ[0,T] are illustrated in Figure C1(Appendix C). 
From the proof of Corollary 1A, the terminal marginal value to the focal firm of 
its own variance, λσ(T), is positive reflecting the benefits of increasing the likelihood of 
an extreme right tail outcome, thereby gaining the competitive advantage of being the 
best performer. Conversely, the terminal marginal value to the focal firm of an increase in 
the rival firm’s variance, λS(T), is negative since a reduction in the rival firm’s variance 
reduces the likelihood that the rival firm achieves an extreme right tail outcome. 
However, as the focal firm invests in increasing its own variance, σ(t), it also contributes 
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to improving the variance of its co-opetitive partner. Therefore, as described below, the 
firm must manage the various tensions which arise as a consequence of investing in its 
own knowledge creation, and potentially ceding its competitive advantage due to the 
knowledge gained by its co-opetitive partner.  
In Case 1A-I, under competition to be the best within an exploration alliance, the 
marginal value to the focal firm of increasing its own variance, λσ(t), is positive. 
However, the focal firm recognizes that its rival can benefit from the outflow of its own 
knowledge, (-a1I(t)yσ(t)y-1λS(t) in Equation(8)). Therefore, although it is valuable for the 
focal firm to increase its variance (λσ(t)>0), it is optimal to delay that increase until later 
in the planning horizon (dλσ(t)/dt>0). The focal firm postpones increasing its own 
variance as this also improves the rival firm’s variance, to the focal firm’s competitive 
detriment. This apprehension about sharing knowledge with its competitor gives rise to 
the focal firm adopting a dysfunctional alliance behavior, in which it delays and limits the 
extent of knowledge creation and knowledge-sharing for purposes of competitive 
deterrence (Hamel 1991, Khanna et al. 1998, Müller 2010).  On the other hand, while the 
marginal value to the focal firm of an increase in its rival’s variance is negative (λS(t)<0), 
the focal firm also recognizes that it can benefit from the knowledge inflows from its co-
opetitive partner (-α1i(t)XS(t)
X-1λσ(t) in Equation (9)). Therefore, although the marginal 
value of the rival firm’s variance is negative, the focal firm benefits from any knowledge 
inflows from the co-opetitive partnership earlier in the planning horizon (dλS(t)/dt≤0). It 
is important to recognize that as the terminal time approaches when the firms compete in 
the marketplace, the focal firm’s incentives with respect to improving its own variance 
(λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0) versus its incentives for improving its rival’s variance (λS(t)<0, 
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dλS(t)/dt≤0) are not only opposing, but also becoming less aligned. Analytically, the 
diverging magnitude and direction of the marginal value functions seem to capture 
Hamel’s (1991) observation that within strategic alliances, “as the firm moved nearer and 
nearer its goal of independence, it successively raised the ‘price’ for its continued 
participation in the alliance” (p. 88). 
Case 1A-II demonstrates that even in an exploration-only alliance, a focal firm 
competing to be the best performer may have an incentive to decrease its own variance 
early in the planning horizon (λσ(t)<0, tœ[0,t1)). Mathematically, the solution given in 
Case 1A-II applies when either of the following hold: (i) the marginal effectiveness of the 
rival firm’s variance generation capabilities or the rate of exploration of the rival 
increases (i.e., a1 or I(t) is larger) or (ii) the cumulative variance or the degree of 
knowledge-sharing of the focal firm increases (i.e., σ(t) or y is larger). Therefore, this 
case occurs when the potential competitive loss resulting from the knowledge outflow 
from the focal firm is large (-a1I(t)yσ(t)y-1λS(t)). 
Finally, under Case 1A-III, the marginal value to the focal firm of increasing its 
co-opetitive partner’s variance, λS(t), is first positive and decreasing, and then later non-
positive and decreasing. This is an interesting result as it demonstrates a possible scenario 
under which the focal firm initially has an incentive to enhance its rival’s variance in a 
right-tail race (λS(t)>0 for tœ[0,t2)). Furthermore, when the focal firm has an incentive to 
increase its rival’s variance, it is also optimal to increase its own variance earlier in the 
planning horizon (dλσ(t)/dt<0).  Consequently, under these conditions the focal firm’s 
incentives for delaying knowledge creation and knowledge-sharing are reversed relative 
to Case 1A-I. Moreover, the focal firm’s incentives with respect to improving its own 
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variance (λσ(t)>0) versus its incentives for improving its rival’s variance (λS(t)>0) are 
aligned, since both are initially positive and non-increasing early in the planning horizon 
(λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t2)). Mathematically, the solution given 
in Case 1A-III applies when either of the following hold: (i) the marginal effectiveness of 
the focal firm’s variance generation capabilities or its rate of exploration increases (i.e., 
α1 or i(t) is larger) or (ii) the cumulative variance or the degree of knowledge-sharing of 
the rival firm increases (i.e., S(t) or X is larger). Therefore, this case occurs when the 
benefits gained from the knowledge inflow from the rival firm are large (-α1i(t)XS(t)
X-1
 
λσ(t)). This suggests that when the focal firm holds the weaker competitive position in a 
right-tail race, its incentive to participate in the exploration knowledge-sharing alliance 
increases. 
Based on Theorem 1, and since the marginal value of the focal firm’s own mean 
is positive and constant, the optimal rates of both exploration and exploitation follow 
from the solutions for the marginal value of the variance, λσ(t), in Corollary 1A. For 
Cases 1A-I and III, since the marginal value of the variance is positive, (λσ(t)>0 for 
tœ[0,T]), it is always optimal to invest in exploration, (i*(t)>0 for tœ[0,T]). However, for 
Case 1A-II, although the firm is competing to be the best performer, during the initial 
periods for which the marginal value of the variance, λσ(t), is negative, if the firm’s rate 
of variance generation, α1, outpaces the mean improvements from exploration, α0, then it 
may not be optimal to explore, (i*(t)=0). Therefore, there may exist an optimal starting 
time, which we define as tstart, before which the firm does not participate in the 
exploration knowledge-sharing alliance.   
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The rate of exploration by the focal firm, i*(t), also depends on the rate of 
increase in the rival’s variance, dS(t)/dt. Suppose the marginal value to the focal firm of 
its own variance is positive. If the rival’s variance is increasing, (dS/dt>0), it is better for 
the focal firm to invest in exploration at an increasing rate in order to wait until the rival 
firm has undertaken more exploration and has a larger variance so that the focal firm can 
benefit from a larger knowledge pool later in the horizon.  From Equation (7), if the 
rival’s variance is increasing, (dS/dt>0), given the solution for the marginal value of the 
variance, λσ(t), in Corollary 1A,  it follows that the focal firm’s investment in exploration 
is optimally back-loaded (see Figure 4.1).  The optimal rate of the focal firm’s 
exploration is also back-loaded in Case 1A-II. However, for an initial interval of time in 
which the marginal value of the variance is negative, (λσ(t)<0, tœ[0,t1), exploration may 
not optimally occur if the variance effect dominates the marginal improvement in the 
mean (α0λμ(t)+α1λσ(t)S(t)
X<0, i*(t)=0), (see Figure 4.2).  Finally, in Case 1A-III, as the 
potential knowledge inflows from the rival increase (-α1i(t)XS(t)
X-1λσ(t)), exploration 
may follow a bookend strategy, in which the manager initially front-loads and later back-
loads the rate of exploration, attaining its minimum value at some time during the 
planning horizon (U-shaped), as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Therefore, the manager 
optimally pursues a Back-load Explore-Front-load Exploit strategy in Cases 1A-I and 
1A-II, or a Bookend Explore-Delay Exploit strategy in Case 1A-III. The solutions are 
illustrated in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.  For Cases 1A-I, II and III, note that 
when the marginal value of the variance is positive, (λσ(t)>0), if the focal firm’s rate of 
variance reduction, β1, outpaces the mean improvements from exploitation, β0, it is 
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possible that exploitation may not optimally occur under competition to be the best, if 
λμ(t)β0-λσ(t)β0<0 holds (e*(t)=0). 
 
 
                          Back-load Exploration                  Front-load Exploitation 




                          Back-load Exploration                  Front-load Exploitation 
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                          Bookend Exploration                  Delay Exploitation 
Figure 4.3: Case 1A-III 
 
COROLLARY 1B. For a firm operating under competition to avoid being the worst 
performer within an exploration-only alliance, the marginal value to the focal firm of its 
own mean is positive and of the competitor’s mean is negative, while the marginal value 
of the firm’s own variance and of the competitor’s variance satisfies one of the following 
three cases for tœ[0,T]: (I) λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,T]; (II)  
λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)≤0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1] and λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt<0, λS(t)>0, 
dλS(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t1,T]; (III) λσ(t)≥0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t2] and 
λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t2,T]. The optimal solutions for λσ(t) and 
λS(t) for tœ[0,T] are illustrated in Figure C3(Appendix C). 
Under Case 1B-I, in a left-tail race, the marginal value to the focal firm of 
increasing its co-opetitive partner’s variance, λS(t), is positive and increasing. The focal 
firm is motivated to increase its rival’s variance since this increases the likelihood that the 
rival realizes the worst performance. On the other hand, the marginal value to the focal 
firm of increasing its own variance, λσ(t), is negative and decreasing. That is, while it is 
valuable for the focal firm to reduce its variance (λσ(t)<0), it is more valuable to reduce 














incentives with respect to changes in its own variance versus changes in the rival firm’s 
variance become increasingly divergent over time (Hamel 1991).  
Under Case 1B-II, the marginal value to the focal firm of the rival’s variance, 
λS(t), is initially negative. This is an interesting result since it provides possible 
conditions under which the incentive for the focal firm to reduce its own variance, as well 
as its incentive to reduce the variance of the rival firm, are initially aligned (i.e., both are 
negative and increasing (λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≥0, tœ[0,t1)). The solution 
given in Case 1B-II applies when either of the following hold: (i) the marginal 
effectiveness of the focal firm’s variance generation capabilities or its rate of exploration 
increases (i.e., α1 or i*(t) is larger) or (ii) as either the cumulative variance or the degree 
of knowledge-sharing from the rival firm increases (i.e. S(t) or X is larger). When the 
rival’s variance is large in an exploration knowledge-sharing alliance this poses a 
competitive hazard to the focal firm as this also increases its own variance, which reduces 
its likelihood of avoiding an extreme left tail outcome. Therefore, there is an initial 
incentive for the focal firm to reduce its own variance and to reduce the variance of the 
rival firm (λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)≤0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1). However, later in the 
planning horizon the incentives for the focal firm to improve its own knowledge versus 
improving its rival’s knowledge are again divergent (λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt<0, λS(t)>0, 
dλS(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t1,T]). Importantly, in Cases 1B-I and 1B-II, since the marginal value to 
the focal firm of increasing its variance is negative, (λσ(t)<0, tœ[0, T], the focal firm may 
optimally select not to participate in the exploration knowledge-sharing alliance if the 





Finally, Case 1B-III demonstrates that even when a focal firm competes to avoid 
being the worst performer it may have an incentive to increase its own variance, as well 
as an incentive to increase its rival’s variance, early in the planning horizon (λσ(t)>0 for 
tœ[0,t2)). The solution given in Case 1B-III applies when either of the following hold: (i) 
the marginal effectiveness of the rival’s variance generation capabilities or its rate of 
exploration increases (i.e. a1 or I*(t) is larger) or (ii) the cumulative variance or the 
degree of knowledge-sharing of the focal firm increases (i.e., σ(t) or y is larger). This 
suggests that when the focal firm holds the weaker competitive position in a left-tail race 
it has a greater incentive to participate in the exploration knowledge-sharing alliance. 
Under these conditions, the focal firm may deliberately increase its variance even further, 
and worsen its competitive position, in order to limit to the rival’s competitive advantage.  
The following optimal solutions for the rates of exploration and exploitation 
follow analytically from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1B-I. Given that the marginal value to 
the focal firm of increasing its own variance, λσ(t), is negative and decreasing, 
exploitation optimally follows a backload strategy. Since both firms are competing to 
avoid the worst performance, it is reasonable to assume that each firm’s variance is 
optimally decreasing, (dσ/dt<0, dS/dt<0). Since the marginal value to the focal firm is 
negative, under comparable marginal cost and knowledge creation effectiveness for both 
exploration and exploitation, since exploration (exploitation) is increasing (decreasing) in 
λσ(t), it is reasonable to assume that the dS/dt term is negative, and dominates the 
expression in Equation (7). Therefore, exploration follows a backload strategy. 
Intuitively, the focal firm seeks to avoid being the worst performer, and therefore the firm 
has an incentive to delay its own exploration, and therefore defers its participation in the 
126 
 
exploration alliance, i(t), until later in the planning horizon when the co-opetitive partner 
has resolved some of its initial uncertainty, S(t). Therefore, under the conditions 
described above, the manager optimally pursues a Backload Explore-Backload Exploit 
strategy in Cases 1B-I, as illustrated in Figure 4.4 below (see Appendix C, Table C2, 
Figure C4).   
We numerically analyze and highlight several interesting optimal solutions that 
arise from Cases 1B-II and III, as contrasted with Case 1B-1 (see Appendix C, Table C2, 
Figures C5).  Suppose the focal firm, j=1, has access to very cheap and effective 
exploration capabilities so that its rate of exploration increases (i.e., cost, c0, is small, and 
mean exploration improvement, α0 is large, so that i*(t) is larger), then Case 1B-II holds. 
From Case 1B-II, for the focal firm, j=1, the marginal value of its own variance, λσ(t), is 
initially negative and increasing, and then later negative and decreasing and the marginal 
value of an increase in the rival firm’s variance, λS(t), is initially negative and increasing, 
and then later positive and increasing.  However, for the rival firm, j=2, as the variance 
generation capabilities or the rate of exploration of firm j=1 increases (i*(t) is larger), the 
solution for firm j=2 follows Case 1B-III.  
From Case 1B-III, for the rival firm j=2 the marginal value of its own variance, 
LS(t), is initially positive and decreasing, and then later negative and decreasing, and firm 
j=2 optimally front-loads exploration, (I*(t)), and backloads exploitation, (E*(t)).  
However, for firm j=2, later in the planning horizon, when the marginal value of its own 
variance, LS(t), is negative and decreasing, it may not be for optimal for firm j=2 to 
explore (I*(t)=0) (see Figure 4.5). From Equation (8), when firm j=2 does not invest in 
exploration, I*(t)=0, the dynamic incentives for the focal firm, j=1, is eliminated, and so 
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that the marginal value to firm j=1 of its own variance is constant, dλσ/dt=0, when this 
occurs later in the planning horizon. Also recall that the marginal value of the focal firm’s 
own variance, λσ(t), is initially negative and increasing, and then later negative and 
decreasing then, so that for the focal firm, exploitation optimally follows a bookend 
strategy. Furthermore, given that the marginal value to firm j=1 of its own variance is 
constant, dλσ/dt=0, later in the planning horizon, the rate of exploitation is also constant 
later in the planning horizon. Clearly, since the marginal value of firm j=1’s own variance 
is negative for the entire planning horizon, (λσ(t)<0 for tœ[0,T]), then firm j=1 is driven 
not to invest in exploration. However, given the conditions assumed in this scenario, that 
is, since the marginal effectiveness of the focal firm’s capabilities to improve the mean 
from exploration are large (i.e., α0 is large, α0λμ(t)+α1λσ(t)S(t)
X>0), then exploration 
optimally occurs, (i*(t)>0). Furthermore, given that the marginal value to firm j=1 of its 
own variance is constant later in the planning horizon, dλσ/dt=0, then the dS/dt term, 
which is negative later in the horizon, dominates so that firm j=1 pursues exploration at 
an increasing rate later in the planning horizon, as illustrated in Figure 4.6.   
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Figure 4.6: Case 1B-II for Firm j=1 
 
4.4.2 Case 2: Knowledge Sharing in an Exploitation-only Alliance 
In Theorem 2 below, we introduce the solutions for the focal firm’s optimal rates 
of exploration and exploitation, within an exploitation-based knowledge sharing alliance. 
Recall that in Case 2, both firms exchange knowledge as they pursue their individual 
variance reduction activities, so that y=0, X=0, g>0, Y>0. 
THEOREM 2 Within an exploitation-only knowledge sharing alliance, the optimal rates 



























and (11). The rates of change of the marginal values of an additional unit of the focal 
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To examine the optimal solutions for an exploitation-only alliance, as given in Theorem 
2, we consider subcases 2A and 2B, as shown in Table 4.1. Corollary 2A corresponds to 
Case 2A in which both firms compete to achieve the best performance within an 
exploitation-only alliance, while Corollary 2B corresponds to Case 2B in which both 
firms compete to avoid the worst performance, within the exploitation-only alliance. 
COROLLARY 2A. For a firm operating under competition to be the best performer 
within an exploitation-only alliance, the marginal value to the focal firm of its own mean 
is positive and of the competitor’s mean is negative, while the marginal value of the 
firm’s own variance and of the rival firm’s variance satisfies one of the following three 
cases for tœ[0,T]: (I) λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,T];  (II) λσ(t)≤0, 
dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1] and λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt<0 
for tœ(t1,T] where t1œ(0,T) or (III) λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)≥0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t2] 
and λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt>0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ(t2,T] where t2œ(0,T) . 
130 
 
COROLLARY 2B. For a firm operating under competition to avoid being the worst 
performer within an exploitation-only alliance,  the marginal value to the focal firm of its 
own mean is positive and of the competitor’s mean is negative, while the marginal value 
of the firm’s own variance and of the competitor’s variance satisfies one of the following 
three cases for tœ[0,T]: (I) λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,T]; (II)  
λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)≤0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1] and λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt<0, λS(t)>0, 
dλS(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t1,T]; (III) λσ(t)≥0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t2] and 
λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t2,T]. 
From Corollary 2A, under competition to be the best performer within an 
exploitation alliance, exploitation is most likely to optimally occur under Case 2A-II, for 
the initial interval of time in which the marginal value of the variance is negative, 
(λσ(t)<0, tœ[0,t1), so that β0λμ(t)-β1λσ(t)S(t)-Y>0 holds. Therefore, in a right-tail 
competition, the focal firm is motivated to participate in the exploitation knowledge-
sharing alliance when the knowledge outflow from the focal firm is larger                        
(-b1I(t)gσ(t)-g-1λS(t)), which is increasing as the focal firm’s variance is smaller (σ(t)-g-1). 
This suggests that when the focal firm holds the weaker competitive position in the right-
tail race, it may deliberately engage in the exploitation alliance in order to decrease its 
own variance even further, and forgoing its competitive position, in order to worsen to 
the rival’s competitive position. 
From Corollary 2B, under competition to avoid being the worst performer within 
an exploitation alliance, exploitation is least likely to occur under Case 2B-III, for the 
initial interval of time in which the marginal value of the variance is positive, (λσ(t)>0, 
tœ[0,t1), so that β0λμ(t)-β1λσ(t)S(t)-Y<0 holds. Therefore, in a left-tail competition, the 
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focal firm is not motivated to participate in the exploitation knowledge-sharing alliance 
when the knowledge inflow from the rival firm is larger (-β1i(t)YS(t)-Y-1λσ(t)), which is 
increasing as the rival firm’s variance is smaller (S(t)-Y-1). This suggests that when the 
focal firm holds the weaker competitive position in a left-tail race, this decreases its 
incentive to participate in the exploitation knowledge-sharing alliance. 
4.5 Managerial Insights and Conclusions 
In this essay, we extend the model of temporal ambidexterity, introduced in Essay 
1, to include considerations of the strategic imperatives of competition and cooperation. 
In particular, we introduce a dynamic optimization model of knowledge-sharing between 
two rival firms. A firm can participate in knowledge-sharing in order to explore new 
technological opportunities, as well as to improve the ability to exploit its existing 
capabilities. As such, we consider two alternative types of alliances: (i) an exploration 
knowledge-sharing alliance and (ii) an exploitation knowledge-sharing alliance. Based on 
the analysis of our model we are able to examine how a firm’s collaborative and 
competitive objectives, as well as its innovation capabilities, impact its optimal 
knowledge creation strategy. Empirically, Yang et al. (2010) demonstrate that source 
firms benefit from their own knowledge contributions when a “spillover knowledge pool” 
is formed from which they can benefit.  However, through our stylized model, we 
illustrate the challenges of leveraging the benefits of knowledge spillovers within a co-
opetitive partnership. Specifically, we demonstrate the tension which co-opetitive 
partners face as they try to manage their knowledge creation and knowledge sharing 
activities in order to “maximize incoming while minimizing outgoing knowledge 
spillovers” (Alexy et al. 2013) and to ensure that their competitor’s do not “outlearn” 
132 
 
them. This apprehension about sharing knowledge with a potential competitor is aptly 
captured by Hamel in one manager’s comment, from a case study of strategic alliances: 
“Whatever they learn from us, they'll use against us worldwide” (Hamel, 1991, p.87). 
Our results demonstrate how such concerns within knowledge-sharing alliances, can give 
rise to firms adopting dysfunctional alliance behaviors in which they may delay and limit 
the extent of knowledge sharing, for purposes of competitive deterrence (Hamel 1991, 
Khanna et al. 1998, Müller 2010).   
Our results show that a firm’s dysfunctional alliance behavior is increasing in 
cases in which the losses from the knowledge outflow from the focal firm dominates the 
benefits it realizes from the knowledge inflow from its co-opetitive partner, (i.e., if the 
firm believes it has more to lose than it has to gain). This suggests that competitive 
leaders are more likely to adopt dysfunctional alliance behaviors, while laggards are more 
likely to participate in the alliance.  Consistent with this insight, in a study of 
biotechnology firms, Shan (1990) empirically confirms that laggards are more likely than 
leaders to participate in cooperative arrangements.  
Hamel’s (1991) observes that within strategic alliances, “as the firm moved nearer 
and nearer its goal of independence, it successively raised the ‘price’ for its continued 
participation in the alliance” (p. 88). In support of this view, we find that in several 
instances a firm’s incentives for improving its own performance versus improving its co-
opetive partner’s performance, are not only opposing, but may also become increasingly 
divergent as the firm approaches the time to compete in the market.  
Our results suggest the boundary conditions, with respect to both the alliance 
structure and competitive regime, under which the typical “explore-exploit” strategy may 
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be optimal within an exploration knowledge-sharing alliance (Rothaermel and Deeds 
2004). Furthermore, our results may provide additional insights to support these 
empirical findings, by analytically demonstrating the conditions, with respect to 
competitive regime, relative knowledge stocks and relative learning capabilities, under 
which this solution arises endogenously. Moreover, our remaining analytical solutions 
also provide the conditions under which alternate sequential strategies arise 
endogenously. Future research may empirically test and validate the conditions and the 





Table A1: Range of Exploration-Exploitation Strategies 
% of Patents High Exploration Low Exploration 
High Exploitation 
23% (3072 of 13464) 33% (4385 of 13464) 
Low Exploitation 
15% (1962 of 13464) 30% (4045 of 13464) 
  
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Full Sample: 13464 patents 
 Variable Mean S.D Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Failure  0.10 0.30 0 1      
2 Success  0.03 0.17 0 1 -0.06     
3 Explore 0.38 0.25 0 0.91 0.003 0.04    
4 Exploit 11.02 7.72 0 97 0.09 -0.05 0.09   
5 Prior Failures (in Five Years) 1.01 2.39 0 17 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.03  
6 Prior Successes (in Five Years) 1.52 3.53 0 22 -0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.34 
 
Sub-sample of publicly listed firms: 2836 patents 
 Variable Mean S.D Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Failure  0.08 0.27 0 1        
2 Success  0.04 0.19 0 1 -0.06       
3 Explore 0.41 0.27 0 0.89 0.01 0.03      
4 Exploit 10.92 7.04 1 68 0.13 -0.05 0.11     
5 Prior Failures (in 5 Years) 2.33 3.58 0 17 0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.03    
6 Prior Successes (in 5 Years) 5.19 5.8 0 22 -0.03 0.12 0.11 -0.01 0.24   
7 Assets 6456 11100 1.66  168259 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05  








Table A3: Complementary Log-Log Model for Probability of Success and Failure 
 
 Probability of  Success Probability of Failure 
 (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (F1) (F2) (F3) (F4) (F5) 
           
Explore 0.34*** 0.35***   0.34*** -0.04+ -0.07**   -0.06* 
 (0.08) (0.08)   (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) 
           
Exploit -0.49*** -0.49***   -0.51*** 0.33*** 0.35***   0.35*** 
 (0.05) (0.05)   (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) 
           
Explore X Exploit  0.01   0.02  0.11***   0.10*** 
  (0.05)   (0.04)  (0.02)   (0.02) 
           
Prior Success Experience   0.59***  0.61***   -0.19***  -0.19*** 
   (0.05)  (0.06)   (0.04)  (0.04) 
           
Prior Failure Experience   -0.54***  -0.53***   0.10**  0.11** 
   (0.09)  (0.09)   (0.03)  (0.03) 
           
Exploit X Prior Failure    0.24*** -0.01    0.03 0.01 
    (0.06) (0.05)    (0.03) (0.03) 
           
Explore X Prior Failure    -0.16+ -0.02    0.01 0.01 
    (0.08) (0.08)    (0.02) (0.02) 
           
Exploit X Prior Success    -0.23*** 0.09**    -0.03 -0.00 
    (0.04) (0.03)    (0.04) (0.04) 
           
Explore X Prior Success    0.14 -0.09*    0.00 0.02 
    (0.10) (0.04)    (0.02) (0.02) 
           
Constant -4.77*** -4.77*** -4.85*** -4.91*** -4.75*** -3.17*** -3.18*** -3.03*** -2.95*** -3.23*** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 13385 13385 13464 13385 13385 13385 13385 13464 13385 13385 
χ2 200 198 281 141 471 588 601 520 502 642 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -1830 -1830 -1789 -1866 -1729 -3955 -3948 -4041 -4017 -3931 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  




Table A4: Linear Regression for Mean and Variance of Citations Received 
   
   
 Variance  
Absolute Deviation of Number of Citations Received 
Mean  
Number of Citations Received 
 (V1) (V2) (V3) (V4) (V5) (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 
           
Explore 0.04*** 0.04***   0.03** 0.06*** 0.06***   0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) 
           
Exploit -0.05*** -0.05***   -0.05*** -0.14*** -0.15***   -0.15*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) 
           
Explore X Exploit  -0.01*   -0.01*  -0.04***   -0.03*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.01)   (0.00) 
           
Prior Success Experience   0.13***  0.12***   0.22***  0.21*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)   (0.02)  (0.02) 
           
Prior Failure Experience   -0.07***  -0.07***   -0.14***  -0.14*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.02)  (0.02) 
           
Exploit X Prior Failure    0.03* 0.01    0.05* 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.01) 
           
Explore X Prior Failure    -0.02+ -0.02+    -0.03 -0.03* 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.01) 
           
Exploit X Prior Success    -0.04* -0.02+    -0.05* -0.02 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.01) 
           
Explore X Prior Success    0.02 0.01    0.03 0.01 
    (0.02) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.02) 
           
Constant 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.61*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.29*** -0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 13385 13385 13464 13385 13385 13385 13385 13464 13385 13385 
R2 0.022 0.023 0.040 0.020 0.047 0.059 0.061 0.081 0.043 0.103 
F 7.056 6.609 10.02 5.531 8.045 24.72 22.74 32.76 16.32 27.04 
 
  
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
Clustered by Assignee. Year and Technology Class Fixed Effects Included 
  
   
   
   
   
   















Table A5: Quantile Regression for Citations Received 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile 
Explore 0.01 0.17*** 1.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.17) 
    
Exploit -0.26*** -0.89*** -2.44*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.18) 
    
Explore X Exploit -0.03 -0.23*** -0.68*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.17) 
    
Prior Success Experience 0.22*** 1.13*** 4.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.20) 
    
Prior Failure Experience -0.13*** -0.59*** -1.96*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.20) 
    
Exploit X Prior Failure 0.07** 0.19*** 0.25 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.21) 
    
Explore X Prior Failure 0.01 -0.11* -0.53** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.20) 
    
Exploit X Prior Success -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.32 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.20) 
    
Explore X Prior Success -0.04+ 0.04 0.30 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.19) 
    
Constant 1.66*** 7.61*** 25.28*** 
 (0.07) (0.16) (0.59) 
N 13385 13385 13385 
Psuedo R2 0.0364 0.0885 -4.9023 
  Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  






Table A6: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for Citations Received 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Explore Exploit Mean 
Number of  
Citations Received 
Explore Exploit Variance  
Number of  
Citations Received 
 













 (-2.4) (-6.29) (-14.52) (-2.44) (-6.29) (-10.40) 
       
Prior Success Experience 0.09*** -0.00 2.23*** 0.09*** -0.00 0.12*** 
 (9.81) (-0.15) (22.73) (9.81) (-0.15) (16.60) 
       
Explore   0.40***   0.03*** 
   (4.61)   (5.34) 
       
Exploit   -1.38***   -0.05*** 
   (-15.02)   (-7.59) 
       
Explore X Exploit   -0.34***   -0.01* 
   (-3.96)   (-2.12) 
       
Exploit X Prior Failure   0.24**   0.01 
   (2.59)   (1.87) 
       
Explore X Prior Failure   -0.29**   -0.02*** 
   (-3.13)   (-3.67) 
       
Exploit X Prior Success   -0.15   -0.02*** 
   (-1.65)   (-3.49) 
       
Explore X Prior Success   0.01   0.01* 
   (0.11)   (2.08) 
       
Constant -0.00 -0.00 11.39*** -0.00 -0.00 0.61*** 
 (-0.01) (-0.40) (36.45) (-0.01) (-0.40) (25.96) 
R2 0.007 0.003 0.178 0.007 0.003 0.047 
χ2 99 48 2901 99 48 673 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  




Table A7: Complementary Log-Log Model for Probability of Success  
 
Probability of  Success 
 (S1) (S2) (S3)  
 Top 1% Top 2% Top 3%  
     
Explore 0.55*** 0.37*** 0.34***  
 (0.15) (0.09) (0.07)  
     
Exploit -0.46*** -0.55*** -0.51***  
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)  
     
Explore X Exploit 0.04 0.02 0.02  
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)  
     
Prior Success Experience 0.82*** 0.68*** 0.61***  
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)  
     
Prior Failure Experience -0.75*** -0.66*** -0.53***  
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.09)  
     
Exploit X Prior Failure 0.13* 0.00 -0.01  
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)  
     
Explore X Prior Failure -0.05 0.03 -0.02  
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.08)  
     
Exploit X Prior Success 0.08+ 0.08* 0.09**  
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)  
     
Explore X Prior Success -0.14* -0.12* -0.09*  
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)  
     
Constant -6.08*** -5.02*** -4.75***  
 (0.57) (0.36) (0.34)  
N 13385 13385 13385  
χ2 390 416 471  
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Log Likelihood -773 -1309 -1729  
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  





Table A8: Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model for Citations Received 
 
 Number of Citations Received 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Explore 0.08*** 0.08***   0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) 
      
Exploit -0.16*** -0.18***   -0.17*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) 
      
Explore X Exploit  -0.04***   -0.03*** 
  (0.01)   (0.01) 
      
Prior Success Experience   0.22***  0.21*** 
   (0.02)  (0.01) 
      
Prior Failure Experience   -0.14***  -0.14*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02) 
      
Exploit X Prior Failure    0.05* 0.00 
    (0.02) (0.01) 
      
Explore X Prior Failure    -0.03 -0.02 
    (0.02) (0.01) 
      
Exploit X Prior Success    -0.03+ 0.01+ 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
      
Explore X Prior Success    0.02 -0.00 
    (0.02) (0.01) 
      
Constant 2.18*** 2.18*** 2.16*** 2.11*** 2.23*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Inflation Factor 
     
Explore 1.25* 1.10+ 0.63* 0.56+ 1.12* 
 (0.51) (0.63) (0.31) (0.31) (0.49) 
      
Exploit 1.89*** 1.96*** 1.82*** 1.87*** 1.88*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) 
      
Constant -9.35*** -12.46 -7.21*** -7.37*** -9.16*** 
 (1.64) (35.03) (0.46) (0.50) (1.51) 
lnalpha      
Constant -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.12*** -0.20*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.02) (0.02) 
N 13385 13385 13385 13385 13385 
χ2 1489 1490 1223 1056 1698 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 






Table A9: Complementary Log-Log Model, Sub-sample of Publicly Listed Firms 
 
 Probability of Success Probability of Failure 
 (S1) (S2) (F1) (F2) 
     
Explore 0.20 0.22 -0.14 -0.13 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.0949) (0.09) 
     
Exploit -0.59*** -0.57*** 0.57*** 0.56*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
     
Explore X Exploit -0.10 -0.07 0.24** 0.25** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) 
     
Prior Success Experience 0.58*** 0.62*** -0.15* -0.15* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
     
Prior Failure Experience -0.31* -0.27+ 0.05 0.05 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) 
     
Exploit X Prior Failure  -0.11+ -0.10+ 0.004 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
     
Explore X Prior Failure  0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Exploit X Prior Success  0.12+ 0.13* -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
     
Explore X Prior Success  -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Control Variables     
Assets  0.17*  0.00 
  (0.08)  (0.03) 
     
R&D Intensity  0.32**  0.00 
  (0.12)  (0.06) 
     
Constant -4.838*** -5.18*** -3.250*** -3.14*** 
 (1.004) (1.003) (0.392) (0.49) 
N 2825 2782 2825 2782 
χ2 287 510 476 397 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -411 -400 -715 -696 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  






Table A10: Complementary Log-Log Model for Probability of Success with 
Alternate Exploit Measure  
 
 (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) 
      
      
Explore 1.04*** 1.04***   0.97*** 
 (0.30) (0.30)   (0.28) 
      
Exploit II 0.06 0.07   0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04)   (0.05) 
      
Explore X Exploit II  0.05   0.02 
  (0.05)   (0.05) 
      
Prior Success Experience   0.72***  0.73*** 
   (0.06)  (0.07) 
      
Prior Failure Experience   -0.82***  -0.90*** 
   (0.15)  (0.16) 
      
Exploit II X Prior Failure    -0.10* 0.09 
    (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Explore X Prior Failure    -1.04+ 0.04 
    (0.57) (0.54) 
      
Exploit II X Prior Success    0.10* -0.02 
    (0.04) (0.03) 
      
Explore X  Prior Success    0.78 -0.35 
    (0.55) (0.22) 
      
Constant -4.39*** -4.38*** -4.37*** -4.34*** -4.45*** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
N 12700 12699 12777 12700 12699 
χ2 115 115 264 133 303 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -1871 -1870 -1783 -1873 -1766 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  





Table A11: Complementary Log-Log Model for Probability of Failure with 
Alternate Exploit Measure  
 
 (F1) (F2) (F3) (F4) (F5) 
      
      
Explore -0.06 -0.06   0.01 
 (0.11) (0.11)   (0.11) 
      
Exploit II -0.02 -0.02   -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) 
      
Explore X Exploit II  -0.01   -0.01 
  (0.02)   (0.02) 
      
Prior Success Experience   -0.24***  -0.26*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05) 
      
Prior Failure Experience   0.15**  0.15* 
   (0.05)  (0.06) 
      
Exploit II X Prior Failure    0.02 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.02) 
      
Explore X Prior Failure    0.17 0.11 
    (0.16) (0.16) 
      
Exploit II X Prior Success    -0.01 0.04 
    (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Explore X  Prior Success    -0.03 0.18 
    (0.15) (0.17) 
      
Constant -2.93*** -2.93*** -3.00*** -2.94*** -3.01*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 13386 13385 13464 13386 13385 
χ2 508 513 523 506 538 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -4015 -4013 -4037 -4015 -3994 
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  





Table A12: Complementary Log-Log Model for Probability of Success and Failure 
with Square Root Discount Factor for Experience  
 
 Probability of  Success Probability of Failure 
 (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (F1) (F2) (F3) (F4) (F5) 
           
           
Explore 0.34*** 0.35***   0.37*** -0.04+ -0.07**   -0.07* 
 (0.08) (0.08)   (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) 
           
Exploit -0.49*** -0.4***   -0.49*** 0.33*** 0.35***   0.35*** 
 (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) 
           
Explore X Exploit  0.01   0.02  0.11***   0.11*** 
  (0.04)   (0.04)  (0.02)   (0.02) 
           
Prior Success Experience   0.36***  0.38***   -0.14***  -0.14*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)   (0.04)  (0.03) 
           
Prior Failure Experience   -0.42***  -0.41***   0.05  0.07* 
   (0.08)  (0.09)   (0.03)  (0.03) 
           
Exploit X Prior Failure     0.21** 0.02    0.03 0.01 
    (0.06) (0.05)    (0.03) (0.03) 
           
Explore X Prior Failure     -0.10 -0.01    0.01 0.01 
    (0.07) (0.07)    (0.02) (0.02) 
           
Exploit X Prior Success     -0.16* 0.06    -0.04 -0.03 
    (0.07) (0.04)    (0.04) (0.04) 
           
Explore X Prior Success     0.01 -0.101*    0.01 0.02 
    (0.10) (0.04)    (0.03) (0.03) 
           
Constant -4.21*** -4.21*** -4.37*** -4.38*** -4.25*** -3.15*** -3.16*** -2.98*** -2.94*** -3.20*** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 12699 12699 12777 12699 12699 13385 13385 13464 13385 13385 
χ2 186 185 126 85 329 606 620 526 509 657 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table A13: Complementary Log-Log Model for Probability of Success and Failure 
with Linear Discount Factor for Experience 
 
 (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (F1) (F2) (F3) (F4) (F5) 
           
           
Explore 0.34*** 0.35***   0.37*** -0.04+ -0.07**   -0.07* 
 (0.08) (0.08)   (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) 
           
Exploit -0.49*** -0.49***   -0.49*** 0.33*** 0.35***   0.35*** 
 (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) 
           
Explore X Exploit  0.01   0.02  0.11***   0.11*** 
  (0.04)   (0.04)  (0.02)   (0.02) 
           
Prior Success Experience   0.35***  0.37***   -0.14***  -0.13*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)   (0.04)  (0.03) 
           
Prior Failure Experience   -0.40***  -0.39***   0.05  0.06* 
   (0.07)  (0.08)   (0.03)  (0.02) 
           
Exploit X Prior Failure     0.19** 0.01    0.03 0.01 
    (0.06) (0.05)    (0.03) (0.03) 
           
Explore X Prior Failure     -0.10 -0.01    0.01 0.02 
    (0.07) (0.07)    (0.02) (0.02) 
           
Exploit X Prior Success     -0.15* 0.06+    -0.04 -0.03 
    (0.07) (0.03)    (0.04) (0.04) 
           
Explore X Prior Success     0.01 -0.09*    -0.01 0.01 
    (0.10) (0.04)    (0.03) (0.03) 
           
Constant -4.21*** -4.21*** -4.39*** -4.37*** -4.27*** -3.15*** -3.16*** -2.98*** -2.94*** -3.20*** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.3) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 12699 12699 12777 12699 12699 13385 13385 13464 13385 13385 
χ2 186 185 140 83 349 606 620 526 510 658 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 







Table B1: Model Notation 
t Time, t∈[0,T]: 0 (T) denotes the start (end) of the planning horizon. 
i(t) Rate of exploration efforts at time t, i(t)≥0; control variable. 
e(t) Rate of exploitation efforts at time t, e(t)≥0; control variable. 
µ(t) Mean technical performance at time t,  µ(t)≥0; µ(0) given; state variable. 
σ(t) Variance technical performance at time t, σ(t)≥0; σ(0)  given; state 
variable. 
α0 (α1) Marginal impact of exploration on the mean (variance); α0 (α1)>0. 
β0 (β1) Marginal impact of exploitation on the mean (variance); β0 (β1)>0. 
c Parameter indicating marginal cost of exploration. 
c Parameter indicating marginal cost of exploitation. 
j=S,L Managers short-term and long-term objectives, respectively 
Z(t) Random variable indicating the innovation’s technical performance at 
time t; Z(t)∼N(µ(t),σ(t)). 
wj Marginal value of a unit increase in technical performance 
Pj Normalized statistic such that Ф
-1(Pj)=Probability{Z(t)≤zp(t)}.  
Pj>0(<0) Denotes risk seeking (risk averse) manager 
λ0(t)  Instantaneous marginal value of a unit increase in mean technical 
performance at time t. 
λ1(t) Instantaneous marginal value of a unit increase in the variance technical 
performance at time t. 
x0(t)  Cumulative distributed marginal value of a unit increase in mean 
technical performance at time t. 
x1(t) Cumulative distributed marginal value of a unit increase in the variance 







The Hamiltonian function, H, to be maximized is provided below. The first terms in 
Equations (1) and (2) are transformed into the reverse time expression, and represent the 
marginal value of a unit change in the mean and variance at time t, which results from a 














H 1/2c i(t) 1/2c e(t)
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θ
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∫
                     (B1) 
Optimality Conditions  
Optimality Conditions for the rates of exploration and exploitation are as follows:  
∂H /∂e(t)=0, e(t)≥0             (B2) 
∂H /∂i(t)=0,  i(t)≥0                  (B3) 
 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality are as follows:  
 dλ0(t)/dt=-∂H/∂µ(t)  and   λ0(T)=wL                      (B4) 
 dλ1(t)/dt=-∂H/∂σ(t)  and  λ1(T)=wLPL          (B5) 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. The results of Theorem 1 follow from Equations (B4) and 
(B5). 
 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1a.  













−α λ  −λ β∫          (B6)  
(Proof by Contradiction) To prove that λ0(t)>0 "t, suppose there exists some t0 ∈[0,T) 
such that λ0(t0)<0. Since λ0(T)>0 it follows that there exists λ'0(t1)>0 for some t1 ∈(t0,T). 
From Theorem 1(i) since ws, α0, i(t1), β0, e(t1), and θ(τ-t) >0 for τ≥t then λ0(t1)<0 must 
148 
 
hold. Again, since λ0(T)>0 it follows that there exists dλ0(t2)/dt>0 for some t2 ∈(t1,T) from 
which we obtain λ0(t2)<0. Repeating the process for a sufficiently large n, tn converges to 
T such that λ0(tn)=λ0(T)<0. However, since we know λ0(T)>0, it has been shown by 
contradiction that λ0(t)<0 is not possible so that λ0(t)>0 "t. By similar reasoning, from 
Equation (5) given 
T
0 t 0
x (t) (τ-t) (τ)dτλθ=∫  and x0(T)=0 it follows that x0(t)>0 "t must 
hold. Since λ0(t)>0, ws, α0, i(t), β0, e(t)>0 and θ(τ-t) >0 for τ≥t we obtain dλ0(t)/dt<0 "t. 
 



















∫                (B7) 
Let y = t-t therefore θ(t-t) = θ(y) and  it follows that d (τ t) -d (τ t) .
dt τ
θ − θ −
=   
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≤0, we know the sum on 
the right hand side of Equation (B10) is negative,  so that 0dx (t)
dt






PROOF OF COROLLARY 1b. 
We consider all the possible optimal solutions for λ1(t) and dλ1(t)/dt for the four possible 
terminal conditions as follows: 
− Case I which assumes that λ1(T)<0 and dλ1(T)/dt>0 hold, 
− Case II which assumes that λ1(T)>0 and dλ1(T)/dt<0 hold, 
− Case III which assumes that λ1(T)<0 and dλ1(T)/dt<0 hold. 
− Case IV which assumes that λ1(T)>0 and dλ1(T)/dt>0 hold. 
 
Case I. Assume λ1
*
(T)<0 and d λ1
*
(T)/dt>0 hold. 
From Theorem 1(i) we have 1 L Lλ (T) w P .=  Therefore, given wL>0, for λ1(T)<0 then PL<0 
must hold. From Equation (6) we obtain 1x (T) 0,=  so at the terminal time, Theorem 1(i) 










λ          (B11) 
From Equation (B11)¸ to obtain dλ1(T)/dt>0, given λ1(T)<0,  we must have PS<0. In 
conclusion, we have shown that PL<0 and PS<0 must hold under the suppositions in Case 
I, λ1(T)<0 and dλ1(T)/dt>0. This gives us three possible solutions for λ1(t) and dλ1(t)/dt, 
as described below in 1-3 and illustrated in Figure B1. 
1. λ1(t)<0; dλ1(t)/dt>0 "t,  
2. λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1,T] or 
3. λ1(t)≥0, dλ1(t)/dt<0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ(t1,t2]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t2,T]. 
 






                                           
Case I.1                       Case I.2       Case I.3      
 
Figure B1:  Case I  λ1(T)<0, dλ1(T)/dt>0 
 
 
Case I.1: λ1(t)<0; dλ1(t)/dt>0 "t  









 w P (t) ( t (t) ( )d e(t))
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λ
θ= − −α − +λ λ β∫ τ τ τ                     (B12) 
Applying the reverse time transformation to the sixth term of Equation (B1) and 
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λ            (B14) 
From Equation (B14) applying backward integration we obtain:  
T
L L S S
t













λ∫                    (B15) 
Based on Equation (B14), since we know  PS<0 must hold, we consider two possible 
scenarios:   





































 for tœ[0, T]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt>0 must 
hold. Therefore, Case III.1 is feasible under scenario (a). However, since σ(t) is 
increasing in i(t) and decreasing in e(t), and since i(t) is increasing in λ1(t), while e(t) is 











Therefore, Case I.1, while feasible under scenario (a), is unlikely to occur. In addition, 
given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, Case I.1 is feasible under scenario (b) when  |PS| 
is  large.  
 
Case I. 2: λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1,T] 
Based on the analysis of Case I.1, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] in Case 
I.2 hold.  Since we know PS<0 must hold, based on (B14) we consider two possible 
scenarios:   









σ for t tœ[0,t1], 










 for tœ[0, t1]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 cannot 
occur. Therefore, Case I.2 is infeasible under scenario (a). In addition, given λ1(t)<0  and 
the above conditions, Case I.2 is feasible under scenario (b) when  |PS| is  small. 
However, based on the analysis of Case I.1, we know the conditions under which tœ[t1,T]  
hold are more likely when  |PS| is large. Therefore, Case I.2, while feasible under scenario 
(b), is unlikely to occur. 
 
Case I. 3: λ1(t)≥0, dλ1(t)/dt<0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ(t1,t2]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, 
tœ(t2,T]. 
First, corresponding to Cases I.1 and I.2, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] 
from Case I.3 hold.  Second, at t=t1 we know λ1(t1)=0 and dλ1(t1)/dt<0 hold. From 
Equation (B14) since we know PS<0 and PL<0 and then λ1(t1)=0 and dλ1(t1)/dt<0  cannot 




Focusing on Case I.1, we now consider the solutions for x1(t) and dx1(t)/dt when λ1(t)<0; 
dλ1(t)/dt>0 "t.  The proof that x1(t)<0 and dx1(t)/dt>0, given λ1(t)<0 and dλ1(t)/dt>0, is 
analogous to the proof that x0(t)>0 and dx0(t)/dt<0 must hold given λ0(t)>0 and 
dλ0(t)/dt<0 (see Corollary 1a). 
 
Lastly, we need to prove that x1(t)>λ1(t). Since λ1(t)<0 and dλ1(t)/dt≥0, we know     
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Since ( )
t
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τ dτ> (τ t) dτ= .( t) (t) (t) (t)− λ −θ λθ λ∫ ∫
¶
     (B17) 
Comparing  x1(t) from Equation (6) with Equations (B16) and (B17) above, we obtain 
x1(t)>λ1(t),  as desired.  
 
In summary we have shown that Corollary 1b.I is most likely to occur given the 
conditions assumed.  
 
Case II. Assume λ1(T)>0 and d λ1(T)/dt<0 hold. 
From Theorem 1(i) we have 1 L Lλ (T) w P .=  Therefore, given wL>0, for λ1(T)>0 to hold 
then PL>0 must hold. From Equation (B11), to obtain dλ1(T)/dt<0, given λ1(T)>0,  we 
must have SP 0.>  In conclusion, we have shown that PL>0 and PS>0 hold under the 
suppositions in Case II, λ1(T)>0 and dλ1(T)/dt<0. This gives us three possible solutions 
for λ1(t) and dλ1(t)/dt, as described below in 1-3 and illustrated in Figure A2. 
1. λ1(t)>0; dλ1(t)/dt<0 "tœ[0,T],  
2. λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≥0, tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ(t1, T] or 
3.  λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≥0, tœ(t1,t2]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, 
tœ(t2,T]. 
Below we consider the feasibility of these three possible solutions.  
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`                          
           Case II.1                      Case II.2        Case II.3 
Figure B2:  Case II  λ1(T)>0, dλ1(T)/dt<0 
 
Case II.1: λ1(t)>0; dλ1(t)/dt<0 for tœ[0,T], 
Based on Equation (B14), we consider two possible scenarios since we know  PS>0 must 
hold:   










for tœ[0, T], 










 for tœ[0, T]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 must 
hold. Therefore, Case II.1 is feasible under scenario (a). Similarly, given λ1(t)>0  and the 
above conditions, Case II.1 is feasible under scenario (b) when  |PS| is  large.  
 
Case II.2: λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≥0, tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ(t1, T] 
Based on the analysis of Case II.1, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] in Case 
II.2 hold. With PS>0, we consider two possible scenarios:   





















 for tœ[0,t1]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt>0 cannot 
occur. Therefore, Case II.2 is infeasible under scenario (a). In addition, given λ1(t)>0  and 


















However, note that σ(t) is increasing in i(t) and decreasing in e(t); i(t) is increasing in 











also holds. Therefore, Case II.2, while feasible, is unlikely to occur. 
 
Case II.3: λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≥0, tœ(t1,t2];λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, 
tœ(t2,T]. 
First, corresponding to Cases II.1 and II.2, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] 
from Case II.3 hold. Second, at t=t1 we know λ1(t1)=0 and dλ1(t1)/dt>0 . With PS>0 and 
PL>0, then from Equation (B15) Case II.3 is infeasible. 
 
Focusing on Case II.1, which is most likely, we now consider the solutions for x1(t) and 
dx1(t)/dt. The proof that x1(t)>0 and dx1(t)/dt<0, given λ1(t)>0 and dλ1(t)/dt<0, is 
analogous to the proof that x0(t)>0 and dx0(t)/dt<0 must hold given λ0(t)>0 and 
dλ0(t)/dt<0 (see Corollary 1a). The proof that x1(t)≤λ1(t) when λ1(t)>0 and dλ1(t)/dt≤0 is 
analogous to the proof that x1(t)≥λ1(t) when λ1(t)<0 and dλ1(t)/dt≥0 hold (see Corollary 
1b.I) 
 
In summary we have shown that Corollary 1b.II is most likely to occur given the 
conditions assumed for Case II.  
 
Case III. Assume λ1
*
(T)<0 and d λ1
*
(T)/dt<0 hold. 
From Theorem 1(i) we have 1 L Lλ (T) w P= .  Therefore, given wL>0, for λ1(T)<0 to hold 
then PL<0 must hold. From Equation (B11) for dλ1(T)/dt<0 and λ1(T)<0, then either PS>0 
or PS<0 hold. This gives us four possible solutions for λ1(t) and dλ1(t)/dt, as described 
below in 1-4 and illustrated in Figure B2. 
1. λ1(t)<0; dλ1(t)/dt<0 "tœ[0, T].  
2. λ1(t)≥0, dλ1(t)/dt<0 for tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ(t1, T]. 




4. λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≥0, tœ(t1,t2] ;  λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, 
tœ(t2,t3]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t3, T]. 
 
Below we consider the feasibility of these four possible solutions.  
`     
Case III.1        Case III.2   
                 
         Case III.3                 Case III.4 
Figure B3: Case III  λ1(T)<0, dλ1(T)/dt<0 
  
 
Case III.1: λ1(t)<0; dλ1(t)/dt<0 "t œ[0, T], 
Based on Equation (B14) , we consider four possible scenarios based on the two possible 
solutions for PS>0 and PS<0:   










for all tœ[0, T], 

































t2 t1  t3 
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for all tœ[0, T], 










 for all tœ[0, T]. 
 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, Case III.1 is feasible when  |PS| 
is  large. However, since σ(t) is increasing in i(t) and decreasing in e(t), and since i(t) is 











also holds. Therefore, Case III.1, while feasible under scenario (a), is 
unlikely to occur. For  scenario (b),  given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, we know  
dλ1(t)/dt<0 must hold. Therefore, Case III.1 is feasible under scenario (b). However, for 
scenario (c),  given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 cannot occur. 
Therefore, Case III.1 is infeasible under scenario (c). Lastly, for scenario (d), given 
λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, Case III.1 is feasible when  |PS| is  small. 
 
Case III.2: λ1(t)≥0, dλ1(t)/dt<0 for tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ(t1, T] 
Based on the analysis of Case III.1, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] in Case 
III.2 hold. Also, at t=t1 we know λ1(t1)=0 and dλ1(t1)/dt<0 . Since we know PL<0, then 
from Equation (B14), we know λ1(t1)=0, dλ1(t1)/dt>0  is infeasible when PS<0. Therefore, 
PS>0 must hold. To prove the conditions for feasibility of λ1(t)>0 and dλ1(t)/dt<0 for 
tœ[0, t1], given λ1(T)=wLPL<0 and PS>0 must hold,  we consider two possible scenarios:  










for tœ[t1, T], 










 for tœ[t1, T]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 must 
hold. Therefore, Case III.2 is feasible under scenario (a). Also, given λ1(t)>0  and the 
above conditions, Case III.1 is feasible under scenario (b) when  |PS| is  large. However, 
since σ(t) is increasing in i(t) and decreasing in e(t), and since i(t) is increasing in λ1(t), 
157 
 










also holds. Therefore, Case III.2, while feasible under scenario (b), is unlikely to occur. 
 
 
Case III.3: λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≥0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)≥0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ(t1,t2]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt<0, 
tœ(t2,T]. 
First, corresponding to Cases III.1 and III.2, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] 
from Case III.3 hold. Therefore PS>0 must hold. This gives us two possible scenarios:  









σ for tœ[0, t1], 










 for tœ[0, t1]. 
For scenario (a), since at t=t1 we know λ1(t1)>0 and dλ1(t1)/dt=0. From Equation (B14), 









 Therefore, Case 
III.3 is infeasible under scenario (a). For scenario (b), given λ1(t)>0  and the above 
conditions, Case III.3 is feasible when  |PS| is  small. However, since σ(t) is increasing in 
i(t) and decreasing in e(t), and since i(t) is increasing in λ1(t), while e(t) is decreasing in 










also holds. Therefore, 
Case III.3, while feasible under scenario (b), is unlikely to occur. 
 
Case III.4: λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≥0, tœ(t1,t2] ;  λ1(t)>0, 
dλ1(t)/dt<0, tœ(t2,t3]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t3, T]. 
Based on the analysis of Cases III.1, III.2 and III.3, we know the conditions under which 
tœ(t1,T] in Case III.4 hold. Therefore, PS>0 must hold. This gives us two possible 
scenarios:  









σ for tœ[0,t1], 










 for tœ[0,t1]. 
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For scenario (a), given λ1(t)< 0  and the above conditions, Case III.4 is feasible when  |PS| 
is  small. However, since σ(t) is increasing in i(t) and decreasing in e(t), and since i(t) is 











also holds. Therefore, Case III.4, while feasible under scenario (b), is 
unlikely to occur. In addition, for scenario (b), given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, 
we know  dλ1(t)/dt>0 cannot occur. Therefore, Case III.4 is infeasible under scenario (b). 
 
In summary we have shown that Corollary 1b.III is likely to occur given the conditions 
assumed.  
 
Case IV. Assume λ1
*
(T)>0 and d λ1
*
(T)/dt>0 hold. 
From Theorem 1(i) we have 1 L Lλ (T) w P= .  Therefore, given wL>0, for λ1(T)>0 to hold 
then PL>0 must hold. From Equation (B11) for dλ1(T)/dt>0 to hold, given λ1(T)>0,  then 
λ1(T)β1e(T)>wSPS must hold. Since λ1(T)=wLPL>0 then either PS>0 or PS<0 is feasible. 
This gives us five possible solutions for λ1(t) and dλ1(t)/dt, as described below in 1-5 and 
illustrated in Figure B4. 
1. λ1(t)>0; dλ1(t)/dt>0 "tœ[0, T].  
2. λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1, T]  
3. λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1, T]  
4. λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1,t2];  
λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t2, T]. 
5. λ1(t)≥0, dλ1(t)/dt<0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ(t1,t2] ;  
λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t2,t3]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t3,T]. 
 







       
Case IV.1      Case IV.2       Case IV.3              
      
             Case IV.4     Case IV.5 
  
         Figure B4: Case IV  λ1(T)>0, dλ1(T)/dt>0 
 
Case IV.1: λ1(t)>0; dλ1(t)/dt>0 "t œ[0, T], 
Based on Equation (B14), we consider four possible scenarios based on the two possible 
solutions for PS>0 and PS<0:   










for all tœ[0, T], 










for all tœ[0, T], 










for all tœ[0, T], 






































t2 t1  t3 
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First, for scenario (a), given λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt>0 
cannot occur. Therefore, Case IV.1 is infeasible under scenario (a). Second, given λ1(t)>0  
and the above conditions, we know dλ1(t)/dt>0 is feasible under scenario (b) when  |PS| is  
small. However, since σ(t) is increasing in i(t) and decreasing in e(t), and since i(t) is 










σ also holds. Therefore, Case IV.1, while feasible under scenario (b), is 
unlikely to occur. Third, for scenario (c). Given λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, Case 
IV.1 is feasible under scenario (c) when  |PS| is  large. Lastly, for scenario (d), given 
λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt>0 must hold. Therefore, Case IV.1 
is feasible under scenario (d). 
 
Case IV.2: λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1, T]  
Based on the analysis of Case IV.1, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] in Case 
IV.2 hold. Based on Equation (B14), we consider four possible scenarios based on the 
two possible solutions for PS>0 and PS<0:   










for all tœ[0,t1], 










for all tœ[0, t1], 










for all tœ[0,t1], 










 for all tœ[0,t1]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 must 
hold. Therefore, Case IV.2 is feasible under scenario (a). Second, for scenario (b), given 
λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, Case IV.2 is feasible under scenario (b) when  |PS| is  
large.  Third, for scenario (c), given λ1(t)>0  and the above conditions, Case IV.2 is 
feasible under scenario (c) when  |PS| is small. Lastly, for scenario (d), given λ1(t)>0  and 
the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 cannot occur. Therefore, Case IV.2 is 




Case IV.3: λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 for tœ[0,t1];  λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1, T]  
Based on the analysis of Case IV.1, we know the conditions under which tœ(t1,T] in Case 
IV.3 hold. Second, at t=t1 we know λ1(t1)=0 and dλ1(t1)/dt>0. From Equation (B14), we 
know λ1(t1)=0, dλ1(t1)/dt>0, so that PS<0 must hold. This gives us two possible scenarios:  





















 for tœ[0,t1]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions we know dλ1(t)/dt>0 must hold. 
Therefore, Case IV.3 is feasible under scenario (a). In addition, for scenario (b), given 
λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, Case IV.3 is feasible under scenario (b), when  |PS| is  
large.  
 
Case IV.4: λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)≤0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t1,t2]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0, 
tœ(t2,T]. 
Corresponding to Cases IV.1 and IV.3, we know the conditions under which the 
suppositions in Case IV.4 hold for tœ(t1,T]. Therefore,  we only consider PS<0.This gives 
us two possible scenarios:  





















 for tœ[0,t1]. 
For scenario (a), given λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 cannot 
occur. Therefore, Case IV.4 is infeasible under scenario (a). For scenario (b), given 
λ1(t)<0  and the above conditions, Case IV.4 is feasible when  |PS| is  small. However, 
based on the analysis of Case IV.3, we know the conditions which hold during the 
interval tœ(t1,T]  are more likely when  |PS| is large, which contradicts Case IV.3. 




Case IV.5: λ1(t)≥0, dλ1(t)/dt<0 tœ[0,t1]; λ1(t)<0, dλ1(t)/dt≤0, tœ(t1,t2] ; λ1(t)≤0, 
dλ1(t)/dt>0, tœ(t2,t3]; λ1(t)>0, dλ1(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t3,T]. 
First, corresponding to Cases IV.1, IV.3 and IV.4, we know the conditions under which 










Given λ1(t)>0 we know  dλ1(t)/dt<0 cannot occur. Therefore, Case II.5 is infeasible. 
 
In summary we have shown that Corollary 1b.IV is likely to occur given the conditions 
assumed.  
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2. The results of Theorem 2 follow from the optimality 
conditions in Equations (B2) and (B3) . Note that if at some t∈[0,T] we obtain e(t)<0 for 
e(t) satisfying ∂H/∂e(t) = 0, then e*(t) =0 holds at that instant of time. Similarly, if we 
obtain i(t)<0 for i(t) satisfying ∂H/∂i(t) = 0, then i*(t) = 0 holds at that instant of time. 
 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2a. The results of Corollary 2a are derived from Theorem 
2. Consider e(t) such that it satisfies ∂H/∂e(t) = 0 (unconstrained). First, if e(t)>0 for all 
t∈[0,T],  then e*(t) >0 over the entire planning horizon and no stopping or starting time 
occurs. Second, if t0 exists such that: e(t)<0 for  t<t0,  e(t0)=0, and e(t)>0 for t> t0, then t0 
is an optimal starting time for exploitation. Third, if t0 exists such that: e(t)>0 for  t<t0,  
e(t0)=0, and e(t)<0 for t> t0, then t0 is an optimal stopping time for exploitation. The 
analysis for starting and stopping times for i*(t) is analogous and is omitted.  
 
PROOF OF COROLLARIES 2b and 2c. The results of Corollaries 2b and 2c follow 
from  Theorem 2. 
 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3. The results of Corollary 3 follow from  Theorem 2. 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. The results of Theorem 3 follow from differentiation of the 
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(t) (t)x − −α −λ β=  Substituting these expressions for dµ/dt  and dλ1/dt into 











+  and eliminating common terms we obtain:  
t T
0 0 0 S 0 0
0 t
τ τ)( ) ττ )i (  d w τ t) τ)dτ (t) (t i(t) ( t .( ) 
 
 λ α  µ − −α
   
β ( θ − + θ   
   
 − λ  µ
    
∫ ∫                                (B18) 
Applying the reverse time transformation to the fourth terms of Equation (B1) we obtain: 
t T
0 0 0 0
0 t
τ) τ)(t) ( τt )τ τ( .i(τ)i( ( d (t) (τ tt  d) )− ≡λ α µ  α λθ −θµ∫ ∫                                                   (B19) 
Since we know β0, ws, µ(t)>0, then substituting  Equation (B19)  into Equation (B18) and 
eliminating common terms we obtain: 0
0 0 0 S
d (t)dµ(t)









Therefore we have shown that the sum of the first two terms from Theorem 3(i) is 
negative. Given β1, σ(t)>0, we know that  de(t)/dt<0 at time tœ[0,T] holds if the sum of 
the third and fourth terms for the variance effects of exploitation is negative. Clearly, if 
both the third and fourth terms are negative then their sum is negative.  Therefore, it 
follows that  de(t)/dt<0 at time tœ[0,T] if the conditions given in the statement of 
Corollary 4a hold.  
 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4b. The proof of Corollary 4b is analogous to the proof for 
Corollary 4b.  
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Numerical Analysis  
Numerical solutions are obtained using an ordinary shooting method for a discrete 
approximation of the continuous model (Sethi and Thompson 2000). We present a subset 
of the numerical analysis which highlights six temporal ambidexterity strategies. The 
parameter settings, short-term and long-term (terminal time) objectives for each scenario 
are presented in Table B2. The optimal rates of exploration and exploitation, (i(t), e(t)), 
the instantaneous and cumulative distributed marginal values of the variance, (λ1(t), 
x1(t)), and the evolution of the mean performance and the variance (µ(t), σ(t)) over the 
planning horizon process are illustrated in Figures B1-6 below. Note that all figures are 
drawn over time, for 20 time periods (i.e., the x-axis is t). 
The probability density function for the distributed lag θ, is given by Equation 
(B20) below, where ω and κ are the Gamma distribution’s shape and scale parameters, 
respectively. The mean and variance of the probability density function are given by 
Equations (B21) and (B22) respectively. For a given shape parameter, as the scale factor 
increases, both the mean and the variance are larger. Therefore, an increasing scale factor 
represents a lagged effect in which a larger portion of the impact from investments in 
knowledge creation is realized later in the planning horizon. 
θ (x) = (xω-1e-x/κ )/Γ(ω)κω                                  (B20)     
Mean (X) = ωκ                                                                                         (B21)
Variance (X) = ωκ2                                                                                         (B22) 
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Table B2: Numerical Analysis Parameter Settings 










Θ~Gamma (ω, κ) 
Initial 
Knowledge 
1A PS = -1 
wS = 0.002 
PL = -1  
wL=0.002 
α0 = 1 
α1 = 5 
c0 = 20 
β0= 2 
β1 = 8 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 1 
μ(0)= 50 
σ(0)=  45 
1B PS = -1 
wS= 0.002 
PL = -1 
wL= 0.002 
α0 = 3 
α1 = 5 
c0 = 20 
β0= 2 
β1 = 8 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 1 
μ(0)= 50 
σ(0)=  45 
1C PS = -1 
wS= 0.002 
PL = -1 
wL= 0.002 
α0 = 2 
α1 = 5 
c0 = 20 
β0= 2 
β1 = 8 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 1 
μ(0)= 50 
σ(0)=  5 
1D PS = -1 
wS= 0.002 
PL = -1 
wL= 0.002 
α0 = 2 
α1 = 5 
c0 = 12 
β0= 2 
β1 = 8 
c1 = 30 
ω = 3 
κ = 1 
μ(0)= 50 
σ(0)=  5 
1E PS = -200 
wS = 0.00001 
PL = -1 
wL= 0.002 
α0 = 3 
α1 = 2 
c0 = 16 
β0= 3 
β1 = 3 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 0.01,  0.25 or 1 
μ(0)= 50 
σ(0)=  5 
2A PS = 1 
wS= 0.002 
PL = 1 
wL= 0.002 
α0 = 0.01 
α1 = 3 
c0 = 20 
β0= 4 
β1 = 2 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 0.01, 0.25 or 1 
μ(0)= 15 
σ(0)=  15 
2B PS = 1 
wS= 0.002 
PL = 1 
wL= 0.002 
α0 = 0.01 
α1 = 3 
c0 = 20 
β0= 4 
β1 = 2 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 1 
μ(0)= 15 
σ(0)=  5 
3 PS = 10 
wS= 0.002 
PL = -10 
wL= 0.001 
α0 = 3 
α1 = 1 
c0 = 20 
β0= 3 
β1 = 1 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 1 
μ(0)= 40 
σ(0)=  20 
4 PS = -50 
wS= 0.001 
PL = 10 
wL= 0.001 
α0 = 3 
α1 = 1 
c0 = 20 
β0= 3 
β1 = 1 
c1 = 20 
ω = 3 
κ = 1 
μ(0)= 60 





         
                            
   Instantaneous Marginal Variance, λ1(t)   Cumulative Marginal Variance, x1(t) 
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Figure B5: Case 1A Short-Term Risk Averse and Long-Term Risk Averse 
SCENARIO: Small Marginal Improvements in Mean from Exploration 
 










































                       
   Instantaneous Marginal Variance, λ1(t)               Cumulative Marginal Variance, x1(t) 
 
           
       Rates of Exploration and Exploitation       Rate of Exploration, i(t) 
*y-axis scale magnified 
 
 
              
  
                     
                   Net change in Variance, σ(t)       
 
 
Figure B6: Case 1B Short-Term Risk Averse and Long-Term Risk Averse 
SCENARIO: Large Initial Variance 
 
 
    






































Exploration, i(t) -●-  Exploitation, e(t)-□-       
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Instantaneous Marginal Variance, λ1(t)   Cumulative Marginal Variance, x1(t)             
       
                       Rates of Exploration and Exploitation              
 
    
               
            
                 
         Net change in Variance, σ(t)       
 
 
Figure B7: Case 1C Short-Term Risk Averse and Long-Term Risk Averse 
SCENARIO: Small Initial Variance 
 
    
               



























Exploration, i(t) -●-       Exploitation, e(t)-□-       
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Instantaneous Marginal Variance, λ1(t)      Cumulative Marginal Variance, x1(t) 
          
       
             
                 Rates of Exploration and Exploitation    
     
 
 
              
              
                          




Figure B8: Case 1D Short-Term Risk Averse and Long-Term Risk Averse 










































   
Rates of Exploration i(t) and Exploitation e(t)  





Figure B9: Case 1E Short-Term Risk Averse and Long-Term Risk Averse 
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No Lag     -□- ω = 3;  κ = 0.01 
Small Lag -●- ω = 3;  κ = 0.25 
Large Lag  -o- ω = 3;  κ = 1 
Exploration, i(t) -●-        Exploitation, e(t)-□-       
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Figure B10: Case 2A Short-Term Risk Seeking and Long-Term Risk Seeking 



































































































































No Lag     -□- ω = 3;  κ = 0.01 
Small Lag -●- ω = 3;  κ = 0.25 
Large Lag  -o- ω = 3;  κ = 1 
Exploration, i(t) -●-       Exploitation, e(t)-□-       
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Figure B11: Case 2B Short-Term Risk Seeking and Long-Term Risk Seeking 
SCENARIO:  Small Variance 
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Figure B12: Case 3 Short Term Risk Seeking and Long Term Risk Averse 
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Figure B13: Case 4 Short Term Risk Averse and Long Term Risk Seeking   
 

































Table C1: Model Notation 
t Time, t∈[0,T]: 0 (T) denotes the start (end) of the planning horizon. 
Parameters for Focal Firm, j=1 
i(t) Rate of exploration efforts at time t, i(t)≥0; control variable. 
e(t) Rate of exploitation efforts at time t, e(t)≥0; control variable. 
µ(t) Mean technical performance at time t, µ(t)≥0; µ(0) given; state variable. 
σ(t) Variance technical performance at time t, σ(t) ≥0; σ(0) given; state variable. 
v(t) Random variable indicating the innovation’s technical performance at time t; 
v(t)∼N(µ(t),σ(t)). 
α0 (α1) Marginal impact of exploration on the mean (variance); α0 (α1)>0. 
β0 (β1) Marginal impact of exploitation on the mean (variance); β0 (β1)>0. 
y Degree of participation in exploration knowledge-sharing alliance  
g Degree of participation in exploitation knowledge-sharing alliance 
c Parameter indicating marginal cost of exploration. 
c Parameter indicating marginal cost of exploitation. 
lμ(t) Marginal value to the focal firm of a unit increase in the mean of its technical 
performance at time t. 
lσ(t) Marginal value to the focal firm of a unit increase in the variance of its 
technical performance at time t. 
lM(t) Marginal value to the focal firm of a unit increase in the mean of the rival’s 
technical performance at time t. 
lS(t) Marginal value to the focal firm of a unit increase in the variance of the 
rival’s technical performance at time t. 
Parameters for Rival Firm, j=2 
I(t) Rate of exploration efforts at time t, I(t)≥0; control variable. 
E(t) Rate of exploitation efforts at time t, E(t)≥0; control variable. 
M(t) Mean technical performance at time t, M(t)≥0; M(0) given; state variable. 
S(t) Variance technical performance at time t, S(t)≥0; S(0)  given; state variable. 
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V(t) Random variable indicating the innovation’s technical performance at time t; 
V(t)∼N(M(t),S(t)). 
a0 (a1) Marginal impact of exploration on the mean (variance); a0 (a1)>0. 
b0 (b1) Marginal impact of exploitation on the mean (variance); b0 (b1)>0. 
X Degree of participation in exploration knowledge-sharing alliance  
Y Degree of participation in exploitation knowledge-sharing alliance 
C Parameter indicating marginal cost of exploration. 
C Parameter indicating marginal cost of exploitation. 
LM(t) Marginal value to the rival firm of a unit increase in the mean of its technical 
performance at time t. 
LS(t) Marginal value to the rival firm of a unit increase in the variance of its 
technical performance at time t. 
Lμ(t) Marginal value to the rival firm of a unit increase in the mean of the focal 
firm’s technical performance at time t. 
Lσ(t) Marginal value to the rival firm of a unit increase in the variance of the focal 







The Hamiltonian function, H, is given below for j=1. The Hamiltonian for j=2 is 
analogous.   
( ) ( )











I E I E
(t) (t)
(t) (t) (t) (t) (t)S t) (t)S
(t) a (t)
H 1/2c i 1/2c e
i e i e t)
b (t) b (t)(t) (t) a (t)σ (t)σ
−
=− −






      
Lagrangian 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is given below for j=1. The Lagrangian for j=2 
is analogous. 
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∂L/∂e(t)=0              (C5)
  
∂L/∂i(t)=0               (C6) 
ησ(t)σ(t)=0;  ηS(t)S(t)=0;                                                 (C7)  
ησ(t)≥0; ηS(t)≥0             (C8)  
dησ(t)/dt<0; ηS(t)/dt<0      (C9)               
σ(t)>0;  S(t)>0                             (C10) 




Note that these non-negative constraints and optimality conditions ensure σ(t),S(t)>0 
hold. However, for simplicity in the remainder of the paper, we assume σ(t),S(t)>0 hold. 
Therefore, we optimize the Hamiltonian and do not consider the Lagrangian (i.e., ησ(t), 
ηS(t)=0 for all tœ[0,T]). Lastly, for the sufficiency condition given in Feichtinger and 
Jørgensen (1983) to hold in an exploration knowledge-sharing alliance where g=0 and 
Y=0, then the following condition must be satisfied for the focal firm j=1:                     
(X-1)a0λµ(t)+(2X-1)a1λσ(t)S
X<0. (Analogous conditions exist for firm j=2, and for the 
exploitation knowledge-sharing alliance where y=0 and X=0.) Although we are not able 
to analytically prove that the sufficiency conditions hold, in extensive numerical analysis 
in which each input parameter was varied over a wide range of values, there was not a 
single solution in which sufficiency was violated. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1. The results of Theorem 1 follow from the optimality conditions in 
Equations  (C1)-(C6) and (C11) given ησ(t), ηS(t)=0, for tœ[0,T]). Note that Theorem 1 
focuses on the scenario where g=0,Y=0.  
 
Proof of Corollary 1A. We know that g=0, Y=0 and Equation (3) hold. From Equations 
(3), (8) and (9), we obtain:  
λσ(T)>0, dλσ(T)/dt>0,  λS(T)<0 and dλS(T)/dt<0.                 (C12) 
Also from Equations (8) and (9), we observe that λσ(t) and λS(t) must be solved 
simultaneously. This gives us the following for any tœ[0,T]: 
If  λσ(t)>0 then dλS(t)/dt<0.         (C13i) 
If  λS(t)>0 then dλσ(t)/dt<0.         (C13ii) 
If  λσ(t)<0 then dλS(t)/dt>0.                   (C13iii) 
If  λS(t)<0 then dλσ(t)/dt>0.                   (C13iv) 
If  λσ(t)=0 then dλS(t)/dt=0.         (C13v) 




Lastly, given Equation (C12) and the conditions in (C13i)-(C13vi) above, we obtain the 
following pairs of solutions for λσ(t) and λS(t), for tœ[0,T] depicted in Figure C1: 
Case 1A-I: λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,T]. 
Case 1A-II: λσ(t)≤0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1]; λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, 
λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt<0 for tœ(t1,T]. 
Case 1A-III: λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)≥0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t1]; λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt>0, 
λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ(t1,T]. 
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The only other solutions that satisfy the conditions for λσ(T) and dλσ(T)/dt given in 
Equation (C12) are illustrated in Figure C2 below.  
 
           
Case IV      Case V 
  
Figure C2: Possible solutions for λσ(t) 
 
Consider the solution for λσ(t) shown in Figure C2. With λσ(t)<0  and dλσ(t)/dt<0  for 
tœ[0,t3), from Equations (C13ii) and (C13iii) we obtain λS(t)>0  and dλS(t)/dt>0 for  
tœ[0,t3). In addition, with λσ(t3)<0 and dλσ(t3)=0, from Equations  (C13iii) and (C13vi) we 
obtain  λS(t3)=0 and dλS(t3)/dt>0. However, since λ
*
S(t) is a continuous function over all 
tœ[0,T] these conditions cannot occur. Therefore the solution for λσ(t) illustrated in Figure 
C2-IV cannot occur. Similarly, it can be shown that the solution for λσ(t) illustrated in 
Figure C2-V cannot occur. 
 
In conclusion, the only solutions of  λσ(t) and dλS(t) for tœ[0,T], corresponding to the 
conditions given in Corollary 1A can occur. QED 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1B. We know that g=0, Y=0 and Equation (4) holds. From Equations 
(4), (8) and (9), we obtain:  
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Since λσ(t) and λS(t) must hold simultaneously, then by analogous reasoning to Corollary 
1A, there are three possible solutions for both λσ(t) and λS(t) which are continuous 
functions for tœ[0,T]: 
Case 1B-I: λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,T]. 
Case 1B-II: λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)≤0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1] and λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt<0, 
λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ(t1,T]. 
Case 1B-III: λσ(t)≥0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t2] and λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, 
λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt>0 for tœ(t2,T]. 
 
           
Case 1B-I 
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Proof of Theorem 2. The results of Theorem 2 follow from the optimality conditions in 
Equations (C5) and (C6) and non-negativity constraints on ij(t) and ej(t) and with y=0, 
X=0. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2A. We know that  y=0, X=0 and Equation (3) holds. From 
Equations (3), (12) and (13), we obtain the following:  
λσ(T)>0, dλσ(T)/dt≤0, λS(T)<0 and dλS(T)/dt≥0.                   (C15) 
Since λσ(t) and λS(t) must hold simultaneously, then by analogous reasoning to Corollary 
1A, there are three possible solutions for both λσ(t) and λS(t) which are continuous 
functions for tœ[0,T]: 
Case 2A-I: λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,T]. 
Case 2A-II: λσ(t)≤0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1]; λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, 
λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt<0 for tœ(t1,T]. 
Case 2A-III: λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)≥0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t1]; λσ(t)>0, dλσ(t)/dt>0, 
λS(t)<0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ(t1,T]. 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 2B. We know that  y=0, X=0 and Equation (4) holds. From 
Equations (4), (12) and (13), we obtain the following:  
λσ(T)<0, dλσ(T)/dt≤0, λS(T)>0 and dλS(T)/dt≥0                               (C16) 
Since λσ(t) and λS(t) must hold simultaneously, then by analogous reasoning to Corollary 
1A, there are three possible solutions for both λσ(t) and λS(t) which are continuous 
functions for tœ[0,T]: 
Case 2B-I: λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,T]. 
Case 2B-II: λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≥0, λS(t)≤0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ[0,t1] and λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt<0, 
λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≥0 for tœ(t1,T]. 
Case 2B-III: λσ(t)≥0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, λS(t)>0, dλS(t)/dt≤0 for tœ[0,t2] and λσ(t)<0, dλσ(t)/dt≤0, 





Table C2: Numerical Analysis Parameter Settings 
  
FOCAL FIRM PARAMETERS 
 
RIVAL FIRM PARAMETERS 
 α0 α1 c0 β0 β1 c1 µ(0) 
 
σ(0) y g a0 a1 C0 b0 b1 C1 M(0) 
 
S(0) X Y 
1B-I 1 1 20 1 1 20 1 1 0.6 0.6 1 1 20 1 1 20 1 1 0.6 0.6 
1B-II/III 10 1 4 1 1 20 1 1 0.6 0.6 1 1 20 1 1 20 1 1 0.6 0.6 
 
   
     
  
Figure C4: Case 1B-I 
 






FOCAL FIRM - Marginal Own Variance , l1HtL






FOCAL FIRM - Marginal Rival 's Variance , L1HtL







FOCAL FIRM - Exploration iHtL






FOCAL FIRM - Exploitation eHtL
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Figure C5: Case 1B-II for firm j=1 and Case 1B-III for firm j=2 
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RIVAL FIRM Exploitation EHtL
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Figure C5 (continued): Case 1B-II for firm j=1 and Case 1B-III for firm j=2 
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